
THE ADVAITA CONCEPT OF FALSITY—
A CRITICAL STUDY

By

NIROD BARAN CHAKRABORTY, M. A., D. Phil.
Honorary Fellow, Sanskrit College Seminar, Calcutta
and
Assistant Professor of Philosophy, Presidency College, Calcutta.



SANSKRIT COLLEGE
CALCUTTA
1967

Published by

The Principal, Sanskrit College,

1, Bankim Chatterjee Street, Calcutta-12

Price: Rs. 10·00

Printed by

S. Mukherjee, Superintendent, Government Printing,

West Bengal Government Press, Alipore, Calcutta-27

CALCUTTA SANSKRIT COLLEGE RESEARCH SERIES, NO. LVII

Published under the auspices of the Government of West Bengal

STUDIES NO. 36

THE ADVAITA CONCEPT OF FALSITY— A CRITICAL STUDY



SANSKRIT COLLEGE
CALCUTTA
1967

Calcutta Sanskrit College Research Series

CONTENTS

To

My respected teachers

Professor GOPINATH BHATTACHARYA

and

Doctor KALIDAS BHATTACHARYA.

FOREWORD

According to the Monistic Vedānta, this world of ours has been declared to be false—i.e., neither real nor unreal, it being a product of nescience which is superinduced upon the foundational reality of the Absolute. The Absolute, which is essentially a self-luminous principle, does not require the aid of any proof for its existence. But the falsity of nescience and its product requires to be carefully studied and interpreted. Madhusūdana Sarasvatī, the author of that *magnum opus*, the *Advaitasiddhi*, has examined the concept of falsity with his trenchant logic and his observations are held to be the last words on the subject.

It is a pleasure that Dr. Chakraborty, who was once our research student, attached to the Post-graduate training and Research Department, has undertaken a difficult task of critically studying the Advaita concept of falsity. His first hand acquaintance with the cardinal texts on the subject has enabled him to present an intricate subject to all lovers of Monistic Vedanta. I am particularly happy that he has introduced in course of his discussions the relative Western views wherever necessary.

Sanskrit College,
Calcutta.
July, 1967

GAURINATH SASTRI

FOREWORD

According to the Monistic Vedānta, this world of ours has been declared to be false—i.e., neither real nor unreal, it being a product of nescience which is superinduced upon the foundational reality of the Absolute. The Absolute, which is essentially a self-luminous principle, does not require the aid of any proof for its existence. But the falsity of nescience and its product requires to be carefully studied and interpreted. Madhusūdana Sarasvatī, the author of that *magnum opus*, the *Advaitasiddhi*, has examined *the concept of falsity with his trenchant logic and his observations* are held to be the last words on the subject.

It is a pleasure that Dr. Chakraborty, who was once our research student, attached to the Post-graduate training and Research Department, has undertaken a difficult task of critically studying the Advaita concept of falsity. His first hand acquaintance with the cardinal texts on the subject has enabled him to present an intricate subject to all lovers of Monistic Vedanta. I am particularly happy that he has introduced in course of his discussions the relative Western views wherever necessary.

Sanskrit College,
Calcutta.
July, 1967

GAURINATH SASTRI

PREFACE

The Advaita Metaphysics entails the falsity of the world. The unobjective and non-subjective consciousness as the only reality cannot be established unless the world is proved false. So the concept of falsity occupies a uninque position in Advaita philosophy. Moreover, consciousness which is the only reality in Advaita Vedānta requires no positive proof as it is self-luminous (Svayamprakāśa). So, the only possible proof for Advaita will be the proof for the falsity of the world. These are the reasons why we have taken up 'the concept of falsity' first for our discussion when we are out to study the fundamentals of Advaita. We expect to discuss the other important Advaita concepts in our later publications.

In our present discussion we have mainly followed 'Advaita Siddhi' with Brahmānanda's annotation on it. 'Advaita Siddhi', acctually speaking, represents the answer of Madhusūdana Sarasvati, the famous advaitin, to the polemics of Vyāsarājatītha and Śaṃkara miśra against the Advaita metaphysics and its implications. Vyāsarājatīrtha was the champion of Mādhva dualism which is one of the bitterest enemies of Advaita Vedānta. Śaṃkara Miśra tried to refute the Advaita position with the help of the Nyāya of new school. 'Advaita Siddhi' negatively implies the refutation of the Mādhva and the Nyāya charges against Advaita and positively it implies the establishment of Advaita in its pristine purity. We have specially chosen 'Advaita Siddhi' as the basis of our discourse for it represents the best arguments for Advaita and against its antagonists—the Mādhavas and the Naiyāyikas.

'Advaita Siddhi' is one of the most difficult treatises in Indian philosophy and it is a very difficult task even to translate it. Our thesis does not represent any varbatim translation of 'Advaita Siddhi'. It may be regarded as a free representation and interpretation of the discussion on falsity as we get it in this book. Here I must express my sincere gratitude to Late M. M. Jogendranath Tarka Vedāntatīrtha who was kind enough to take me through 'Advaita Siddhi' and other important Advaita texts. But for his kind and affectionate assistance it would not have been possible for me to make any head or tail of the difficult treatises of Advaita.

Here it requires mention that Dr. Anil Kumar Roy Choudhury published a book *'Self and falsity in Advaita Vedānta'* where the concept of falsity was discussed. Our venture on the same concept has its justification in the sense that Dr. Roy Choudhury has not discussed all the different definitions of falsity. There are, in all, five alternative definitions of falsity of which only three have been discussed in Dr. Roy Choudhury's book. We have discussed all the five difinitions of falsity. The simple assertion 'The world is false' cannot silence the critics of Advaita. They will further urge—is this falsity false? or is it true? If the falsity of the world is false, the world becomes real and in that case the world will be the second real prnciple as against consciousness. This implies dualism and the negation of Advaita. If the falsity is true, then this falsity will be the second real principle in addition to consciousness which is admittedly real. This also entails dualism and the refutation of non-dualism. So, the establishment of Advaita presupposes the refutation of this dilemma. This is why we think that any discussion on falsity without a discussion on the falsity of the false is incomplete and inadequate. We think, we shall not make an unjustified claim if we consider our treatise as a supplement to Dr. Roy Choudhury's book.

We have also added an introduction to establish the falsity of the world on independent reasoining. Sometimes it is said that Advaita metaphysics has only textual basis and it cannot be established on any logical consideration. Therefore, the critics urge that Advaita may at best be a religion with spiritual significance but it is no philosophy with logical support for it. Our claim is that Advaita is undoubtedly a system of philosophy and it is no less logical than any other philosophical system of the world. We have tried to substantiate our claim by showing that the falsity of the world which is the necessary corollary of Advaita may be established at least from three different logical approaches. We have also added a discussion on 'Place of reasoning in Advaita philosophy' in order to refute the charges of alogism and supernaturalism against Advaita. We have also tried to justify our selection of 'Advaita Siddhi' as the basis of our discourse on a short account of the history of Advaita literature where this treatise occupies a unique position.

People are sometimes found to say that Advaita is old and dead

and any discussion on it in this twentieth century means waste of time. Here, our answer will be two-fold. First, Philosophy enquires into truth. Truth knows no age and country and moreover it does not become untrue simply because it is old. So, a philosophical discussion on Advaita is not unwarranted even in this twentieth century. Secondly, Advaita philosophy appears to be dead as it is propagated in such a language which is not intelligible to all. If it can be expressed in modern philosophical terminology, the pulse of its life will surely be felt even to-day. The rich treasure of Sanskrit language where the jem of Advaita speculation lies hidden should be unearthed and brought to light so that its lustre may be visible to all who are interested in intrinsic and eternal values. Ours is an humble attempt in this direction and we hope that others also who are interested in Indian philosophy and eternal verities will follow the same path.

It has been a fashion with some of the modern thinkers to decry all forms of metaphysical speculation. Logical positivists, of late, have attacked metaphysics in the most emphatic way and we think that any metaphysical discussion in the modern period without a prior criticism of logical positivism will be unjustified and unsatisfactory. So, we like to refute logical positivism in order to prove the usefulness of metaphysical speculation.

The Logical positivists demonstrate the meaninglessness of metaphysics on the basis of their peculiar conception of Meaning. This conception was first introduced by Ludwig wittgenstein in his famous book 'Tractatus Logico—Philosophicus'* and later on it was accepted by the Logical positivists like Ayer, Morris, Carnap and Neurath.

* Wittgenstein in his later book 'Philosophical Investigations' (Published first in 1953 and then in 1958 (as revised) by Basil Blackwell, Oxford) gives up his earlier views expressed in the Tractatus. His conception of Language and of fact undergo a behaviorist and relativist transformation here. Philosophical problems, he holds now, cannot be solved by empirical observation, but are to be desolved by looking into and describing all kinds of uses of the trouble making words in the various contexts where they are ordinarily found. "We must", he says, "do away with all explanation and description alone must take its place." We must describe the uses of different words and tabulate rules as in grammar. Philosophy thus becomes a kind of Grammar. Here it is interesting to note that Russell an admirer of early Wittgenstein complains about 'Investigations. 'I do not understand why a whole school finds wisdom in its pages' (My Philosophical Development, p. 216).

Wittgenstein points out that language is the symbolic representation of facts experienced. It can be analysed into meaningful assertions or propositions, and all propositions, in turn, can be analysed into some elementary propositions. Every elementary proposition, Wittgenstein holds, is a picture of some atomic fact experienced.[1] The world of reality, he adds, is composed of such facts and can be completely analysed into them.

From the previous analysis it is clear that all propositions are completely analysable into elementary propositions which are the pictures of the facts of the world of experience. This implies that the ultimate referents or contents of propositions are empirical facts. From this it follows that a proposition which does not refer to any fact of experience is no proposition at all as it fails to fulfil its purpose, the purpose being the expression of some sense by revealing an empirical fact.[2] It thus becomes a non-sensical proposition or a meaningless expression. The sense of a proposition lies in its reference to a possible empirical fact.

Wittgenstein's conception of meaning is expressed by the dictum 'The sense of a proposition is the method of its verification.' According to this conception of meaning, the truth of a proposition lies in its reference to a fact which can be expected to be observed. The method of verifying the proposition is also to experience such facts. Thus the experience which can verify a proposition is also that which constitutes its sense.

The logical positivists make use of this verificational theory of meaning for showing the futility of metaphysical speculation. To them, metaphysics means a discussion of reality lying beyond experience. The 'fundamental postulate of metaphysics' is that there is a superphonomenal reality. As all significant propositions are utlimately reducible to empirically verifiable elementary propositions, so, propositions having no reference to empirical facts are meaningless. Metaphysical propositions always ultimately refer to the existence of unverifible, trans-empirical entities. They are, therefore,

1 'The proposition is a picture of reality'—Tractatus, p. 63 (Kegan Paul ed, 1933)

2 'This proposition has such and such a sense'—'This proposition represents such and such a staff of affairs'—Ibid, p. 69

non-sensical. Such propositions are not really propositions at all. They represent certain non-sensical expressions.[1]

From this it is evident that the Logical positivistic attack on metaphysical speculation is based on their peculiar concept of meaning. If we can show that their concept of meaning itself is non-sensical, their charge against metaphysics will be easily refuted.

The dictum 'the meaning of a proposition is the method of its verification' is itself non-sensical as it does not assert any experiencable fact, nor is it reducible to simple factual propositions, nor does it refer to any matter of fact which can be observed to verify its truth. Some logical positivists do admit this. But they call it an important type of non-sense. This shows that the foundamental assumption of Logical positivists itself is defective. This again proves that their attack on metaphysics based on this assumption cannot be faultless.[2]

This conception of meaning also involves a vicious circle. The truth of a proposition lies in the experience of the fact referred to and again the truth is known through the same experience. This vicious circle cannot be avoided and hence the conception itself which involves this circle is to be rejected. This rejection again implies the veracity of metaphysical speculation.

Moreover, it may be said that logical positivists have arbitrarily confined their notion of experience to sense-experience. Of course, Carnap in his recent writings does not overlook mystical experience. But strangely enough such recognition also does not bring about any change in his fundamental outlook. This again is entirely unjustified. If mystical experience also is recognised as a form of experience then unobjective and non-subjective consciousness which has its glimpse in deep sleep and which is entirely realised in mystical experience cannot be non-sense. And in that case any discussion on Advaita holding unobjective and non-subjective consicioness as the sole reality cannot be meanigles. This justifies our present discussion on the Advaita concept of falsity.

We do not believe in arbitrary division of philosophy into Eastern and Western. We are of opinion that philosophical problems

---

1 Ayer: Demonstration of the impossibility of metaphysics. Mind, July, 1934

2. 'To say metaphysics is nonsense is nonsense.—Waismann, Contemporary British Philosophy 3rd Series, p. 489

are almost the same always and everywhere irrespective of any age and clime. Therefore, in our discussion, we have not been confined to so called Indian Philosophy only, on the other hand, we have also brought in the views of the Westerners, wherever necessary, in order to make the discussion coplete and comprehensive.

At the end, I must express my sincere gratitude to my respected teacher Dr. Kalidas Bhattacharya, the present Vice-chancellor of the Visva Bharati University who has been kind enough to go through the manscripts and suggest changes here and there, which have always been for the better. I also gratefully acknowledge my indebtedness to the erudite patron of Sanskrit learning, Dr. Gauri Nath Sastri, *the present Principal of Sanskrit College, Calcutta for* arranging the publication of my book and for his scholarly foreward which has encouraged me much. My special thanks are due to Sri Nani Gopal Tarkatirtha, Editor, Publication Department of Sanskrit College, Calcutta for the expeditious publication of my book.

Presidency College,
Calcutta,
30th June, 1967.

NIROD BARAN CHAKRABORTY

THE ADVAITA CONCEPT OF FALSITY—A CRITICAL STUDY

INTRODUCTION

The Concept of Falsity—Why and how far it is necessary for the Advaita Thesis

(In Advaita Philosophy Reality is one without a second and that is Brahman. the great. The non-duality of reality cannot be established, if the world cannot be shown false. This is why the concept of falsity is so important in Advaita literature. Now, falsity does not mean unreality. The false is that which is other than reality and unreality. Reality is consciousness as such. The Unreal cannot appear at all. As the world is other than consciousness, so it is other than reality. Again, the world appears, so it is not unreal either. (The. Advaitins never deny the objectivity and the externality of the world. To the Advaitins, the world has both objectivity and externality; but it has no reality at all.) Persistence or non-temporality is the criterion of reality. The world is temporal and transitory, so it is not real. But the objects of the world are not mere subjective ideas. The Vijñānavāda Buddhists of the East and Berkeley in the West, think that the external objects are nothing but internal ideas. Śaṁkara himself has refuted such subjective Idealism in his commentary on Brahma sutra.[1] He thinks that (an idea without an object cannot be conceived at all. (The idea and its object are inseparable correlatives.) So the superiority of an idea over an object, as the subjective idealists think cannot be admitted at all. (The idea and its object sail in the same boat.) Moreover, we perceive objects as external and out there in the world. The delivaernce of our clear perception cannot be denied. So, the objectivity and the externality of the objects must be admitted.

And, again, our waking experience cannot be equated with dream experience But on the admission that the objects of the world are internal ideas, such an equation becomes a necessity. So, the objects can never be mere subjective ideas. Here the question arises—why is waking experience not at par with dream experience? The answer is obvious. (Dream experience is entirely private and subjective. All men do not dream the same dream and at the same time. But waking experience is more or less uniform and universal All men have more or less the same waking experience. So the uniformity and universality of waking experience will differentiate it from dream experience.)

But are the objects of waking experience,—objects which are external and objective—real also? Śaṁkara will say—no; the objects have objectivity without reality. Why are they not real? They are not real as they are not eternal. Eternality is the other name of reality. The non-eternality of the world is, therefore, its falsity. Falsity, in other words, means, in Advaita literature, non-eternality. Now, we think that falsity in this sense is a necessary concept for a system of philosophy which would claim to be self-consistent. This may be shown at least in three different ways. There may be an approach from the stand-point of the nature of Reality. The second approach may be based

[1] 2/2/28 to 2/2/30 Brahma Sutra.

The Concept of Falsity—Why and how far it is necessary for the Advaita Thesis

In Advaita Philosophy Reality is one without a second and that is Brahman. the great. The non-duality of reality cannot be established, if the world cannot be shown false. This is why the concept of falsity is so important in Advaita literature. Now, falsity does not mean unreality. The false is that which is other than reality and unreality. Reality is consciousness as such. The Unreal cannot appear at all. As the world is other than consciousness, so it is other than reality. Again, the world appears, so it is not unreal either. The Advaitins never deny the objectivity and the externality of the world. To the Advaitins, the world has both objectivity and externality; but it has no reality at all. Persistence or non-temporality is the criterion of reality. The world is temporal and transitory, so it is not real. But the objects of the world are not mere subjective ideas. The Vijñānavāda Buddhists of the East and Berkeley in the West, think that the external objects are nothing but internal ideas. Śaṁkara himself has refuted such subjective Idealism in his commentary on Brahma sutra.[1] He thinks that an idea without an object cannot be conceived at all. The idea and its object are inseparable correlatives. So the superiority of an idea over an object, as the subjective idealists think cannot be admitted at all. The idea and its object sail in the same boat. Moreover, we perceive objects as external and out there in the world. The delivaernce of our *clear perception cannot* be denied. So, the objectivity and the externality of the objects must be admitted.

And, again, our waking experience cannot be equated with dream experience. But on the admission that the objects of the world are internal ideas, such an equation becomes a necessity. So, the objects can never be mere subjective ideas. Here the question arises—why is waking experience not at par with dream experience? The answer is obvious. Dream experience is entirely private and subjective. All men do not dream the same dream and at the same time. But waking experience is more or less uniform and universal. All men have more or less the same waking experience. So the uniformity and universality of waking experience will differentiate it from dream experience.

But are the objects of waking experience,—objects which are external and objective—real also? *Śaṁkara will say—no*; the objects have objectivity without reality. Why are they not real? They are not real as they are not eternal. Eternality is the other name of reality. The non-eternality of the world is, therefore, its falsity. Falsity, in other words, means, in *Advaita literature*, non-eternality. Now, we think that falsity in this sense is a necessary concept for a system of philosophy which would claim to be self-consistent. This may be shown at least in three different ways. There may be an approach from the stand-point of the nature of Reality. The second approach may be based

---

[1] 2/2/28 to 2/2/30 Brahma Sutra.

on an analysis of the concept of causation and the third approach may be understood from the stand-point of the peculiarity of subjectivity. Here, of course, we should remember that in this context necessity means logical necessity.

I. *There may be different theories of Reality—Pluralism, Dualism* and Monism. The pluralist believes in a plurality of reals. There are many things-quite a *legion-constituting what we call the world*, and if they are also related with one another, every such realtion is contingent in the sense that the reals have each a being of its own even as conceived apart from its relations. Leibnitz in the West and Nyāya Vaiśeṣika in the East may be regarded as representative pluralists. We can easily show that neither of them, and indeed (no pluralist, has given a satisfactory account of the world.)

Leibnitz thinks that neither the atoms of the atomist nor the mathematical *points of Descartes can be regarded as ultimate reals. The ultimate reals*, Leibnitz holds, must be indivisible. Now the atoms exist, but they are not ultimately *real as they are not indivisible. Atoms are the smallest parts of the material* objects. As the parts of objects the atoms are extended and so they are divisible. *And again the matehmatical points of Descartes are no doubt indivisible as they* are unextended, but they are not reals at all as they are only certain abstractions of thought. *A mathematical point which has niether length nor* breadth cannot be regarded as anything real. So, Leibnitz places the indivisibility of mathematical points and the reality of atoms against one another and finds out (monads or spiritual atoms which are both indivisible and real.) (Consciousness and activity constitute the very essence of monads.) Now the monads are self dependent and so they are independent of one another. The monads are said to be windowless in the sense that no external influence is exerted on the monads, nor can the monads exert any influence upon one another. Now consciousness and activity are not to be found in the same degree in all the monads. According to the degree of presence of consciousness and activity, monads have been graded in three forms—Unconscious, Conscious and Self-conscious. In unconscious monads consciousness and activity are to be found in such a low degree that they are not felt at all. We may say that here consciousness and activity are not patent and explicit, but latent and implicit. In conscious monads, consciousness and activity exist in a greater degree than they are found in unconscious monads. In the self-conscious monad consciousness and activity exist in the highest degree. All the objects of this universe are due to these monads of different forms. Now this world exhibits different marks of harmony. The world is a harmonious system of nicely adjusted objects and not a whole of disconnected parts. Actually speaking the world is a cosmos and not a chaos. How, can this harmony of the world be explained then ? Leibnitz here tells us that the harmony of the monads is responsible for the harmony of the world. How, then, is there the harmony of the monads ? Leilenitz says that it is pre-established in the sense that the monads are harmonised from the very beginning. Now, how is this harmony possible ? Here Leibnitz falls back upon

God for his rescue. He thinks that God is the author of pre-established harmony. Is God, then, anything beyond and above the monads? Leibnitz says that God is the 'Monad of monads' in the sense that He is the supreme monad. The supremacy of God over other monads is recognised by Leibnitz. This shows that Leibnitz exhibited definite tendencies towards monism in his later philosopy. But this is an inconsistency in Leibnitz. He began his philosophy as a pluralist but being driven by the logic of sequence he later on admitted monism accepting the supremacy of God over other monads. There is yet another difficulty also in his philosophy. On his own admission monads are incapable of exerting any influence upon one another. Now God being the Monads of monads cannot also be an exception. So, God cannot establish any harmony amongst the monads, as it requires interference in the activity of the monads. Now, if God cannot be the author of preestablished harmony, who will be the author of it? Leibnitz has no ready answer for it. Actually speaking the dualism of the monads as the material cause and God as the efficient cause of this universe is not tenable at all.

Nyāya Vaiśeṣika pluralism cannot give us a better solution than this. The Nyāya Vaiśeṣikas think that the materil atoms are the ultimate particles of this universe. Two atoms come together and produce a binary, three binaries a tertiary and in this way a complete object is produced. Now the atoms being unconscious cannot by themselves come together to produce an object. Some conscious guidance for the atoms is to be admitted. Of course, the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣikas believe in the guidance by adrsta (the unseen principle which arises out of the acts of a person and accumulates). But this adṛsta, again, is unconscious. So the guidance by (in simple language, the causality of) adṛsta is no explanation of the origination of the world. It is a favourite doctrine, inductively arrived at, of Nyāya-vaiśeṣika and Vedānta alike that every effect must be due to a conscious agent. The inductive ground for this is that no effect can be pointed out which is *undisputably* not due to a conscious agent and there are quite a number of effects which are *undisputably* due to a conscious agent. Adṛsta being unconcious cannot therefore adequately explain the origination of the world. A conscious agent has to be postulated even if this favourite doctrine is challenged. Sāṅkhya, e.g., which does not admit this doctrine has yet recognised conscious self as that whom the world as harmonious must subserve. With suitable modifications Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika would also accept this position. It would argue that as the world is harmonious it must be due to the guidance of a conscious agent. A harmonious thing cannot be the product of blind chance. There must be some conscious agent that has guided the combination of elements into the har- mony. This conscious agent, in Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika, is God. He has fashioned the atoms in different ways and hence the systemic world has come to exist. But then, there arises a dualism between God and the atoms. The atoms being independent of God limit Him and in that case His infinity is lost. And again the combination itself of the atoms is not intelligible as the combination of the atoms implies their contact

and contact is possible only in two particular parts of the objects of contact. The atoms being partless cannot be in the relation of contact at all. Again it is said that an atom though different from a binary is that in which the binary inheres. But is the relation of inherence at all intelligible ?[1] The relation of inherence is definitely different from the terms related. So it requires another relation to be related with the terms and this again will require another relation and in this way there will be an indefinite regress. But the Vaiśesika is supposed to reply that the so-called Samavāya relation (inherence) is eternally connected *with the things between which it exists, so there is no possibility of indefinite* regress. We think that their defence is unavailing, for it would involve the admission that conjunction (Saṁyoga)[2] also as being connected with the things which it joins does, like Samavāya, not require another connection. But the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣikas say that *conjunction does require another connection because* it is a different thing. Here we may reply that then Samavāya also requires another connection because it is likewise a different thing. Nor can the Nyāya Vaiśeṣikas say that conjunction requires another connection because it is a quality (guna), and Samavāya does not as it is not a quality ; for in spite of this difference) the reason for another connection is the same in both the cases. It is the absolute difference of Samavāya and Saṁyoga from the terms which they relate. To be what is technically called 'quality' cannot be the reason in question.

It follows that those who admit Samavāya to be a separate existence are driven to a regressus ad infinitum and so how a binary can inhere in two atoms cannot be understood. For this reason also the atomic doctrine of the Nyāya Vaiśeṣikas is inadmissible.

Now as pluraism is proved to be untenable, we may turn to Dualism as a theory of reality and see whether it is more tenable. According to the dualistic scheme of the universe, there is a dualism between matter and spirit and this dualistic hypothesis can solve the riddle of the Universe. We may take Descartes of the West and the Sāṁkhya philosopher of the East as the representative dualists and so their difficulties will show the difficulties of dualism itself.

Matter and Mind, in the Philosophy of Descartes, are regarded as distinct and separate substances. Matter is extended and unconscious whereas Mind is unextended and conscious. So, actually speaking there is an antagonism between the two. But curiously enough Descartes tells us that there is an inter action between mind and matter in the sense that mind acts on body and body acts on mind. But we cannot understand how two opposed principles like mind and

---

[1] Śāriraka Bhāṣya 2/2/13.

[2] Conjunction is a temporary relation between two things which can exist separately. The relation between a man and the chair when he sits on it is a case of conjunction. The man can exist apart from the chair and the chair also can exist apart from the man. They are only accidentally related to one another,

body can interact in any intelligible way. Now, if there can be no intelligible relation between mind and matter, they fall apart from one another and we cannot understand how knowledge is possible at all. Knowledge is a relation between a subject and an object, the subject being a mind and the object being obviously a species of matter. As there is no relation between mind and matter, so the knowledge-relation itself cannot be understood at all. In order to avoid this difficulty Locke, later on, formulates a form of representationism and tells us that we cannot know the objects directly and what we know directly are our ideas which are nothing but the representations of the external objects.

Berkeley afterwards banished external objects altogethr as they cannot be directly perceived and reduced every thing to subjective ideas and in this way the peculiar position of solipsism that the subject and its ideas alone exist developed. Now solipsism is indeed an unfortunate position in philosophy and that is due to the dualism of Descartes. So, the dualistic philosophy of Descartes cannot be regarded as satisfactory at all.

Apart from this difficulty there is an inner inconsistency also in the philosophy of Descartes. He defined substance in the Principles of Philosophy as 'an existent thing which requires nothing but itself in order to exist' and to speak the truth only God answers this description perfectly, as a Being that is absolutely independent of other things. So God alone can be regarded as a substance. But Descartes regarded both mind and matter also as substances though they are dependent on God. Spinoza understood this point and fashioned his philosophy accordingly. We shall discuss his system later on.

Sāṁkhya of the East also believes in a form of dualism. According to the Sāṁkhysts Puruṣa (spirit) and Prakṛti (matter) are the two realities and the evolution of this Universe is due to their contact. Now Puruṣa is an intelligent principle where as Prakṛti is utterly unintelligent. Prakṛti is active, but Puruṣa has no activity at all. If this be the case, we cannot understand how there can be any contact between Puruṣa and Prakṛti. Puruṣa and Prakṛti being fundamentally opposed to one another cannot meet together automatically. And, again, the existence of any middle-man also for the management of their contact is not accepted in the Sāṁkhya philosophy. So the evolution of the universe due to the contact of Puruṣa and Prakṛti is not intelligible at all. In the Yoga Philosophy, of course, God has been brought in to explain the association and dissociation of Puruṣa and Prakṛti.[1] As Puruṣa and Prakṛti are fundamentally opposed to one another, even a mediator cannot bring them together. Mediation is possible between two parties only when they have some points of agreement. But this is not the case here. So the introduction of God does not solve the problem.

[1]This is of course the view of Vijñāna Bhikṣu. No such idea is to be found in the sūtras of Patañjali, in the commentary of Vyāsa thereupon or in 'Tattvavaiṣāradi' of Vācaspati Miśra. There is no such view even in 'Bhoja Vṛtti'.

Again, in the Sāṁkhya philosophy the unintelligent Prakṛti is regarded as the cause of the universe. But we have already seen that the world cannot be accounted for by any unintelligent cause. The universe, as we have aready said, is not a chaos but a cosmos. It is not a whole of disconnected parts, but a system of connected segments. The world abounds in adaptations of means to ends and the lower ends to higher ones, and this cannot be explained by any blind force. The universe exhibits clear marks of design which require the guidance of an intelligent designing principle in nature[2]. So the unintelligent causality (acetana Kāranatva) in respect of the world cannot be accepted as valid.

Activity itself is an intelligent function. Unintelligent inert objects can have no activity at all.[3] Stones cannot move themselves. So the activty on the part of the unintelligent Prakṛti is not intelligible at all. Here it may be objected that as unintelligent milk naturally pours down into the mouth of the calf, so the unconscious Prakṛti naturally changes itself into the objects of the world.[4] But that also is not a satisfactory explanation of unintellgent activity. Here it is forgotten that the cow is a living, conscious being and milk flows impelled by her love for the calf.[5]

The Sāṁkhya philosophers may again point out that as grass, foliage and water automatically turn into milk, so Prakṛti by itself produces the objects of the world. But this is not true. It is only when cows and other animals eat grass etc. that these turn into milk. Always and everywhere they do not turn into milk. So the analogy is rather misdirected and it proves nothing.[6]

Sometimes it is said that as a blind man and a lame man can co-operate in order to get out of a forest, so the non-intelligent Prakṛti and the inactive Puruṣa combine and co-operate to serve their respective interests and due to their combination the objects of the world evolve.[7] But here it may be pointed out that a blind man can guide a lame man by giving instructions but Puruṣa cannot guide Prakṛti in that way. Puruṣa is so indifferent and inactive that guidance by him cannot be conceived of. So, this argument also cannot prove the case of the Sāṁkhya philosophers.[8]

From the foregoing analysis it is proved, then, that like Pluralism, Dualism also cannot give us a satisfactory explanation of the universe. So we shall have to turn to Monism now. Monism is a theory of Reality according to which Reality is one. We think that the falsity of the world follows as a corollary from Monism

[2]Sārīrakabhāṣya 2/2/1.
[3]*Ibid* 2/2/2.
[4]"Vatsa vivṛddhinimitta..........."
[5]Sārīrakabhāṣya 2/2/3.
[6]*Ibid* 2/2/4.
[7]Pangvandhavadubhayorapi Saṁyoga.
[8]*Ibid* 2/2/7.

as a theory of Reality. A consistent monist must regard the world as false. In order to establish this thesis we shall have to consider those monistic systems where the reality of the world is admitted and to show that all of them suffer from some defect or other. Here we should remember that materialism is a form of monism and the materialists accept this visible universe as real. The materialists consider matter as the ultimate reality and try to explain everything in terms of this principle. They even reduce mind or consciousness to an unimportant by-product of brain functions and deny its speciality, superiority and uniqueness. But this thoroughgoing materialisation of consciousness cannot be justified at all. Mind or consciousness enjoys a unique position as it is unobjective and cannot be understood in objective language. Consciousness reveals an object so it is a revealer and not the revealed. Matter being revealed cannot occupy the place of the revealer. So the revealing consciousness can never be reduced to revealed matter. This shows that consciousness is not as unimportant as the materialists think and again mind or consciousness can be no by product of Matter. Not only this. Matter as such can never be obtained in any form of our experience. This is really a concept derived from the conscious experience of material objects. This means that the concept Matter is based on conscious experience. So, consciousness is a presupposition of Matter. This again implies that matter cannot be explained without consciousness and so consciousness cannot be explained in terms of matter as the materialists think. Actually speaking the materialists put the cart before the horse when they place matter before mind. Moreover, matter becomes intelligible or recognised as matter only when it is revealed. So, revelation gives intelligibility to matter. Now what is not intelligible even cannot be real at all. So we may say that matter enjoys only a borrowed reality as intelligibility of matter is borrowed from revelation or consciousness. Consciousness is self-revealing and it depends on no other thing for its revelation. When I say "I know the book," actually 'I know that I know the book'. This means that the consciousness of book is also automatically conscious of itself. This implies the self-manifesting nature of consciousness. Not only this. The very denial of consciousness posits its existence. Denial is a conscious process and without consciousness this is impossible. So, consciousness is indubitable and self-revealing. We can doubt everything—perceived content, memory content and even mathematical knowledge. Sometimes we perceive a snake where there is only a rope. Here the perceived content is illusory and we may think that similarly in every case of perception, something is perceived which actually does not exist. Memory is impossible without previous perception. Now the perceived content, as it is already shown, may be illusory. So the memory content which is only the reproduction of the perceived content will be of the same nature. Even the mathematical knowledge may be conceived as due to an evil genius. But consciousness cannot be doubted in this way. The denial of consciousness as it is already shown presupposes consciousness. So, the reality of consciousness is indubitable. Therefore, matter which is dubitable as a content of perception can never be on par with

consciousness. And this again proves that matter can never be the ultimate reality.

Now, if reality which is one is not material, it must be spiritual in nature. Of-course in modern times Russell and others have formulated a third form of monism which is known as Neutral monism. Russell in his 'The Analysis of Mind' agrees with the American neo-realists like Professor R. B. Perry and E. B. Holt and holds that both mind and matter are composed of certain neutral particulars which in themselves are neither mental nor material. Here the dualism between matter and mind has been reconciled in the monism of neutral particulars. The neutral particulars in one arrangement constitute mind and in another arrangement constitute what is called matter. "As regards sensations, *i.e.*, what is heard or seen," Russell expressly states that these are composed of neutral particulars and "belong equally to psychology which deals with mind and to physics which deals with matter." (The Analysis of Mind, P. 25). The neutral particulars again are not existent as they do not exist in space and time, but *they are subsistent. Now we for ourselves do not find any entity in our experience* which is neither physical nor mental. Naturally here the question arises—on what basis do Russell and others postulate the neutral entities which are neither existent nor non-existent? In assumption or in mere entertainment, we get certain contents which are neither existent nor non-existent, but these are admitted to be abstractions. If Russell and others have postulated the neutral entities on the basis of these contents, the entities will be abstractions and no metaphysical realities.

If again, Russell and others refer to erroneous content as an example of the entity which is neither existent nor non-existent, *i.e.*, neutral, our answer will be as follows :—

The erroneous content is never perceived as abstract. When a man perceives a snake on the locus of a rope, he takes the snake as a real snake, he trembles in fear and sometimes again takes to heels. Not only this. The erroneous content, even after correction, does not appear to have been merely abstract. Even after correction we feel we *asserted* it. Now the nature of the content of this peculiar assertion which is rejected at the time of correction cannot be easily ascertained. *Different philosophers have tried hard to find a solution of this* problem and we ourselves, in this book, are trying to do this. Russell and others have dogmatically accepted this content as neither existent nor non-existent, *i.e.*, neutral. But such an easy solution of the problem is indeed childish. No concrete content has ever been obtained as neutral. So, there can be no postulation of metaphysical neutral entities which are neither existent nor non-existent.

The Advaitins, we doubt, consider the illusory content as neither existent nor non-existent, but that does not imply that the illusory content is neutral in the sense of Russell and others. The Advaitins admit the illusory content as concrete and they have laboured hard to determine the status of this content.

To them the illusory content has objectivity without reality. The snake which is perceived on the locus of a rope is definitely objective, otherwise people under illusion would not have been afraid of it. No one is afraid of an imaginary snake But it is not real either. Later knowledge of greater logical force reveals its falsity.

Now, if there is no neutral entity as the Russellians admit, there can be nothing which is neither physical nor mental. Everything concrete that we have come across uptil now has been either physical or mental. The postulation must also be according to examples. Here the postulation of neutral entity is not based on any instance, so the postulation is inadmissible. The subsistent entities are, actually speaking, ghostly in nature and there is no sufficient reason for a belief in such entitis. So, neutral particulars are only a matter of language and they have no moorings in reality.

Now as neutral monism cannot stand criticism, so spiritualism in all forms of monism should be accepted as satisfactory. Spiritualism, again, has been understood and interpreted in different ways by different philosophers. We shall discuss the spiritualism of Spinoza, Hegel and Bradley of the West and of Rāmānuja of the East and show that all of them are faulty. In our conclusion we shall see that Śaṁkara alone can satisfy all the demands of spiritualism or monism. Reality is pure and undifferentiated consciousness. The world which is other than consciousness is other than reality also. This means that the world is false.

The concept of substance is the pivotal notion in the philosophy of Spinoza. Spinoza conceives substance in three different ways. Firstly, substance is the pure being existing in itself and capable of being conceived by itself. The implication is that substance exists in itself and is also conceived by itself. This shows that the substance is not dependent on any other thing in any way. The substance cannot be characterised also, as any characterisation will negate the contrary character of substance. If "A" is attributed to substance, the 'not A' will be excluded from it. And in that case, substance will be limited by 'not A'. Therefore, substance is regarded as indeterminate and absolute. Secondly, substance is the ultimate cause of everything that there is. Here we should remember that Spinoza does not regard the substance as a cause in any temporal sense. Substance is a cause only in a logical sense. Substance is, actually speaking, the ground of the *World* which is the consequent. Spinoza conceives of God as the eternal cause of all that is phenomenal or temporary. This is the conception of substance as natura naturans. Thirdly, substance is conceived as identical with all the objects of the world. It is thus not only the cause of all but as Schwegler so beautifully puts it, it is itself everything. This conception of God as identical with the world-plurality is technically known as natura naturata.

Now, it is very difficult to reconcile these three conceptions of substance. If God is the Indeterminate Absolute, we cannot understand how It can also be

the Cause of the world. God as cause is definitely a determinate being and not an Indeterminate Absolute. And again God is regarded as identiacl with the world-plurality. The plurality is characterised and finite. So the Infinite and Indeterminate God cannot be identified with the finite and the characterrised plurality in any intelligible sense.

As Spinoza cannot satisfy us, we may turn to Hegel to see if he has offered any satisfactory explanation of the nature of reality. Hegel is of opinion that reality is not an abstract, colourless principle, it is a concrete organic whole of parts. Nothing is excluded from it, but everything gets its proper place and significance in the systematic whole. Reality is self-consciousness which is realised through the conflict of the subject and the object. So, the subject and the object are the two elements in the being of the Absolute Reality. The Absolute is the *complete* as it is the most concrete. The Absolute is the most concrete in the sense that it is an all-inclusive whole. The most concrete, according to Hegel, is the Ultimate Reality. But everything of this world is, of course, real. The thing which is more and more concrete is more and more real. So, Hegel believes in degrees of reality. The Absolute which is the all-inclusive whole has the highest reality. All other things are more or less real according to their degree of concreteness.

The Absolute again realises itself in the "Consciousness of its objective modifications." "This self-realisation through conscious self-objectification," as Dr. S. K. Maitra[1] observes, "Constitutes, according to Hegel, the life of the Absolute as concrete spiritual reality. The Absolute without the objectivity through which it realises itself is an empty abstraction. " Reality is spiritual as an eternal self-filling and self-concretion, it is spirit conscious of itself as objective and objectified experience.'[2]

Here it may be observed that we cannot understand how there can be any degree of reality. What is real is real and what is false is false. But there is no point in saying that this is more real than that. Reality is one and it admits of no degrees. If we accept the doctrine of the degrees of reality, then the universally accepted distinction between reality and unreality or reality and falsity loses all its significance. Moreover, along with degrees of reality Hegel also admits degrees of Truth. The most Coherent system of the Absolute is ultimately true and the degree of truth varies with the degree of coherence. Hence different kinds of human knowledge will have different degrees of truth. None of them gives us the absolute truth ; nor should any of them, even if it be erroneous, fail to give us some truth as it is contained in the whole. Hence all human errors may be said to be partial truths. Now this is a position which is hardly tenable. If we accept this, the logical distinction between truth and error loses all ground.

[1]Cf. Studies in Philosophy and Religion—Dr. S. K. Maitra (P. 5).
[2]Cf. Studies in Philosophy and Religion—Dr. S. K. Maitra (P. 5).

Again to Hegel objectivity is a necessity for the realisation of the self. But we think that the self, (subjectivity) and objectivity are fundamentally opposed to one another like light and darkness. (*Śārīraka bhāṣya* 1/1/1). The subjectivity is the revealing consciousness and as such can never be objectified. Objectivity, on the other hand, is revealed and so the opposite extreme of subjectivity. So, self-realisation through self-objectification is not at all an intelligible process to us. Objectivity negates subjectivity and so there can be no talk of self-realisation through self-objectification. Actually speaking the maxim "self-realisation through self-objectification" involves self-contradiction. The peculiarity of the self lies in its inwardisation or internality and its withdrawal from all forms of objectivity. But the object is characterised by externality and its speciality is grasped in externalisation. Now if the self is objectified, it will lose its essential nature being externalised and instead of self-realisation, there will be objectification of the self which implies the very negation of selfhood. In this context certain Indian views also may be discussed.

basis

The Naiyāyikas of our country consider the self as the substrate of consciousness. Uddyotkāra says in his Vārttika on the Nyāyabhāṣya (1/1/5) that consciousness cannot be the quality of any of the five elements as consciousness cannot be externally perceived and the five elements are perceived only through the external senses. Consciousness can also be no quality of the body, the mind, the senses or the prāṇa. Therefore, it belongs to the self. Now the self as the substrate of consciousness is known as the object of another cognition. Here the self has been objectified and the possibility of cognition of cognition is admitted. Ofcourse the objectification of the self has been unavoidable here due to the admission of the possibility of cognition of cognition. If we can show that cognition of cognition is not possible, the objectification of self also will be an impossibility.

Cognition of cognition involves an indefinite regress. If the primary cognition is cognised by the secondary cognition, the secondary cognition will have to be cognised by another cognition and so on indefinitely. Moreover in this case the second cognition will be the object of the first cognition. Now the cognition as an object of cognition can no longer be cognition. It becomes the object and thus the cognition in its essential nature is not possible to know. Therefore, the cognition of cognition is an impossible process and hence the objectivity of the self also cannot be consistently maintained.

According to the Bhāttas, the self can be known by the mind as an object in the form of "I".* Here it may be objected that the self, the Knower, cannot be the object known. Here the Bhāttas will say that the subjectivity and the objectivity of the same entity do not involve any self-contradiction. The self has two parts—cit (conscious) and acit (unconscious). The cit part of the self

[1] Slokavārttika, Atmavāda, 107.

is the Knower and its acit (unconscious) part is the object known. If the same part of the self were both the subject and the object of the same cognition, the contradiction would have arisen. But as here the subject and the object of cognition are *two different parts of the self, so the possibility* of contradiction is ruled out from the very beginning. The Bhāttas add that the expression "I know myself" shows how the same self can be both the subject and the object at the same time.

The subject and the object imply genuine difference. The same thing cannot be both the subject and the object at the same time. The self in its cit part and again the *self in its acit part* are the parts of the same self. There can be no intelligible genuine difference between the two. Hence how the acit part of the self can be the object of its cit part is not intelligible to us.

There may be a more fundamental criticism of this theory also. The self can have no parts at all. The parts to be known as parts must be transcended. This implies that the parts without a partless homogeneous background is not intelligible in any way. *Now this homogeneous background* may be conceived as self-consciousness as Hegel thinks. But in this case the cit and the acit parts will be the objects to this self-consciousness. The cit being the Knower or the subject according to the Bhāttas can be no object to anything. So, such self-consciousness cannot be conceived without involving self-contradiction. This again implies that the self can have no parts as in the presence of the parts of the self a belief in such self-consciousness becomes inevitable.

The Prābhākara Mimāmsakas do not subscribe to the Bhātta view of the self. To them the expression "I know myself" does not imply the subjectivity and the objectivity of the same self, it is only used in a figurative sense.[1] The self is *essentially unconscious but it becomes the substrate of consciousness.*[2] *It is* revealed as a necessary element in every case of cognitions. Cognition, according to the Prābhākaras, is a truine process revealing itself, the subject as Knower and the object as Known. It shows that according to the Prābhākaras, the self, the *object and the cognition are revealed at the same time. The self is known as the* substrate of knowledge and knowledge as self-revealed.

Nārāyana here raises an objection that nothing is manifested as the substrate of an act. A burning fuel reveals that portion of it which is not being burnt. This portion again cannot be regarded as the substrate of burning. The part that is burning is identical with burning and is not revealed as any separate content. So, the self cannot be revealed as the substrate of cognition.[3] There is another defect of this theory also. The self, according to the Prābhākaras, though not an object of internal perception (mānasa pratyakṣa) as the Naiāyikas hold,

[1]Tantrarahasya, Gaek. ori. Series, p. 20.

[2]Siddhāntavindu with Nyāyaratnāvali, chow. ed., pp. 110-111.

[3]Mānameyodaya, T.P.H. ed. p. 194.

depends for its revelation on the Knowledge of objects (parādhīna)*. The self is revealed only when an object is revealed. This implies that the self, according to the Prābhākaras, should be regarded as the object of cognition as it depends on cognition for its revelation. Now the self, the subject of cognition can never be an object to it. So the objectification of the self in any form cannot be admissible.

The self, actually speaking, is the pure subjectivity which does not remain unmanifested though not an object of knowledge.

Bradley, in the West, is regarded as "one of the few great builders of system, and one of the boldest and most original and speculative thinkers that Britain has ever produced". (A hundred years of British Philosophy, P. 322). Now (Bradley has advanced various arguments to show that the universe which is a system of inter-related parts is full of congtradictions and hence it is not a reality, but a mere appearance.) The reality is the absolute expereience which "serves to suggest to us the general idea of a total experience, where will and thought and feeling may all once more be one" (Appearance and Reality, P. 141). Everything which falls short of this "total experience" is to be tabooed as appearance. But all the appearances are grounded in reality as the reality alone can appear. "Everything, which appears, is somehow real in such a way as to be self-consistent" (Appearance and Reality, P. 123). In other words, all the objects of the world which involve contradictions within themselves must remain in the real being "transmuted and transfigured" in order to constitute the complete harmony. All the objects of the world are no doubt appearances, but in all of them reality does not appear in the same may. Some of them are more real than others. Bradley says, " of two given appearances the one more wide, or more harmonious is more real. It approaches nearer to a single, all-containing individuality. To remedy its imperfections, in other words, we should have to make a smaller alteration. The truth and the fact, which, to be converted into the Absolute, would require less rearrangement and addition, is more real and truer. And this is what we mean by degrees of reality and truth. To possess more the character of reality, and to contain within oneself a greater amount of the real, are two expressions for the same thing. (Op. cit., pp. 322-3).

Bradley's position may be criticised in the following way. If the appearances harbour contradictions within them, how can they then reside in the Absolute which is self-contsistent ? Some contradictions with other contradictions can never constitute a consistent whole. What is contradictory is to be totally negated

*Parādhīna-prakāśa may be of two kinds. The books, shelves and the like are parādhīna-prakāśa as they are objects of knowledge. But the self is not of 'parādhīna-prakāśa' in this sense. It is parādhīna prakāśa in the sense that that it is manifested only when the objects are manifested and not as an object of knowledge. In contrast to ordinary objects, therefore, the self may be regarded as 'Svaprakāśa'.

and rejected altogether. It can have no place in the real. But Bradley makes room even for contradictory ideas in the wide open bosom of reality. This is a position which is hardly tenable. If Bradley were logical all through, he would have said like Śaṁkara that the world is false as it harbours contradictions and Reality being self-consistent cannot entail the world.

Moreover, we have already seen that Bradley is a believer in degrees of truth and reality. But we cannot understand how truth and reality can admit of any degree. We have already discussed this point. So we need not repeat it again.

Rāmānuja in the East has also given us a form of monistic spiritualism. Let us now see whether his position is more tenable than that of the western monists. Rāmānuja holds that reality is no doubt one but it is not unqualified. He is a believer in qualified monism (Viśiṣṭādvaita). Brahman, the ultimate reality, is a unity of parts, the parts being the finite spirits (cit) and matter (acit). It is not distinctfrom any other thing which is either similar to or different from it. As it is not distinct from a similar thing we are told that Brahman has no sajātīya-bheda ; and so far as it is not distinct from a dissimilar thing, Brahman is said to have no Vijātīyabheda. But though without Sajātīya and Vijātīya bheda, Rāmānuja's Brahman is not without internal distinction (called svagata-bheda) between its parts (conscious and unconscious). In the state of dissolution, when objects are absent, Brahman remains with pure matter and bodiless souls in an unmanifested form (avyakta). This is known as the causal state of Brahman (Kārana-brahma). When again the objects appear to be, Brahman becomes really transformed into the world of objects and embodied souls. This manifested form of Brahman is its effect-state (Kārya-brahma).

In criticising this theory we may point out that how Brahman the spiritual principle can have "matter" (acit) as a part is not intelligible to us. The spirit or cit averts matter or acit as they are fundamentally opposed to each other. Cit is consciousness whereas acit is entirely unconscious. So, the spiritual principle cannot involve any acit part. And again, if matter and spirits are parts of Brahman, then does not Brahman really undergo modification with the change of matter ? In that case Brahman cannot be regarded as a permanent, unchanging reality. If, again, Brahman is really changed into the universe, as Rāmānuja thinks, the imperfections and the defects which we find in the world will be really in Brahman. But Brahman being a perfect being cannot involve any imperfection. In order to obviate these difficulties, Rāmānuja has recourse to different analogies. Sometimes he uses the analogy of the body and the soul. Brahman is the soul of which cit and acit constitute the body. As the soul guides and controls the body, so also Brahman guides and controls matter and spirits. The soul is not affected by the changes of the world. Sometimes again Rāmānuja tries to save the perfection of Brahman by the analogy of the King and his subjects.

Vide Śribhāṣya 1.1.1.

As the King is not subject to the miseries and sufferings of his subjects, so Brahman also does not suffer from the defects of the world (Śrībhāṣya, 2-1-14). These pleas of Rāmānuja definitely show that he was not sure of the exact nature of the relation between Brahman and the world. The relation-between the soul and the body is different from the relation between a King and his subjects and both of them again are different from the relation between a whole and its parts. Moreover, sometimes Rāmānuja regards Brahman as the substantive (Viśeṣya) and the world as an attribute (Viśeṣana) and this explanation cannot save Brahman from the imperfections of the world. Rāmānuja himself perhaps was aware of these difficulties and once he made such a clear confession which is inconsistent with his general position. The essential nature (svarūpa) of Brahman, he says, remains unchanged inspite of the changes in the universe and so Brahman is unaffected (Ibid). If this admission is logically followed, Rāmānuja has to admit that matter which undergoes change is no real part of Brahman, but he cannot admit this as to him matter or acit is eternally in Brahman.

In order to get out of these inconsistencies Rāmānuja once said that if God is admitted as all-powerful, nothing should be thought impossible for Him and actually speaking the mystery of creation is beyond human intellect (Śrībhāṣya 2-1-26-28 and 1-1-3). We shall have to consult scriptures in order to solve the mystery of creation. Śaṃkara also admits this. He is also of opinion that unaided reasoning (Kevala-tarka) cannot solve all problems (Śaṃkara on Brahma sūtra 2.1.27). But to him scriptural evidences rather point to the fact that the world is only a false appearance of Brahman. The Bṛhadaraṇyaka testifies to the same fact (Indro māyābhiḥpuru-rūpa īyate-Brhad, 2-5-19 and Śaṃkara thereon). The Śvetāśvatara clearly states that Brahman is the wielder of Māyā and the world is māyā itself.* And again if we accept this explanation, no difficulty can arise at all. As the world is only a false appearance of Brahman, so the problem of change on the part of Brahman is negated from the very beginning. The imperfections of the world also cannot cling to Brahman. Moreover the pristine purity of the ultimate reality is not affected in any way. We think that the demand of monism is satisfied in the philosophy of Śaṃkara. As Brahman is the only reality so the world which is other than Brahman is definitely to be regarded as false. If it is regarded as real, dualism with all its difficulties will arise. So, that alternative being negated, the only alternative which is left to us is to accept the world as false. Our discussion here will remain incomplete if we do not consider the main charges against the accosmitic (world-negating) monism. We have held that the world is to be regarded as false in order to frame a consistent monistic scheme of the universe. Now Hegelians of the West and Rāmānuja in the East have raised different objections against such a theory of reality. Our position will not be secure until we answer their charges.

The Hegelians mainly contend that the unity apart from the plurality is an abstraction of thought and never the living reality. The principle of unity is

*Māyām tu prakṛtim vidyāt, māyinamtu Maheśvaram. Vide Sv., 4.10.

intelligible in and through the plurality. So the reality of unity cannot be upheld at the cost of plurality. The Hegelians hold that the plurality is as real as the unity is. The plurality is a fact of the world and this should be explained and not explained away. Hegel, therefore, considers the Absolute of Spinoza as the "Lion's den". Everything goes there and never comes out. The Absolute has, actually speaking, devoured up all the pluralities and diversities. This monsterous Absolute cannot satisfy our intellectual demand. "Negativity", says Bosanquet, "is fundamental in all that is real". "An element of Reality can find completion only in what is not itself".* Here we may say that (Śaṃkara never denies the objectivity and externality of the plurality. At a particular stage of expreience Śaṃkara admits the existence of plurality He only adds that from a superior plain of experience the plurality is negated in its own locus.) The category of "unity" cannot be applied to (Śaṃkara's Brahman. It is the the locus of all negations and this is the ultimate reality.) We cannot even positively say that Brahman is one, we can only negatively discribe it as non-dual So the charge that Śaṃkara's Brahman being the unity must imply the existence of plurality can be easily ruled out.

We cannot even contend that reality finds its completion in its other ; A is completed in not-A. This is a manifest violation of the Law of contradiction. A is admitted to be not not-A. Otherwise there is no point in saying that A is A. Of course there is boldness in the conception of self-realisation through self-alienation, but this is not intelligible in logical terms. Moreover, A and its other are definitely different. Now if they are different, the relation of A with its other will require a third term. This again will require another term to be related with both A and not-A separately and this again another term and so on indefinitely. So not to speak of realisation of A in not-A, the relation between A and not-A is not intelligible at all.

Here a question may arise : if reality is non-dual Brahman, why does the plurality appear at all ? In answer the Advaita philosophers will refer to the analogy of illusion. At the time of illusion, the rope often appears as the snake The appearance of the snake is there, it has objectivity.

We cannot say that it is a mental idea only. In that case the behaviour of a man (trembling, running and the like) under illusion cannot be explained at all. A man cannot tremble or run in fear at the sight of a snake which is only a dead idea of the mind. So, the objectivity of the snake appearing on the rope can not be denied in anyway. But the question is : how does the snake appear where admittedly the rope alone exists ? This is definitely due to ajñāna or ignorance of the real nature of the rope. Now this ajñāna has its two functions—concealment (āvarana) and projection (Vikṣepa). The ignorance of rope does not only conceal the real nature of rope, it also projects the snake on the locus of the rope. This is, according to the Advaitins, the case with the world of plurality. Ajñāna

*Principle of Individuality and value, p. 231, p. 234.

of the real nature of reality which is Brahman conceals the reality and projects the appearance of the plurality of the world on its locus. Hence Ajñāna explains the appearance of the manifold which is objective and extramental.

Now the question is: What is the nature of this Ajñāna? Vedāntasāra defines Ajñāna as "Sadasadbhyām anirvacanīyam triguṇātmakam jñānavirodhi bhāvarūpam yat kiñcit iti".* Ajñāna cannot be real (sat) as it is negated by Knowledge and what is real is never sublated. It cannot again be unreal (asat) as it is the ground of the world. An unreal thing like the son of a barren woman cannot be the ground of anything. The world is an object of immediate expereience. But the unreal being no content of cognition cannot be the ground of this world.[1] So on this consideration also Ajñāna cannot be unreal. It cannot be sadasat also. The contrary qualities like sat (being) and asat (non-being) can not be true of the same thing. Therefore, it is regarded as indeterminate (anirvacanīya). It is not indeterminate in the sense that human intellect is incompetent to grasp it altogether. But is is indeterminate as it cannot be explained by any of the following categories sat, asat or sadasat. Therefore, Ajñāna is distinct from both being and non-being.

It is triguṇātmaka as it is the composite of the three guṇas Sattva, rajas and tamas. Ajñāna has not the three guṇas, but it is itself the three guṇas. Ajñāna is said to be trigunātmaka because its evolutes (the different objects of the world) have these guṇas. Triguṇātmakatva of ajñāna implies that it is not an unintelligible concept though it is indeterminate.

It is jñāna-virodhī. Ajñāna with its gross and subtle expressions is destroyed by the direct Knowledge of its locus. It is, of course, not opposed to pure cit but to cit as reflected in antaḥkaraṇa or intellect. Intellectual knowledge or Vṛttijñāna originating from Aham Brahmāsmi" cancels ajñāna about the self and the self shines in pristine purity.[2]

Ajñāna, again, does not imply jñānābhāva (negation of Knowledge). It is a positive entity (bhāvarūpa). Ajñāna is the cause of the world and hence it cannot be negative as a negative entity cannot be the material cause of anything positive.[3] Now this positivity of ajñāna does not imply its reality. It only implies the presentability of ajñāna. In other words ajñāna is positive as it is other than the unreal which is not presentable at all.[4]

The Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika and others hold that ajñāna means only the negation of knowledge and hence it is a negative entity.. If their contention is correct,

*Jivanānda's ed., pp. 34-35.

1"Vandhyāsutādivat aparokṣapratibhāsānupapattiḥ" (Rāmatīrtha on Jivānanda's Vedāntasāra, p. 35).

2Gīta, III, 14.

3Vidvanmanoranjanī, Jivānanda's ed. p. 37.

4Abhāvavilakṣaṇatvamātram Vivakṣitam (Advaitasiddhi N.S., p. 544).

the Advaita position obviously becomes false. How can we, then, meet their charge ?

We may ask : does ajñāna which is the negation of Knowledge mean (1) the negation of any particular Knowledge or (2) the negation of Knowledge in general ?

The first alternative is not true. Ajñāna does not always imply the negation of any particular Knowledge. There are certain cases where a man is aware of the absence of Knowledge as such. A man who is ignorant and does not know anything feels that he has the absence of any knowledge and not any knowledge in particular. In suṣupti stage a man is aware of nothing and this shows that ajñāna does not always mean the absence of a particular knowledge. The admission of ajnāna as the negation of any particular Knowledge will imply the impossibility of the suṣupti stage and this is inadmissible.[5]

The second alterntive also is no better tenable than the first one Ajñāna cannot also mean the negation of all knowledge The negation to be known must imply knowledge. So the negation of all knowledge involves self-contradiction. This means that the negation of all knowledge is inconceivable Hence ajñāna cannot mean the negation of all knowledge

Thus it is clear that the positivity of *Ajñāna cannot be denied. Sometimes* it is urged . if ajnāna is a positive entity, it will be a second real principle with Brahman and consequently dualism will arise. We have already said that positivity of ajñāna does not imply its reality but only its presentability. So this possibility cannot arise at all.

Here the question arises : What is the relation between Brahman and ajñāna ? Are they identical or different or identical and different both ? They are not identical as Brahman, pure cit can never be ajñāna which is inert (Jaḍa). Nor can they be different as ajñāna is inconceivable and meaningless apart from pure cit. Ajñāna can not both be identical with and different from Brahman. Identity and difference being contradictory categories cannot belong to the same thing. So, the relation between Brahman and ajñāna is an anirvācya relation. Hence, Ajñāna has been defined as 'Yat Kincit'.[6] The impossibility of definite characterisation of ajñāna cannot be regarded as a defect in Advaita philosophy. Ajñana being false and illogical cannot admit of any logical characterisation.

This Ajñāna is beginningless also.[7] Ajñāna is regarded as the material cause of the world. Now if we think of a beginning of this ajñāna, it will imply that ajñāna has a cause. *That cause again will have another cause and so on indefinitely.* Therefore, in order to avoid the fallacy of indefinite regress we shall have to characterise ajñāna as beginningless.

---

[5]Rāmatīrtha on the Vedāntasāra, Jivānanda's ed., p. 36.

[6]Subodhinī, Jivānanda's ed., p. 36.

[7]'Anāditve sati bhāvarūpam vijñānanirasyam ajñānam' (citsukhī, N.S., p. 57).

Rāmānuja has raised different objections against the Śaṃkarite conception of Ajñāna. The Śaṃkarite position will not be conclusively established unless we answer these charges of Rāmānuja. Let us now, therefore, consider the objections of Rāmānuja against Śaṃkara's doctrine of Ajñāna.

Rāmānuja has raised seven objections (Saptānupapatti) against the concept of Ajñāna in his celebrated Śrībhāṣya. These are: (1) The Āśrayānupapatti of Avidyā (Impossibility of finding out a substrate for Ajñāna). (2) The Tirodhānānupapatti of Avidyā (Impossibility of hiding Brahman by Ajñāna). (3) The Svarūpānupapatti of Avidyā (Impossibility of understanding the nature of Ajñāna as a defect (doṣa) in cit). (4) The anirvacanīyatvānupapatti of Avidyā (Impossibility of accepting ajñāna as indeterminate). (5) The pramānānupapatti of Avidyā (Impossibility of proving ajñāna). (6) The Nivarttakānupapatti of Avidyā (Impossibility of determining the cause for the cessation of ajñāna) and lastly (7) The nivṛttyānupapatti of Avidyā (Impossibility of thinking of any cessation of ajñāna). We shall now consider these charges one by one.

1. *The Āśrayānupapatti of Avidyā.*

Ajñāna must exist somewhere. It cannot hang in air. Where, then, does it exist? It cannot exist in Jīva as Jīvahood itself is due to ajñāna. Nor can it exist in Brahman as Brahman being jñāna-svarūpa is contradictory to ajñāna. (Sā hi Kimāśritya bhramam janayati iti vaktavyam. Na tāvajjīvamāśritya, avidyāparikalpitatvāt jīvābhāvasya. Nāpi Brahmāśritya, tasya svayamprakāśa jñānarūpatvena avidyāvirodhītvāt (Śrībhāṣya, N.S., p. 166).

This charge may be answered in the following way. The jīva may be the locus of ajñāna though jīvahood is caused by ajñāna. This may be understood with the help of an analogy. The sprout, no doubt, comes out of the seed, but we can very well say that the sprout is the locus of the seed. So, there can be no anomaly if jīva be admitted as the locus of ajñāna.[1]

Brahman, may, as well be the substrate of ajñāna. The Śaṃkarites do not think that pure cit or Brahman is contradictory to avidyā. To them, Vṛttijñāna or cit reflected in mental modification is opposed to ajñāna. Here a question may arise: pure cit and cit reflected in mental modification have the common character of manifestation. Why, then, only one of them is contradictory to ajñāna and not the other? We can say, in answer, that manifestation has an adjunct in the second case (cit reflected in mental modification) which is the mental modification and this is absent in the first case. This adjunct is, actually speaking, responsible for the difference between the two cases of manifestation.

[1]Anāditvāt vījāṅkuravat Ubhayasiddheḥ (Bhāmatī, N.S., p. 378).

2. *The Tirodhānānupapatti of Avidyā.*

Śaṃkara holds that ajñāna conceals Brahman which is self-luminious. Rāmānuja here says that this concealment may only mean the total destruction of Brahman. Let us see how.[2]

The concealment of luminosity may mean either obstruction of the manifestation of luminosity or its destruction. Now the obstruction of the manifestation of luminosity is inconceivable in this case as the manifestation here is intrinsic. So, the concealment should mean the destruction of Brahman.

Rāmanuja's argument cannot hit the target. (Śamkara never admits the real concealment of Brahman. What he holds is that Brahman due to our ajnāna appears to be concealed. So, the possibility of the destruction of Brahman cannot arise at all.)

3. *The Svarūpānupapatti of Avidyā.*

(Śaṃkara holds that the unobjective and the non-subjective pure consciousness appears as an infinite number of conscious subjects cognising an infinite number of objects due to some defect. Now the question is : What is the nature of this defect ? Is it real or unreal ?[3] It cannot be real as the Advaitins do not admit this. It cannot be unreal either. If it is unreal, then it must either be the Knower (draṣṭā) or the Known (dṛśya), or the Knowledge (dṛśi). We cannot conceive of anything which is none of these three. The Advaitins will never admit this as the Knower. It is not also known as consciousness of consciousness is not admitted in Advaita philosophy. It canot be the Knowledge also as any distinction within Knowledge is altogether denied. Moreover, if the Knower, the Known or the Knowledge be regarded as unreal, another defect is to be admitted in order to explain their unreality. This defect again will have another defect at its root and this will thus lead us to an indefinite regress. If consciousness itself which is, of course, Brahman, be regarded as the defect, then these difficulties will not arise. But in that case ajñāna as the cause of the world would be unnecessary as Brahman itself would be the cause of the world. And again if Brahman itself be the defect, the salvation of jīva will be an impossibility because Brahman being eternal the defect also will be of the same nature. Rāmānuja, therefore, concludes that the nature of ajnāna as a defect in consciousness cannot be determined and hence the falsity of the world also cannot be maintained.

The Śaṃkarites, in answer, will say that ajñana is an object (dṛśya) to the Sākṣī. Ajñāna is beginningless and hence it requires no other defect for its explanation as Rāmānuja contends.

[2]Kiñca, avidyayā prakāśaikasvarūpam Brahma tirohitamiti vadatā svarūpanāśa evoktaḥsyāt. Prakāśatirodhānam nāma prakāśotpatti pratibandhah. vidyamānasya Vināśo vā. Prakāśasya anutpādyat vābhyupagamena prakāśa tirodhānam prakāśa nāśa eva. (Srībhāṣya, N.S., p. 168)

4. *The Anirvacanīyatvānupapatti of Avidyā.*

The Śamkarites hold that Avidyā is neither real nor unreal. It is not real as it is non-eternal and it is not unreal as it is presented. Now Rāmānuja contends that all our knowledge is either of reality or of unreality. We never get any knowledge of anything which is neither real nor unreal. So, Avidyā as anirvācya is not intelligible to us at all. If it be argued that a thing which is neither real nor unreal is known by the knowledge of either real or unreal, Rāmānuja will say that then anything can be an object of any Knowledge.*

Here the Śaṁkarites will say that the admission of an anirvācya object involves no anomaly. According to them, the real is never sublated and the unreal is never presented. Now the 'Snake in the rope' is not real as it is sublated. It is not also unreal as it is presented. So in order to justify the prior presentation of the snake and its later sublation, we must take it as anirvācya. It is anirvācya in the sense that it does not belong either to the category of 'real' or to the category of 'unreal'. Now this concept of 'anirvācya object' agrees with our experience, so its admission can entail no unintelligibility.

The author of 'Advaitāmoda' suggests that the nature of darkness can be no object of light as they are contradictory, yet it is established by light; in the same way it may be held that ajñāna which is not an object of any knowledge either of the real or of the unreal, is established as anirvācya by the knowledge of the real and the unreal.†

5. *The pramāṇānupapatti of Avidyā.*[1]

In order to establish the positivity of Avidyā, the Advaitins have advanced an inference and the inference is as follows :—

Right knowledge (pramāṇajñāna) is preceded by something else (vastvantarapūrvakam) which is other than its prior non-existence, which covers its own object, which has the same locus with it and which is removable by it for, it manifests the unmanifested, as the first rays of light remove the darkness of a room and manifests things which were covered by darkness.[2]

Rāmānuja contends that the inference is erroneous as the hetu or the probans is viruddha and ahaikānta. He, however, does not use the word 'viruddha' in its accepted sense. Generally a hetu is called viruddha when it does not

*Sadasadākārāyāḥ tu pratiteḥ sadasadvilakṣaṇam viṣaya iti abhyupagamyamāne sarvam sarvapratiteḥ viṣayaḥ syāt (Ibid, p. 170).

†Yathā andhakārarupam prakāśāviṣayam api prakāśavyavas-thāpyam bhavati, tathā sadasadrūpadvividha pratityaviṣayasyāpi bhāvarūpa jñānasya svarūpam anirvacanīyam ityevam rūpena pratītivyavasthāpyam bhavatyeva (Advaitāmoda, p. 139).

[1]See Śrībhāṣya, N.S. ed., p. 173-179.

[2]Pramāna jñānam svaprāgabhāvavyatirikta-svaviṣayāvaraṇa-svanivarttya-svadeśagata-vastvantarapūrvakam, aprakāśitārthaprakāśakatvāt, andhakāro prathamotpannapradīpaprabhāvat.

exist in a thing which involves the probandum (sādhya).[3] Rāmānuja uses the word 'Viruddha' in the sense of "māyāvādīmatavirduddha". In this inference the probans is viruddha as it proves something (another ajñāna veiling the ajñāna which is the sādhya here) which is not desired by the Advaitins. The Advaitins prove the positivity of ajñāna by this inference. But Rāmānuja says that the probans (aprakāśitārthaprakāśakatva) proves another ajñāna veiling the positive ajñāna which is intended to be proved. Let us try to follow his argument. This inference proves bhāvarūpa ajñāna Now this bhāvarūpa ajñāna was definitely veiled by another ajñāna which this inference (being a prāmāna jñāna) removes. Thus a second ajñāna veiling the first ajñāna is proved. But this second ajñāna is not admitted by the Advaitins. So the probans is viruddha. A probans is anaikānta when it exists both in the sapaksa and the vipakṣa [4] Now the question is: *What are we to mean by the words 'Sapakṣa' and 'Vipakṣa'? The word* 'Sapakṣa' implies that where the sādhya exists and 'Vipakṣa' means that where the sādhya does not exist. If the second ajñāna covering the first ajñāna be not admitted, the probans becomes anaikānta. The probans exists in the light that removes the darkness of a room and this is sapakṣa. But it equally exists *in the above inference and this inference, according to the vedāntins, does not* contain the probandum (such as vastvantara pūrvakatva) and hence it is vipaksa. Thus the probans becomes anaikānta as it exists both in sapakṣa and vipakṣa.

The example also is defective. Rāmānuja thinks that knowledge alone can manifest a thing and there is no point in *saying that light manifests things.* So the hetu (aprakāśitārtha-prakāśakatva) does not exist in the example.

Perception also cannot prove the existence of Ajñāna. Perceptions like 'I am ignorant,' 'I do not kngw myself' do not prove the existence of bhāvarūpa ajñāna. They only prove the negation or absence of knowledge. If it is said that knowledge and negation of knowledge being contradictory cannot exist in the same self at the same time as it is the case in these perceptions, Rāmānuja will say that the admission of the positivity of ajñāna also will not improve the *situation in any way.*[5] Ajñāna is definitely contradictory to jñāna. The *Śruti* texts quoted by Śomkara in order to prove the existence of avidyā do not actually serve the purpose of Śamkara (Śrī-bhāṣya, N. S. ed., P. 189).

In answer to this charge, it can be maintained that Rāmānuja has misunder-*stood the implication of the inference. The inference does not intend to prove* the existence of Ajñāna, but only the positivity of it. The Śamkarites hold that ajñāna is directly intuited by Sākṣī-caitanya. So the possibility of second ajñāna about the first ajñāna is altogether ruled out. Moreover, it should be

[3] "Yaḥ sādhyavati naivāsti sa viruddha udahṛtaḥ" (Bhāṣā-pariccheda, śloka 55).

[4] "Yat sapakṣe vipakṣe ca bhavet sādhāraṇastu saḥ" (Ibid, sloka 54).

[5] "Yastu jñāna-prāgabhāva-viṣayatve virodha uktaḥ sa hi bhāvarūpa jñāne' pi tulyaḥ" (Śrībhāṣya, N.S. ed. p. 173).

remembered that immediate knowledge (aparokṣa pramā) alone can remove ajñāna that precedes it. Inference is a case of mediate knowledge, so it cannot remove any ajñāna. The subject of the inference 'right knowledge' implies immediate knowledge only.) Rāmānuja misunderstands the Advaitins when he means any valid knowledge by 'right knowledge'. Therefore, Rāmānuja's contention that the inference proves a second ajñāna veiling the first one is unjustified.

Rāmānuja adds that the example is faulty. The light has no manifesting power at all. But this is not true. The Advaitins recognise the manifesting capacity even of that which removes an obstacle to manifestation. The light undoubtedly removes darkness which veils the manifestation of an object. So, the manifesting power of the light cannot be denied.

Rāmānuja's contention that the perceptions like 'I am ignorant' and 'I do not know myself' reveal the negation of knowledge is untenable. Knowledge and its negation being contradictory cannot exist in the same self and at the same time. But this is not the case with knowledge and ajñāna. Ajñāna, according to the Advaitins, is contradictory to Vṛttijñāna. But it is not contradictory to pure jñāna. Ajñāna as positive can exist side by side with jñāna in the same place and at the same time.

Rāmānuja's interpretation of the texts cited by Śaṃkara in support of his doctrine appears to be far fetched.

6. *The Nivarttakānāpapatti of Āvidyā* (Śrībhāṣya, N S. ed , p. 198).

Śaṁkara thinks that the salvation is due to the removal of avidyā. Now avidyā is removed with the rise of the knowledge of the Indeterminate Brahman. But Rāmānuja thinks that salvation is due to the constant meditation on God as the repository of all auspicious attributes. He has quoted the following text in support of his view :—

Vedāhametam puruṣaṃ mahāntam āditya varṇamtamasaḥ parastāt. Tameva vidvān amṛta iha bhavati. Nānyaḥ panthā vidyate ayanāya (Taitti Araṇyaka, 3-13-1).

In answer the Śaṁkarites will say that the knowledge of Saguna Brahman or God is not unnecessary for salvation. The grace of God alone can lead a man to the knowledge of the Indeterminate Brahman (Īśvarānugrahāt eṣā puṃsām advaitavāsanā). But this knowledge of the Indeterminate Brahman alone is directly responsible for salvation. As the knowledge of God is a means to the knowledge of the Nirguṇa Brahman so sometimes in the Vedas the knowledge of God also is regarded as the cause of salvation.

7. *The Nivṛttyānupapatti of Āvidyā* (Śrībhāṣya, N.S. ed., P. 215).

As the correct means for the removal of bondage is not recognised by Śaṁkara, so there can be no freedom or salvation in the Advaita philosophy. Moreover,

Rāmānuja thinks that the bondage of an individual self is due to Karma, a concrete reality and hence it cannot be destroyed by any abstract knowledge. The worship of God and His grace only can negate it.

The Śaṁkarites will answer the charge in the following way.

It is not true that the Śaṁkarites have not found out the correct means for salvation. This has already been shown in the answer of the Śaṁkarites to the sixth objection of Rāmānuja So we cannot say that due to the absence of the means for emancipation, there can be no salvation in Advaita philosophy.

Rāmānuja is not correct when he says that the abstract knowledge cannot destroy concrete Karma. Both Śruti and Smṛti show that knowledge destroys Karma. "Kṣiyante Cāsya Karmāni tasmin dṛṣṭe parāvare" (Mund, 2, 2, 9). The Gīta says—"Jñānāgniḥ Sarvakarmāṇi bhasmasāt Kurute tathā" (4, 38).

Thus it is proved that all the charges of Rāmānuja against the Śāṁkara doctrine of Māyā falls to the ground. So, the Advaita doctrine of Śāṁkara remains invincible and unassailable. The world is actually false. Of course, the falsity of the world does not negate its objectivity and externality. When we say that the world is false, we mean that the world is other than reality, and the reality is Brahman. Bur it is not unreal either. This point has been elaborated at the outset and this will be further elaborated later on when we shall consider the different definitions of falsity.

The second approach to falsity is based on an analysis of the concept of causation. Here, of course, it should be remembered that in this context by cause we only mean the material cause. If we discuss the nature of the effect we shall find that ultimately the effect turns to be a false appearance of the cause. The effect can neither be an entirely new fact nor can it be a real modification of the cause.

The Nyāya-Vaiśeṣikas think that the effect does not remain in any form in the cause. The effect is, actually speaking, a new product which is totally absent in the cause. This is asat kārya vāda or ārambha vāda in Indian philosophy. The Nyāya-Vaiśeṣikas hold that the effect cannot ramain in the cause prior to its production as in that case there is no point in saying that the cause produces the effect. The cause causes the effect which arises with its effectuation. So the novelty of the effect is to be admitted otherwise the word "effect" becomes insignificant and meaningless. Further unless we accept asat kārya vāda, we cannot explain why the efficient cause is necessary in order to produce an effect. *If curd were already there in milk, no milk-man would have been necessary in order to get curd out of milk.* Moreover, if the effect "pot" already existed in its material cause 'clay', then there is no point in giving two names to the cause 'clay' and the effect 'pot' as they are essntially identical. It cannot also be said that there is a distinction of form between the effect and its material cause, for then we have to admit that there is something in the effect which was absent

in the cause and this means that the effect was not entirely there in the cause.

The Sāṁkhyas and the Vedāntins repudiate this theory of causation and establish in its place the therory of Sat Kārya Vāda. According to this theory the effect remains in the cause prior to its production. Now in order to establish this theory, we shall have to criticise the main points of the asat Kārya Vādins expressed in the preceding paragraph. Against the Asat Kārya Vādins we may say that the effect does not lose all it significantce if it already exists in the cause. The effectuation may be understood as a modification of the cause. The cause modifies itself and appears in the form of the effect. The pot which is produced out of clay is actually speaking existent in the clay. The pot is only a modification or appearance of clay in a particular form. The necessity of the efficient cause may also be explained without believing in asat Kārya Vāda. The efficient cause in necessary only in order to get particular form of the stuff or the cause. Clay may appear in different forms like pot and pitcher and the efficient cause determines at a particular time what particular form the stuff will take. So far as the matter is concerned, the efficient cause cannot add anything to the cause when something is produced. Form is immamaterial, what matters is the matter of the thing. So, asat Kārya vāda cannot prove that the efficient cause adds any thing really significant to the cause. When the asat Kārya vādins tell us that two different names of cause and effect can be justified only if we accept their theory, we may answer them with the words of Shakespeare—What is in a name ? Name is never an important part of a thing. A rose does not lose it's scent if it is called by any other name. So though the cause and the effect are given two names their essential identity is not lost. So far as matter is concerned Cause and effect are definitely identical. And again the distinction of form is no real distinction according to the sat Kārya vādins. What counts is the distinction of matter or essential distinction. Now as this distinction can never be proved between the cause and the effect, so we cannot say in any significant sense that the effect is a new fact which was absent in the cause.

The arguments of the asat Kārya vādins thus do not prove their case. Now we may consider certain positive arguments for sat Kārya vāda. (vide Sāṅkhya-Kārikā and Tattava-Kaumudi, 8-9, Sāṅkhya-provacana-bhāṣya, 1.113-121; Aniruddha's Vṛtti 1.113-21). (a) If the effect were really non-existent in the cause, then no amount of effort on the part of any agent could produce it. Sugar can never be turned into salt and white into balck. So, when an effect is produced we are to say that it was present in the cause and it manifests itself clearly when certain conditions are fulfilled. Oil is in the seed, but when the seed is pressed, oil becomes apparent. The efficient cause helps the manifestation of the effect which is already there in the cause. (b) We see that a particular effect comes out of a particular cause. Any cause cannot produce any effect. Curd can be obtained only out of milk and cloth out of thread. Milk canot produce a

cloth nor the threads curd. This shows that the effect somehow exists in the cause. If it were not so, any cause would have produced any effect and the potter need not take clay in order to produce pots; anything could have caused the pots. (c) A potent cause alone is found to produce a desired effect. A cause is potent in the sense that the effect potentially exists in it. Milk may be regarded as the potent cause of curd as curd is potentially present in milk. So the effect only actualises the potentiality of the cause. This means that the effect is only a manifestation of the cause. (d) If the effect were really non-existent in the cause, then when the effect is produdced, we are to say that something comes out of nothing. But this is absurd. Non-existence or nothing can never produce any positive content. (e) Lastly, we find in our experience that the effect is non-distinct from and essentially identical with the cause. The effect is, actually speaking, the manifestation of the cause. A cloth is not really different from threads of which it is made, a pot is non-distinct from its cause 'clay' and a statue is essentially the same as its material cause. So, the effect is to be taken as existent in the cause. Many in the west also understand the cause as quantitavely equal to the effect. The cause is equal to the effect in the sense that the amount of mass and energy in the cause, in the language of science, is equal to that of the effect. If we are ready to follow all the implications of the statement we shall have to say that the effect really exists in the cause, otherwise the quantitative identity or equality of the cause and the effect loses all its significance. If we say that the effect is quantitavely equal to the effect, we are also to say that the effect is identical with the cause in certain respects. This proves the case of the sat Kārya vādins.

It is clear, then, that the effect cannot be regarded as a new fact and sat Kārya vāda stands as against asat Kārya vāda. Sat Kārya vāda again has not been understood in the same way by all its followers. The Sāṅkhya and Rāmānuja think that there is a real transformation (parināma) of the cause *into the effect. When a pot is produced out of clay, clay is actually transformed* into the pot. So according to the Sāṅkhya and Rāmānuja effectuation is transformation and transformation is a real process. This is technically known as parināmavāda. But we think that parināmavāda which claims to be a form of sat Kārya vāda cannot explain all its implications. If there is real modification of the cause in the effect, the effect cannot be said to be essentially identical with the cause. Transformation cannot be regarded as a real process. If it is real the cause will be transformed into the effect and the effect will be really distinct from the cause. In that case we cannot say in any intelligible sense that the effect exists in the cause. Therefore, the Advaitins tell us that the effect is only a manifestation (vivarta) of the cause. As the rope appears as the snake so the cause appears as the effect. The appearance again is ultimately false, as the snake has ultimately no status at all and it is only a false appearance of the rope. In the same way the cause falsely appears as the effect. Actually speaking in a casual situation cause alone exists the effect is only an

appearance of it. Clay alone is real in the different products of clay like pot and pitcher. This is vivartavāda. According to this theory cause alone is real and the effect is only a manifestation of cause. The manifestation again is not the reality, so, as other than reality, it is false. This shows that the world as an effect must be regarded as vivarta. This means that the world is an appearance of Brahman. So the world has only borrowed and derivative reality which is acheived from the reality of Brahman. This again proves the falsity of the world. If the effect were real along with the cause, dualism would have arisen, which has already been shown to be faulty. This shows that the reality of the cause alone can be consistently maintained. Here it should be remembered that though the Advaitins negate Pariṇāmavāda from the ultimate stand point, still they are of opinion that from the empirical (Vyāvahārika) standpoint pariṇāmavāda may be accepted. The world is really the pariṇāma of Māyā, but the Vivarta of Brahman. Māyā is empirical and so is the world. One empirical may be transformed into another empirical. But the transcendental (Brahman) cannot be changed into the empirical. The transcendental can alone appear as the empirical. In short, we may say that from the ultimate viewpoint, Vivarta alone is real. But from the empirical standpoint pariṇāma has its place. By 'Vivarta' we mean that the cause and the effect have different forms of reality, the cause having transcendental and the effect possessing the empirical reality. "Pariṇāma" implies the same kind of reality of both the cause and the effect.[1]

The Advaitins accept the empirical reality of the world and its transcendental falsity. So, no anomaly arises if the world is regarded as the Pariṇāma of the empirical Māyā and the Vivarta of the transcendental Brahman. The falsity of the effect from the ultimate standpoint may be shown in another way also. The Asat Kārya vādins as well as the advocates of Sat Kārya vāda accept the reality of the cause. The difference between the Asat Kārya vādin and a section of the upholders of Satkāryavāda (the Śaṁkarites) arises with regard to the ultimate reality of the effect. The Asat Kāryavādins hold that the cause is different from the effect and both of them are equally real. Now the Śaṁkarites will say that 'difference' as a category is entirely unintelligible.

Difference cannot in the first place be the essential nature (of that which differs), for from that it would follow that with the cognition of the essential nature of a thing there would at once arise not only the judgment as to that essential nature but also judgments as to its difference from everything else. But, it may be urged against this, even when the essential nature of a thing is cognised, the judgment 'this thing is different from other things' depends on the remembrance of its counter-entities, and so long as this remembrance does not take place the judgment of difference is not formed. Such reasoning, we reply, is inadmissible. He who maintains that 'difference' is nothing but

[1] "upādānaviṣamasattākaḥ Kāryāpattiḥ Vivartaḥ, upādānasamasattākaḥ Kāryāpattiḥ pariṇāmaḥ" (Vedānta paribhāṣā, Kṛṣṇanātha's Ed., p. 80).

'essential nature' has no right to assume a dependence on counter-entities since, according to him, essential nature and difference are the same, i.e., nothing but essential nature: the judgment of difference can, on his view, depend on counter-entities no more than the judgment of essential nature does. His view really implies that the two words 'the jar' and 'different' (in the judgment 'the jar is different') are synonymous, just as the words 'hasta' and 'Kara' are (both of which mean hand).

Nor, in the second place, can 'difference' be held as an attribute (dharma)? For if it were that, we should have to think that 'difference' possesses difference (i.e. is different) from the essential nature; for otherwise it would be the same as the latter. And this latter difference would have to be viewed as an attribute of the first difference, and this will lead us on to the third difference, and so on ad infinitum. And the view of 'difference' being an attribute would further imply that difference is cognised on the cognition of a thing distinguished by attributes such as genuine character and so on and at the same time that the thing thus distinguished is apprehended on the apprehension of difference, and this would constitute a logical see-saw. Difference thus showing itself incapable of logical difinition, we are confirmed in our view that the effect cannot be different from the cause.

If the effect in non-different from the cause, then ultimately the effect as a separate entity can have no reality at all. The reality of the cause is admitted on all hands. The Sat Kāryavādins as well as the Asat Kāryavādins equally admit the reality of the cause. The dispute between Satkāryavāda and Asat Kārya vāda centres round the problem of the reality of the effect. As we have already seen that the effect cannot be different from the cause, so the reality of the effect as independent of the cause cannot be maintained. So, the effect as independent of the cause can alone be a false appearance of the cause. This again proves that the world as an effect is only a false appearance. Thus the falsity of the world as an effect becomes inevitable.

The third approach of showing the falsity of the world is based on the consideration of the uniqueness of consciousness. The uniqueness of consciousness lies in self-luminosity (svayamprakāśatva), non-temporality and non-contradictedness. Now, we shall try to show how and in what sense consciousness may be self-luminous, non-temporal and non-contradicted.

Consciousness is self-certifying whereas an object is certified on the certificate of consciousness. So the evidence of objects is derived from that of cons ciousness. This point requires further elucidation.

Nothing can be accepted as real unless there is actual evidence of it in consciousness or experience. The Naiyāyikas insist on the validity of this principle when they say that the padārthas or prameyas (knowables) can be accepted only on the basis of valid evidence in consciousness (Prameyasamvit pramāṇāt hi). Of course, this does not mean that whatever we are conscious of should be taken

as real. As a matter of fact, in many cases we find that an experience of higher order cancels an experience of lower order. Our dream experience is sublated by our waking experience. But this does not negate the validity of our principles formulated in the beginning. Our principle does not imply that the evidence of any experience should be infallible, but it does imply that out conjecture must in every case be based on experiecee of some sort, and even when an experience is negated it should be on the bases of some other experience of superior logical value.

The question that arises now is: if consciousness be the ultimate proof of truth and reality, what is the proof of consciousness itself? We may consider three different alternatives here: (1) We may say that consciousness certifies all other things but is itself uncertified and unproved, or, (2) we may say that consciousness is proved by another consciousness—one conscisous state or act by another conscious state or act, or, (3) we may say that consciousness is self-certifying or self-luminous.

(1) The first alternative bears no examination. If consciousness itself is uncertified or unproved, it cannot certify or prove any other thing. It has already been shown that we cannot accept anything as real without its actual evidence in consciousness. Now, this shows that consciousness which certifies other things can never itself be uncertified or unproved.

(2) The second alternative also is no better tenable than the first one. Consciousness cannot be proved by another consciousness or one conscious state or act by another conscions state or act. The Naiyāy kas, of course, say that the primary consciousness of an object is followed by a secondary consciousness which makes the primary consciousness an object to itself. In th s way the primary consciousness is proved by the evidence of the secondary consciousness. The Nyāya view of cognition has its echo in John Laird's realistic theory of knowledge. In 'Contemporary British philosophers series' Prof. Laird explains his theory of knowledge. There be observes : "Our cognitive processes are, in their usual exercise, the processes, with which (not at which) we look ; and none of them, perhaps, can look at itself. It does not follow, however, that another (introspective) look can be directed towards this process of looking.......... ....Even 'awareness of awareness', then, is not impossible, and this conclusion is consoling, since if anything seems to occur, introspection does. What is there except observation to acquaint us with the difference between pleasure and pain, or between belief and repugnance ?" Thus Prof. Laird, like the Naiyāyikas, thinks that a particular cognition cannot be aware of itself, it can be known by another cognition only. So a cognition can be cognised only as an object of another cognition. Thus both Nyāya and Prof. Laird objectify subjective cognition.

Cognition is subjective awareness and not an object known. All that is known is other than consciousness, because it is a content of consciousness. So

consciousness can never be known as an objective content. There are other difficulties also in this theory. Consciousness is hamogeneous and so one consciousness cannot be understood as generically different from another consciousness. So one consciousness (the primary cognition) cannot be understood as the object and another consciousness (the secondary cognition) cannot be the subject. The subject-object relation is possible only between generically different entities. The subject reveals and the object is revealed. So the subject-object relation is not possible between two cognitions which as cognitions are of the same nature.

There is yet another difficulty of this theory. If the reality of the primary consciousness is proved by the secondary consciousness, the reality of the secondary consciousness must also be proved by another consciousness and so on without end Thus the process of proving cognition leads to indefinite regress. This difficulty, of course, can be avoided if one cognition in the series is taken as self-proved, which the Naiyāyikas will never do

(3) Hence the first two alternatives, viz, that consciousness is uncertified and that consciousness is certified by secondary consciousness are untenable. So, consciousness is to be regarded as self-certifying. Consciousness cannot go without evidence and this means that it is self-proved. By the self-luminosity of consciousess is meant that which without depending on anything else for its own revelation yet never stands unrevealed (avedyatve sati aparokṣavyāvahāra yogyatvam svaprakāśatvam).

The unobjectivity and the self-luminosity of consciousness may also be proved by criticising certain other theories. The Mīmāṃsā of the Prabhākara school holds that cognition is known in the act of being aware of the object. Therefore, the cognition of an object also implies the awareness of that cognition. The Prābhakaras admit the essential distinction between knowing and the known. Knowing knows itself as knowing (samvit) and not as the known (samvedya). We do not know knowing in the same way as the object is known. Prof. Alexander of the West also recognises this distinction between the knowing of knowing and the knowing of the known (object). "The mind enjoys itself and contemplates its object. The act of mind is an engjoyment ; the object is contemplated.[1]"

This view also is not without defect. The Prābhākaras indeed hold a peculiar position with regard to the reveleation of consciousness when they think that consciousness is self-revealing (svayam-prakāśa) and it is automatically revealed at the time of cognising an object. This implies that consciousness depends on a particular cognition for its manifestation as in the absence of any particular cognition, consciousness is not revealed. But we think that wherever there is revelation dependent on cognition, there is an objecthood of cognition. Therefore, the objecthood of consciousness should be accepted by the Prābhākaras as they think that consciousness is revealed only at the time of a particular cognition.

[1]Space, time and Deity Vol. 1, p. 12.

So, if it is admitted that consciousness is revealed only at the time of a particular cognition, consciousness becomes an object of cognition. This is, of course, a manifest absurdity as consciousness the revealer can never be the object revealed.

Prof. Alexander also cannot escape this charge. To him, the act of mind is known as enjoying and the object as contemplated. And again the -ing is always conditioned by -ed. This means that unless an object is contemplated there can be no enjoying of the mental act. This again implies that -ing is the object of -ed as the -ing is conditioned by -ed. In this case -ing which refers to a mental act will also be an object. But the mental act being subjective cannot again be objective. The mental act implies subjective apprehension and not an object apprehended.

The Bhāṭṭas are of opinion that the knownness of a known object constitutes the mark (liñga) of the inferential knowledge of cognition. When an object appears as known, it acquires an additional quality of knowness. This knowness points to the cognitive act as the cause of this new quality.

The main difference of the Bhāṭṭas with others lies in the fact that the Bhāṭṭas believe in the inferential knowledge of consciousness whereas others admit some form of uninferential knowledge. But this difference does not improve the situation in any manner. In the Bhāṭṭa view, knowness is an additional objective character in the object known. It will, therefore, have to be known. Then the knownness of that knownness again is to be known and this will lead to infinite regress.

Hence it follows that consciousness certifies itself in certifying everything and this has the following positive and negative implications. Negatively it means (1) that consciousness can never be unproved and uncertified, (2) that it cannot be certified by anything other than consciousness and (3) that it is not self-certified in the sense of being an object to itself. Positively it implies that in certifying objects it also certifies itself.

That consciousness never remains uncertified is clear from the fact that a consious individual can never doubt his consciousness. Doubting as a conscious process presupposes the existence of consciousness. And, again when a man knows an object he is also automatically conscious of the cognition. The judgment 'I know the table' means 'I know that I know the table'. When I say that I know the table, I cannot say that I know the talbe as unknown to me. It means that consciousness reveals itself in revealing objects. Consciousness also remains manifest even in the absence of all objective contents. Hence the self-luminosity (svayam prakāśatva) of consciousness implies that consciousness remains revealed without being an objective content either to itself or to any secondary cognition[1].

[1]Vide—The definition of Svayam Prakāśatva: "Avedyatve sati aparokṣa-Vyavahāra-Yogyatvam", citsukhī, N. S. Ed., p. 10.

Here a question may arise : Can there be any consciousness without an objective content ? Generally in our experience consciousness has always some objective reference, i.e. consciousness implies consciousness of object. Then what gurantee have we got to say that there is self-revealing consciousness unrelated to all objective reference ?

The experience of deep dreamless sleep may be cited to show the possibility of such consciousness. In deep dreamless sleep a man is not aware of any objective content and yet his consciousness does not remain unrevealed. After waking from a sound sleep a man is often heard to say 'I had a sound sleep' and 'I did not know what happened'. This is, of course, the report of memory and memory is impossible without a presented content. So it is to be admitted that consciousness without any objective content can be experienced at least in deep dreamless sleep.

Here the Naiyāyikas will say that deep dreamless sleep only reveals the absence of all forms of knowledge and 'I did not know anything in deep dreamless sleep' is not a report of memory but only an inference. Here, of course, it is asked in reply 'can we infer anything the like of which was never presented ?'[1] Actually speaking, there can be no such valid inference at all. The inference, if any, will be of the following form :—

The self in deep dreamless sleep is not conscious of any knowledge at all, as there is no remembrance of it.

Now, an inference cannot be valid if there is no previous knowledge of the pakṣa or the subject of inference and a defectless probans. But neither of them is possible in the inference under consideration. The subject of the inference 'the self in deep dreamless sleep' is unknown as no knowledge[2] is admitted to exist in deep dreamless sleep. So, the self in deep dreamless sleep[2] itself is inadmissible and hence this paksa cannot make a sound inference possible. The probans also of this inference is not defectless. 'The absence of remembrance' which is the probans here cannot imply the absence of perception always and everywhere. In the waking life of a man he comes across different things but does not remember all of them. The absence of remembrance of all these things cannot prove the absence of perception of the things on the part of the man. Actually speaking he perceived the things, but he cannot remember them as he did not seriously attend to them. So perception without proper attention cannot result in recollection. Moreover, the Naiyāyikas themselves admit that indeterminate perception cannot beget any memory. Therefore, the absence of remembrance does not always imply the absence of perception. Here it cannot also be said that the absence of one of the conditions of perception, i.e., sense-object contact in deep dreamless sleep proves the absence of knowledge. In this case the fallacy of

[1] Studies in Vedāntism (K. C. Bhattacharyya), p 7.
[2] Suṣupti.

mutual dependence (anyonyāśraya doṣa) will arise. The absence of the conditions of knowledge depends on the absence of knowledge and the absence of knowledge again is based on the absence of the conditions of knowledge. Thus it is clear that the probans of the inference is defective. Therefore, the absence of knowledge in deep dreamless sleep cannot be inferred. Actually there is the experience of contentless consciousness in Suṣupti which is certified by posterior memory in the form "I had a sound sleep" and "I did not know what happened". So the possibility of the existence of consciousness without any objective content cannot be ruled out altogether.

Consciousness which is unobjective and selfevident is also non-temporal. The self-luminosity of consciousness implies that consciousness is without a beginning and without an end. A beginning in time implies previous non-existence and an end in time, the absence after the destruction of the thing Thus beginning and end imply non-existence of two forms-antecedent and emergent. Now non-existence of Consciousness cannot be proved at all. The non-existence of a pot can be proved by the consciousness of its non-existence But the non-existence of consciousness cannot be proved in the same way without involving a selfcontradiction. The absence of consciousness can alone be proved by consciousness and this implies the existence of consciousness. So consciousness can have no beginning and end in time and thus implies the non-temporality of consciousness. The Vijñānavādin, however, thinks that the successive moments of consciousness alone are real Consciousness as abiding and continuous is a myth to him. Hume in the West subscribes to the same view when he thinks that the changing experiences or mental states are alone real and there is nothing as a continuous consciousness.

Here we may point out against the Vijñānavādin and Hume that consciousness in order to be successive must be conscious as successive and this implies transcending the sucessive nature of consciousness. Succession implies a consciousness which is not successive ; otherwise the very notion of succession loses its meaning and purport.

Moreover, if consciousness be successive and momentary, the conscious processes like memory and recognition will remain unexplained. Memory implies the retention and reproduction of the past parcept in its original form Now retention presupposes the continuity of consciousness as the past percept can be retained only in an abiding consciousness. If consciousness be momentary the past percept will be lost with the loss of the corresponding consciousness and in that case retention will be impossible. So, memory cannot be explained without presupposing the non-temporality of consciousness. Recognition implies the understanding of a present percept as perceived in the past also. Now this understanding is not possible without memory. Memory, again, as it is already shown is impossible without the continuity of consciousness. So recognition also presupposes the non-temporality of consciousness.

· In order to avoid these difficulties the Western psychologist James conceived consciousness as a stream. To him, consciousness cannot be chopped up into bits; it is a continous stream of experiences.

James does not clearly recognise the possibility of consciousness without any objective content. Here we differ with him. We believe in such a possiblitity and this has been already shown in this discussion. But the fact remains that even James cannot reject the continuty of consciousness and in this respect he sides with us.

Kant also had to think of a 'transcendental unity of apperception' or self-consciousness in order to explain the possiblity of knowledge as synthes's. Actually speaking, successive sensations cannot give us any knowlegde. The sensations are to be held together by a synthesis which is the synthes's of consciousness so that the knowledge of an object may be obtained. The Vijñānavādin and Hume, however, maintaining that discrete sensat'ons alone can give us knowledge disregard this truth. Kant, of course, accepts only the epistemic validity of self-consciousness and its ontic reality is denied by him. We have already shown that denial or rejection of consciousness is possible by consciousness alone and this shows the impossibility of rejecting the ontic reality of consciousness. So our thesis that ontic consciousness is non-temporal is proved beyond doubt.

Here it should be remembered that consciousness is not only non-temporal but also indivisible and homogeneous. Division implies a limitation and the division of consciousness is intelligible only if the limitation of consciousness can be logically understood. Now the limit of consciousness can alone be proved by consciousness itself. Consciousness, again, cannot prove the limit of consciousness without making the limited consciousness an object to itself. This is not possible, because we have already seen that consciousness cannot be an object of consciciousness and hence a limit of consciousness cannot be proved by consc'ousness. This proves the impossiblity of any division in consciousness and thus the *indivis.bility and homogeneity of consciousness are obtained.*

Now as consciousness is non-temporal, it is also non-contradicted. What is contradicted cannot but be temporal. The snake that appears on the locus of a rope is temporal as it is negated with the rise of the knowledge of the rope. So, what is non-temporal cannot ever be contradicted. Thus the non-temporality of consciousness proves its non-contrad:ctedness.

The following further reasons also may be given to prove the non-contradictedness of consciousness.

The contradiction of a particular thing can be shown by the awareness of another thing of a greater logical value. This implies that contradiction is possible *only by consciousness. So, the contradiction of consciousness, if possible, at all,* must be by consciousness. But this is absurd as the negatum and the negated cannot be the same thing. This shows that the contradiction of consciousness cannot be logically maintained.

A psychological analysis of waking experience, dream and dreamless sleep will reveal the same conclusion. The contents of waking experience are often found to be contradicted by the contents of dream experience and vice versa. In dreamless sleep again the contents of both waking experience and dream are negated and contentless consciousness alone shines forth. In these three stages of experience, the contents vary and often are contradicted by each other, but the common background, i.e., consciousness persists. Therefore, consciousness is to be admitted as non-contradicted. Thus it is proved that consciousness is self-luminous, non-temporal and non-contradicted and these constitute the uniqueness of consciousness.

The Advaitin defines Being as 'absence of negation'. This means that Being can never be negated. We have seen just now that consciousness cannot be negated without involving any self-contradiction. All other objects can be negated or denied. So consciousness alone is the ultimate Being. The objective world is other than consciousness. So it is other than Being also. What is other than Being is false. Thus the falsity of the world is evident.

Consciousness is already shown to be the Being. It may also be shown to be bliss now. In deep dreamless sleep alone consciousness is revealed in its pure form without any objective determination. Even the consciousness of the subtle body (sukṣmaśarīra), through which all forms of conscious activity are executed, is negated here (Pañcadaśī, 1/39). Consciousness shines here in its pure light and it is experienced as bliss. A man who rises up from a sound sleep knows that he had a blissful sleep. This knowledge is memory and unless he had a direct experience of a blissful state of existence in deep dreamless sleep, he would not have remembered it when aware. Memory is possible only on the basis of a content that was presented. So, the fact that there was the experience of bliss in deep dreamless sleep cannot be denied. It may be objected that the bliss is inferred from a memory of the state before the sleep and the perception of the state after waking. "It is asked in reply, can we infer anything the like of which was never presented ?" (Studies in Vedantism—K. C. Bhattacharyya, p. 7). Fire can be inferred from smoke as the co-existence of fire and smoke has been experienced by us. So the bliss of dreamless sleep can be inferentially known only when it has been previously experienced. Thus the experience of bliss in dreamless sleep cannot be denied in any way. There was consciousness also in that stage otherwise no experience would have been possible. So an analysis of dreamless sleep shows that consciousness is bliss. This can be fully realised in the turīya or the ecstatic state where the reality shines in its pure and essential nature. Deep dreamless sleep is only a pointer to that last stage.

From this long discussion, it is clear that consciousness occupies a unique position as it can never be negated. The very negation of consciousness posits its affirmation. But this is not the case with the objects. Now, that which can never be negated is ultimately real. Consciousness alone being of such a natuer

is to be regarded as the ultimate reality. Consciousness, as it is already shown, alone has the self-certifying capacity and other objects depend on consciousness for their evidence. This again adds support to the claim of consciousness as being the ultimate reality. Now consciousness being the ultimate reality, the world must be other than the real as it is other than consciousness. The world, again, cannot be unreal either as 'hare's horn' and 'the son of a barren woman' are. Unlike the unreal the world appears. So, it has objectivity without reality and this implies that the world is false.

Place of reasoning in Advaita Philosophy

The philosophy of Śaṁkara is Advaita on the positive side and Māyāvāda on its negative side. It is a metaphysic of absolute non-dualism based on the admission of the sole reality of consciousness and the falsity of all thngs that are other than consciousness.

Śaṁkara bases his philosophy mainly on śāstric statements. Three different sets of upaniṣadic texts constitute the basis of his philosophy. These are: (1) Texts teaching non-dualism such as, ekamevādvitīyam (Reality is One without a second), (2) Texts teaching the unreality of pluralism such as neha nānāsti kiñcana (there is no real plurality here) and (3) Texts teaching the non-dual Absolute to be the material cause of this universe (yato vā imāni bhūtāni jāyente, from which all the beings etc., have sprung forth).

The conclusions of Advaita Vedānta may also be arrived at by logical criticism and independent reflection. Śaṁkara himself, of course, does not attach much value to independent reasoning. He thinks that reasoning is a free activity and a man can reason in any way he likes. Finality can never be attained by unaided reasoning.[1] A man can easily refute the arguments of any other man. And in this way conflicts and differences of opinion originate without any final solution. If the argumentation be based on any revelation or if it is determined by certain infallible principles, truth can be easily ascertained. Arguments are effective only when they follow revelation or intuition. Bertrand Russel in the West thinks almost in the same line. He observes[2]: "Instinct, intuition or insight is what first leads to the beliefs which subsequent reasoning confirms or confutes;......... Reasoning is a harmonising, controlling force rather than a creative one". This shows the futility of unaided reasoning. Reasoning should be based on intuition or insight which alone can give us a glimpse of truth.

Truth cannot be obtained by one and all. Only a man who is pure in heart and clear in conscience can realise it. In Advaita philosophy, Truth is regarded as objective (Vastutantra) and not subjective (Puruṣatantra). Truth as objective is also eternal and universal. It is eternal in the sense that it is valid for

[1] Śārīrakabhāṣya, 2-1-11.

[2] Mysticism and Logic, p. 13.

all times and universal in the sense that it demands universal acceptance. Now Truth which is objective can be revealed only to the seers who are pure in heart and clear in conscience. It can never be constructed, created or manipulated by any man. The Vedas represent the truths which were revealed to the great seers of the past. Therefore, these are regarded as the embodiments of truth. As truth is not subjective, so the Vedas representing truth cannot also be the same. The Vedas are objective, universal and eternal. Now reasoning which is in conformity with the revealed truths of the Vedas can alone be relied upon. Actually speaking the value of reasoning lies in the clarification and explication of the revealed truths[3]. Here one is remineded of Mill's view with regard to the value and function of syllogism. He thinks 'that a syllogism is one of the special ways of dealing with the conclusion of an Induction.' Induction establishes general real propositions like "All men are mortal." Syllogism interprets these propositions by applying them to particular cases like Ram, Shyam and Jadu. Induction establishes a conclusion on the basis of observation and causal relation, while syllogism interprets it. In this interpretation lie the value and the function of syllogism. In the same way the Advaitin holds that truth is realised in intuition and reasoning interprets it. The significance of reasoning lies in the interpretation of the revealed truths and in nothing else.

Here a question may arise: If revealed truths are unquestionable, why are contradictory statements found in the upaniṣads which are admittedly the revealed texts? Brahman is said to be characterless and indeterminate (Kaṭha 3-15) and again Brahman has qualities (Muṇḍaka, 1-1-9). The world is said to be nonexistent (Bṛha 4-4-19; Śvetā 6-8) and again the world originates from Brahman (Taitti. Bhṛguvalli, 1). Brahman can never be known (Kaṭha, 6-12; Kena, 1-5, Bṛha 4-5-15) and again Brahman alone is to be known (Bṛha 4-4-19, Taitti 2-1-1). Jīva and Brahman are sometimes regarded as one (Chāndogya, 6-16-3) and again as different (Kaṭha 3-1, Śvetā 4-5). How can these contradictory statements be regarded as equally valid?

In answer we may say that the contradictions in the statements are only apparent and not real. The statements represent different grades of exprince and they are valid from different standpoints. Indian philosophy accepts the principle of the difference of station and duty (adhikāra-bheda vāda). It is admitted in India that all people have not the same capacity and so their station and duty also cannot be the same in the metaphysical and the spritual sphere. For this, the upaniṣads contain various principles which are meant for people at different stages of spiritual life. Advaita is meant only for the strong-hearted who can follow logic dauntlessly and face conclusions however, opposed to the ordinary ideas of reality and value. For them alone Brahman is the only reality, the world is false, and Jīva and Brahman are identical. This Brahman, again,

[3] "Śrutyaiva ca, sāhāyatvena tarkasya abhyupetatvāt"—Śārīraka bhāṣya, 1-1-2.

cannot be known in any ordinary way. Generally, whenever we know anything, we make it an object of knowledge. But Brahman being knowledge itself can not be an object to it. So, at the time of knowing Brahman, the subject becomes Brahman and ultimately knowing means being. Those, again, who are faint-hearted, turn to God for help and mercy. They understand Brahman as possessing attributes, the world as a real creation of Brahman, and Jīva as somewhat different from the Ultimate The Advaita position represnets the higher order of spiritual experience in relation to the theistic position. The theistic experience is not a chimera, but it is valid only from a particular standpoint. A higher order of experience with greater logical force reveals the veracity of the Advaita position, i.e, the non-duality of the ultimate reality.

Foreigners and modern men sometimes misunderstand the meaning and significance of adhikāra-bheda-vāda. They think that this principle goes against the modern humanistic concepion of the equality of all men. Prof. K. C. Bhattacharyya's elucidation of the principle may remove their doubts and misgivings. He observes: "The difference of adhikāra or spiritual status is not necessarily a gradation, and so far as it is a gradation it does not suggest any relation of higher and lower that implies contempt or envy. The notion of adhikāra in fact means, in the first instance, just an acceptance of fact or realism in the spiritual sphere. It is a question of duty rather than of rights in this sphere, and a person should be anxious to discover his acutal status in order that he may set before himeslf just such duties as he can efficiently perform in spirit. It is a far greater misfortune here to overestimate one's status than to underestimate it. A higher status does not mean greater opportunity for spiritual work, since work here means not outward achievement, but an inwardizing or deepening of the spirit" (Advaita vāda and its spiritual significance).

The ultimate reality of the Vedas and the futility of unaided reasoning are therefore logically admissible. Here it may be objected that as ordinary perception is determined by objects, it too is to be regarded as equally valid with the revealed truths of the Vedas.

We reply that validity may be of different forms. Śaṁkara himself admits three forms of validity—transcendental (Pāramārthika), empirical (vyāvahārika) and apparent (prātibhāsika). The apparent validity of a thing is constituted by its capacity of being presented. The snake that appears on the locus of a rope is apparently valid as it is presented, for however, short a period. Of course, the presentation of the object is visible only to a few and not to all. The world has empirical validity, as in the experience of us all it goes as objective and extramental. The world is experienced by all and not by some only, and hence it is superior in status to that of the illusory snake which appears only to a few. But all these experiences are cancelled in a higher realisation, where Brahman or Consciosuness alone shines in its pure light. The Śāstric realisation is superior to ordinary perception, as it supervences afterwards. In the case of apparent

reality, the experience of snake is cancelled by a later knowledge of the real nature of the rope. The experience of rope has empirical validity, and so is superior to that of the snake. This shows that when earlier and later knowledge come in conflict the later knoweldge negates the earlier.[4] The report of perception is contradicted by the later knowledge of the Vedas. In our ordinary perception the world appears as real, but in the Vedas it is negated as false. Here the ordinary perception conflicts with the vedic; and as the vedic *is a later knowledge, it is* superior to the verdict of the ordinary perception. Thus the ultimate validity of the Vedas cannot be questioned.

As Śaṁkara holds that scriptural knowledge is superior to any form of independent reasoning, so he relied more upon the vedic texts than upon mere reasoning. The Śāstric basis of Advaita philosophy has already been pointed out at the outset of this discussion. But it is not meant that Śamkara gives no logical arguments. In Adhyāsa bhāṣya we get superb logic with regard to the falsity of the world. Śaṁkara analyses our experience there, and shows that objectivity is superimposed on the pure subject, and that without this superimposition no objective element is intelligilbe in any way.

Experience involves a distinction between the subject and the object, the knower and the known. As light and darkness are fundamentally opposed to one another, so the subject and the object are. The subject is intelligence as such, but the object is non-intelligent and inert. So, there can be no intelligible relation between the two. But a relation is to be conceived between them in order to explain the possibility of our experience. As this relation cannot be real, it is only imaginary. It is known as the relation of superimposition. Now the question is : What is superimposition? Superimposition is perceiving something in some other thing (atasmin tadbuddhiḥ). The subject is pure self-revealing consciousness and devoid of all attributes. But we superimpose the characters of the object on the subject, and say 'I am lame'. 'I am dumb', 'I am blind', and the like. Lameness, dumbness, blindness etc., are the characters of the sense organs and these are imposed on the inmost self (pratyagātman). Again a man considers himself in difficulty when actually his relatives are in trouble. As the sky which is essentially characterless is conceived as blue, so the pure subject is understood as possessing ojective attributes. This is due to false identification between the subject and the object, which are fundamentally distinct and opposed in nature. As our experience is based on this false identification, it is definitely false. This proves the falsity of the experienced content or the object. It also proves the falsity of the world which as indentified with Consciousness *appears to be significant and meaningful.*

Later Śaṁkarites adduced further arguments to prove the falsity of the world. Post-śaṁkara Advaita philosophy is mainly based on independent

[4]"Tadanapavādhane tadapavādhatmānaḥ tasye utpattera-nupapatti" — Bhāmati, N. S. Ed., p. 10.

reasonging, and Post-Śaṁkara Advaita texts are argumentative treatises. Later Śaṁkarites adopted the technique of argumentation discovered by the logicians of the new school (Navya Naiyāyikas) and used it creditably in their treatises. Various objections were raised against the Advaita contention of the sole reality of Consciousness and falsity of all other things presentable. The Śaṁkarites answered these charges and defended their position against all these attacks. Argumentation, in Indian philosophy, proceeds in three different ways—positively, negatively and positively-negatively[5]. Vāda is the positive form of argumentation where a pholosopher tries to establish his position. The establishment of the thesis of a particular philosophy constitutes the subject-matter of the Vāda form of argumentation. Vitaṇḍā, on the other hand, negates all possible objections against a particular system of philosophy. Here the argumentation is purely negative in character, as it negates the charges and the views of the opponents without adducing any positive proof for the thesis in question. Jalpa is yet another form of argumentation where the positive and the negative characters of the same are balanced. Here the opponents are criticised only to prove the thesis of a particular philosopher. Positive proofs for the thesis are equally important here with the answers to the criticisms against it.[6]

In Post-Śaṁkara Advaita philophy, thinkers have used different forms of argumentation in different contexts. Sometimes treatises after treatises have been written as polemics against the opponents and the argumentation employed has taken the form of Vitaṇḍā. Khaṇḍanakhaṇḍa Khādya of Śrī Harṣa is a case in point. Śrī Harṣa here with the help of a formidable dialectic disproves the case of the opponents but does not take pains for the positive establishment of any thesis. All the efforts of Citsukhācārya, on the other hand, are mainly directed to establish the position of Advaita. So the argumentation used by him is mainly of the Vāda form. Sometimes, again, he uses Jalpa form of argumentation in his Tattvapradīpikā. There he establishes the Advaita conclusions by refuting the charges of the Nyāya Vaiśeṣikas.

We have already said that the Advaita position is based on the conception of the sole reality of consciousness. This negatively implies the falsity of things other than consciousness. Consciousness, as we have already seen, is a self-certifying reality. So no proof is necessary to establish it. Consciousness remains certified in certifying things other than conciousness. As conscsiousness requires no proof, so the falsity of the world alone is to be established. With the establishment of the falsity of the world, the nonduality of reality is automatically established. This is why the Advaitins are very particular to prove the falsity of the world and this is also the reason why we have taken up the concept of falsity as the special subject of our descussion.

[5]There ware three kinds of Kathās: Vāda, Jalpa and Vitaṇḍā (Nyāyabhāṣya, p. 1, 2, 1).

[6]*Vide* M. M. Jogendranāth Tarka Vedānta Tīrtha's article on "The art of philosophical disputation", published in the "Cultural Heritage of India".

Our discussion is minlay based on 'Advaita Siddhi' of Madhusūdan Saraswati, a famous post-Śaṁkarite philosopher. His work 'Advaitasiddhi' is both argumentative and conclusive. It represents all the arguments for Advaita and also the answers against the critics. We have taken up 'Advaita Siddhi' for its thoroughness and conclusiveness. Our contention will be proved if we discuss the different post-Śaṁkara philosophers and determine the place of Madhusūdana among the different luminaries of Advaita.

THE POST-ŚAṀKARA ADVAITINS

Advaita is the philosophy of Śaṁkara and his followers. Śaṁkara in his commentary on Brahma Sūtra presents his thesis of Advaita. Brahma Sūtra is the systematic representatatin of the Upaniṣadic teachings which seem sometimes to contradict one amother. Brahma Sūtra is in the form of aphorisms. As the aphorisms were very short and terse, different interpretations in the way of explanation of these aphorisms originated later on. Śaṁkara interprets Brahma Sūtra in his own way and shows that the consistency of the upaniṣadic texts can alone be maintained on the admission of the sole reality of consciousness and falsity of the world. The commentary of Śaṁkara on Brahmasūtra is known as Śārīraka bhāṣya. The post-Śaṁkara advaita philosophy originates out of the different interpretations and commentaries of Śārīraka bhāṣya. The commentators of Śārīraka bhāsya are all great scholars and the implications of Śaṁkara bhāṣya are fully manifest in their annotations. These annotations are mainly based on independent reasoning and sometimes insurmountable dialectic also is resorted to.

Of all the annotations of Śārīraka bhāṣya, Pañcapādikā of Padmapādācārya, a direct disciple of Śaṁkara is the most famous, Pañcapādikā is a marvellous exposition of Śaṁkara bhāsya. Padmapādācārya spares no pain to understand the implications of the teachings of his preceptor and to represent them in his annotation. The orthodox Śaṁkarites believe that the import of Śārīraka bhāṣya has been represented in its true perspective in Pañcapādikā. In 1200 A.D. Prakāśātma yati wrote an annotation on Pañcapādikā and it was known as Pañcapādikā Vivarana. In the fourteenth century the disciple of Ānanda Giri wrote a commentary on Pañcapādikā Vivarana of Prakāśātma yati and this is famous as Tattva dīpana. Almost simultaneously Viṣnu Bhattapādhyāya also wrote an annotation upon Pañcapādika Vivaraṇa Ṛju Vivarana by name. In the sixteenth century Ācārya Nṛsimhāśrama intercpreted Pañcapādikā Vivarana. His interpretative note is known as Bhāva Prakāśikā. In the year 1350 A.D. Vidyāraṇya muni wrote 'Vivaraṇa prameya Saṁgraha' which is entirely based on Pañcapādikā.

In the first half of the seventeenth century Pandit Rāmānanda Saraswatī wrote another book on Vivaraṇa. This is known as Vivaraṇopanyāsa. Vivaraṇa prameya Saṁgraha and Vivarnopanyāssa are not commentaries. They

may be regarded as independent treatises written in the Vivaraṇa line of thinking. Prakāśatma yati established a new school of Advaita Vedānta which is known as Vivaraṇa school according to the name of his book 'Pañcapādikā Vivaraṇa'. This Vivaraṇa school is considered to be the most representative school of Śaṁkara Vedānta as the thesis of this school is based on Pancapādikā Vivarana which is an annotation upon Pañcapādikā of Padmapādācārya, who was a direct disciple of Śaṁkara. It is held that the direct disciple of Śaṁkara could most definitely and correctly know the implications of the Śaṁkarite Vedānta better than any other Śaṁkarites. Therefore, the Vivaraṇa school which is ultimately based on 'Pañcapādikā' of the direct disciple of Śaṁkara is to be taken as the representative school of Śaṁkara Vedānta. Now this Vivaraṇa school of thinking can be clearly understood if we read Vivarana prameya Saṁgraha and Vivaraṇopanyāsa. Pañcapādikā and Vivarana also express the views of the same school.

Pancapādikā and Vivarana do not annotate the whole of Śārīraka bhāṣy: We get here annotations only on the first four sūtras. Of course, here it should be remembered that the first four sūtras of Śaṁkara bhāṣya express in full the entire philosophy of Śaṁkara.

In 1200 A.D. the author of Prakaṭārtha Vivaraṇa wrote a commentary on the whole of Śārīraka bhāṣya and this commentary is known as Prakaṭārtha Vivarana. Prakaṭārtha Vivaraña explicates the Vivaraña line of thinking which was implicity contained in Pañcapādikā Vivaraṇa of Prakāśātma yati. Prakatārtha Vivaraṇa, therefore, is an important study in order to understand the Vivarana view of Advaita Vedānta.

In the thirteenth centyry Advaitānanda composed 'Brahma Vidyābharaṇa' as an explanatory note of Śaṁkara bhāṣya. The views of Vācaspati Miṣra can be completely understood only with the help of this note. In the fourteenth century Śaṁkarānanda composed 'Brahma sūtra dīpikā' and explained the implications of Śārīraka bhāṣya in a lucid and emphatic way. In the fifteenth century, Ānanda Jñāna annotated Brahma Sūtra bhāṣya and his annotation is 'Nyāya nirṇaya'. In the last half of the sixteenth century Govindānanda wrote 'Bhāṣya ratnaprabhā' a commentary on Śārīraka bhāṣya in the Vivaraña line of thinking. In the same century Appayadikṣita wrote 'Nyāyarakṣāmaṇi'. 'Bhāmatī' also is an important commentary on Śārīraka bhāṣya. As the Vivaraṇa school of Advaita Vedānta is based on 'Pañcapādikā Vivarana', so the 'Bhāmatī' school of Advaita Vedānta orginates out of 'Bhāmatī', a commentary of Śaṁkara bhāṣya written by Vācaspatimiśra. Bhāmatī plays an important role in the interpretation and development of Śaṁkara Vedānta. Of course, the orthodox thinkers hold that Vivarana represents Śaṁkara more faithfully than Bhāmatī. This contention is based on the consideration that Vivarana

[1]The name of the author of the book 'Prakaṭārtha Vivaraṇa' is not known. He is known as the author of Prakaṭārtha Vivaraṇa.

view is based on Pañcapādikā of Padmapāda, a direct disciple of Śaṁkara and the disciple is to know his preceptor's view better than any other man.

Bhāmatī was written in the ninth century and Amalānanda wrote 'Vedānta Kalpataru' as a commentary on Bhāmatī in the thirteenth century A. D. In the sixteenth century Appayadīksita composed 'Vedānta Kalpataru Parimala', an argumentative treatise on 'Vedānta Kalpataru' of Amalānanda. All these commentaries expound the Bhāmatī view of Advaita Vedānta. In the seventeenth century Śrīmat Lakṣmīnṛsiṁha wrote 'Ābhoga' as an explication of Kalpataru. Śrīmat Lakṣmīnṛsiṁha is much influenced by Appay Dīkṣita the author of 'Vedānta Kalpataru Parimala'. Besides these there are other books also like 'Bhāmatī Tilaka', 'Bhāmatī vilāsa' and 'Bhāmatī Vyākhyā' written in the line of Bhāmatī school of thinking. All these books show the popularity of the Bhāmatī view in Post-Śaṁkara Advaita philosophy.

Bhāmatī differs from Vivarana on certain details of Śaṁkara philosophy. Citsukhācārya wrote 'Bhāṣya bhāva-prakāśikā', an annotation of Śaṁkara bhāsya explaining the different points of view of the Vivaraṇa and the Bhāmatī schools of thinking. Nārāyaṇa Saraswatī and others also wrote voluminous commentaries on Śārīraka bhāṣya of Ācārya Śaṁkara.

The name of Maṇḍana Miśra or Sureśvarācārya needs special mention among the post-Śaṁkara advaitins. It is held that Maṇḍana Miśra at first was an ardent advocate of Pūrva Mīmāṁsā. Later on he was defeated by Śaṁkarācārya in argumentation and became a follower of Śaṁkara.* At the time Maṇḍana Miśra became known as Sureśvarācārya. His 'Naiskarmya Siddhi' is a famous treatise in advaita litrature. Vidyāraṇya, Appaydīkṣita, Sadānada and other post-Śaṁkara advaitins made special mention of this book in their treatises. This shows the importance of the bock in Advaita literature and post-Śaṁkara Advaita philosophy. Sureśvarācārya followed Śaṁkara as a loyal disciple all through his book. Another book 'Brahmasiddhi' goes by the name of Mandana Mira Here the conclusions do not agree with the views of Śaṁkara. That Mandana Miśra was really the author of 'Brahma Siddhi' was admitted by personalities like Śrīdharācārya is his 'Nyāya Kandali' (N. K. pp. 218) and Citsukhācārya in his 'Tattvapradīpikā' (Tattva. pra. pp. 140). So the authorship of 'Brahma Siddhi' should undoubtedly go to Maṇḍana Miśra. As the conclusions here do not tally with the conclusions of 'Naiṣkarmya Siddhi', certain people are of opinion that Maṇḍana Miśra and Sureśvaārcārya were two dintinct persons with distinct views on Vedānta. Here the orthodox opinion is that Maṇḍana Miśra and Sureśvarācārya were the same person (vide Śaṁkaradikvijya X4, Prof. Hiriyanna—Journal Royal Asiatic Society—issues of April, 1923 and of January,

*It is learnt from the book 'Śaṁkara dik vijaya' written by Vidyāraṇyamuni that Maṇḍana Miśra was a desciple of Kumārila Bhaṭṭa, the founder of the Bhāṭṭa School of the Mīmāṁsā philosophy and he was deputed by Kumārila for arguing with Śaṁkara when Śaṁkara approached him for argumentation.

the world. He showed through dialectic that no object of this world can be consistently described as either real or unreal. Now what is neither real nor unreal is false or anirvācya. Therefore, the falsity of the world is automatically proved.

Towards the end of the twelveth century and the beginning of the thirteenth century Nyāya of the new school and the dualistic philosophy of Madhvācārya stemmed the tide of Advaita philosophy. At that time Citsukhācārya, Ācārya Śaṁkarānanda, Amalānanda Swamī and others removed all obstacles in the onward march of Advaita philosophy. Citsukhācārya defined the concept of falsity in his own way and established the self-luminosity of consiousness or ātman. His 'Tattvapradīpikā' has produced a land mark in the history of Advaita philosophy.

In the fourteenth century Venkaṭanāthā, Rāmānujacaya the second, Barada Viṣnu Ācārya and others tried to propagate the Rāmānujite school of Vedānta. At that time Vidyāraṇya Muni appeared on the scene and the whole atmosphere was changed. Advaita philosophy again became the victor and the tide of the antagonistic systems of philosophy subsided. Vivarana prameya Saṁgraha of Vidyāranya Muni is a famous book of this period. Ānandajñāna or Ānandagiri and Rāmādvaya also are two famous advaitins of this period.

In the fifteenth century Raghunātha Śiramāni gave a new lease of life to the Nyāya system of philosophy. Śaṁkara Miśra also added strength to the Vaiśeṣikas. Śrī Caitanya raised a revolt against Advaita philosophy and founded his Bhakti-cult which is known as Vaiṣnavism of Bengal. Vijñāna Bhikṣu wrote different books from the standpoint of Sāṁkhya philosophy and hence Advaita philosophy was on the wane. At that time Prakāśānanda, Nṛsiṁhāśrama, Appaya Dīkṣita and other advaitins wrote different books in order to revive the pristine glory of Advaita Vedānta.

At this time Vyāsarāja Swāmī again raised a revolt against Advaita Vedānta. He was a follower of Mādhva dualism and followed the line of argumentation adopted by Jayatīrtha, a famous dualistic Vedāntin. He tried to refute Advaita Vedānta and with that end in view wrote Nyāyāmṛta. We have already seen that the concept of falsity is a very important concept in Advaita philosophy. Vyāsarāja tried to refute all the different orientations of falsity advocated by different post-Śaṁkara advaitins like Padmapāda, Prakāṣātma yati, Ānandabodha and Citsukhācārya. We have seen again that Padmapāda, Prakāśātma yati, Ānandabodha and Citsukhācārya are regarded as great exponents of Advaita Philosophy. So the refutation of their arguments raised a hue and cry in the fold of Advaita Vedānta. Thus in order to show the infallibility of Advaita Vedānta the refutation of Vyāsarāja's Nyāyāmṛta was an absolute demand.

1924). The same person wrote 'Brahma Siddhi' and 'Naiṣkarmya Siddhi' at different times. When he wrote 'Brahma Siddhi' he was uninitiated by Śaṁkara and a follower of Mīmāṁsā philosophy and his name was Manḍana Miśra. Later on he was initiated by Śaṁkara and wrote 'Naiṣkarmya siddhi' in the name of Sureśvarācārya. Therefore, the differences of opinion in 'Brahma Siddhi' and 'Naiṣkarmya Siddhi' are obvious even though they were written by the same author.

Sarvajñātma Muni (758-858 A.D.) also was a famous advaitin of the post-Śaṁkara period. He wrote Śaṁkṣepa Śārīraka in order to explain the implications of the Śaṁkarite philosophy. Many subsequent writers quoted the views of Sarvajñātma Muni as authoritative and some others annotated his Saṁkṣepa Śārīrka. Appaya-Dīkṣita referred to the views of Sarvajñātma Muni on different occasions in his 'Siddhānta Leśa-Saṁgraha (Sidh. Leśa p.p. 26, 186, 233, 359, 433 Śrī Vidyā. e.d.). Nṛsiṁhāśrama wrote 'Tattvabodhinī' as a commentary on Saṁkṣepa Śārīrka and other commentaries were also written on the same book by personalities like Puruṣottama Dīkṣita (subodhinī). Rāghavānanda (Vidyāmṛta varṣinī), Madhusūdan Saraswatī (Sāra Saṁgraha) and Rāmatīrtha (Anvayāratha prakāśikā). These definitely prove the improtance of Sarvajñātma Muni and his Saṁkṣepa Śārīrka in post-Śaṁkara Advaita philosophy.

Vimuktātman (between 9th and 10th century A.D.) developed a new line of argumentation in Post-Śaṁkara philosophy. He for the first time tried to show the validity of the Śaṁkarite conclusions by strong independent arguments. Later on in the twelve and thirteenth centuries A.D. Śrī Harṣa, Ānandabodha, citsukhācārya and others followed his foot steps and inaugurated 'Vedantic dialectics'. Ānandabodha in his 'Nyāya Makaranda' is said to have shown origginality in discussing the different theories of illusion and showing the indescribability of Māyā, the matrix of the world. But his originality is mainly due to the influence of 'Iṣṭa Siddhi', a book written by Vimuktātman. Citsukhācārya in his 'Tattvapradīpikā' (pp. 381, N. S. ed.), Amalānanda Swamī in his 'Vedānta Kalpataru' (pp. 932, N. S. ed), Vidyaraṇya Muni in his 'Vivarana prameya Saṃgraha' (pp. 225) and Venkatadeśika in his 'Sarvārtha Siddhi' have made special mention of 'Iṣṭa Siddhi'. This definitely goes to the credit of Vimuktātman, the author of 'Iṣṭa Siddhi'.

In the tenth and eleventh centuries Advaita philosophy experienced a dull period and the opponents like the Nyāya Vaiśeṣikas took the upper hand. In the twelveth century Śrī Harṣa wrote a polemic against the Nyāya Vaiśeṣikas and thus the revival of Advaita philosophy in its pristine glory was possible.

Śrī Harṣa wrote his famous book 'Khaṇḍana-Khanda-khādya' only to refute the views of the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣikas. We have already shown that falsity or Māyā is an important concept in Advaita philosophy. The Naiyāyikas and the Vaiśeṣikas attacked this concept in the bitterest terms possible. Śrī Harṣa showed the futlity of this attack by proving the indescribability or falsity of

the world. He showed through dialectic that no object of this world can be consistently described as either real or unreal. Now what is neither real nor unreal is false or anirvācya. Therefore, the falsity of the world is automatically proved.

Towards the end of the twelveth century and the beginning of the thirteenth century Nyāya of the new school and the dualistic philosophy of Madhvācārya stemmed the tide of Advaita philosophy. At that time Citsukhācārya, Ācārya Śaṁkarānanda, Amalānanda Swamī and others removed all obstacles in the onward march of Advaita philosophy. Citsukhācārya defined the concept of falsity in his own way and established the self-luminosity of consiousness or ātman. His 'Tattvapradīpikā' has produced a land mark in the history of Advaita philosophy.

In the fourteenth century Venkaṭarāthā, Rāmānujacaya the second, Barada Viṣṇu Ācārya and others tried to propagate the Rāmānujite school of Vedānta. At that time Vidyāranya Muni appeared on the scene and the whole atmosphere was changed. Advaita philosophy again became the victor and the tide of the antagonistic systems of philosophy subsided. Vivaraṇa prameya Saṁgraha of Vidyāranya Muni is a famous book of this period. Ānandajñāna or Ānandagiri and Rāmādvaya also are two famous advaitins of this period.

In the fifteenth century Raghunātha Śīramāni gave a new lease of life to the Nyāya system of philosophy. Śaṁkara Miśra also added strength to the Vaiśeṣikas. Śrī Caitanya raised a revolt against Advaita philosophy and founded his Bhakti-cult which is known as Vaisnavism of Bengal. Vijñāna Bhikṣu wrote different books from the standpoint of Sāṁkhya philosophy and hence Advaita philosophy was on the wane. At that time Prakāśānanda, Nṛsiṁhāśrama, Appaya Dikṣita and other advaitins wrote different books in order to revive the pristine glory of Advaita Vedānta.

At this time Vyāsarāja Swāmī again raised a revolt against Advaita Vedānta. He was a follower of Mādhva dualism and followed the line of argumentation adopted by Jayatīrtha, a famous dualistic Vedāntin. He tried to refute Advaita Vedānta and with that end in view wrote Nyāyāmṛta. We have already seen that the concept of falsity is a very important concept in Advaita philosophy. Vyāsarāja tried to refute all the different orientations of falsity advocated by different post-Śaṁkara advaitins like Padmapāda, Prakāṣātma yati, Ānandabodha and Citsukhācārya. We have seen again that Padmapāda, Prakāśātma yati, Ānandabodha and Citsukhācārya are regarded as great exponents of Advaita Philosophy. So the refutation of their arguments raised a hue and cry in the fold of Advaita Vedānta. Thus in order to show the infallibility of Advaita Vedānta the refutation of Vyāsarāja's Nyāyāmṛta was an absolute demand.

Vyāsarāja Swāmī had a keen intellect and he was a great logicain also. The Naiyāyikas of the new school were famous for their logical acumen and agrumentative capacity. Vyāsarāja refutured the characterisitics of the different valid sources of knowledge enunciated by these Naiyāyikas. This shows the fineness and keeness of the intellect of Vyāsarāja Swāmī. This again shows how difficult it is to refute the arguments of a man like Vyāsarāja's calibre and so the establishment of Advaita position by refuting the arguments of Vyāsarāja became a stupendous task. Madhusūdana Saraswatī took upon himself that task of refutation and wrote 'Advaita Siddhi' in order to establish the validity of the Advaita conclusions. He refuted all the charges of Vyāsarāja against the different definitions and arguments of falsity and thus concluded that as the world is proved false, so the non-duality of the reality is automatically established. By refuting Vyāsarāja, Madhusūdana showed to all subsequent philosophers that Advaita philosophy stands on a solid rock and it cannot be rejected or refuted easily.

I have based the following chapters of my book mainly on Advaita Siddhi of Madhusūdana as he has summed up all the arguments for Advaita Vedānta in his treatise and refutes the objections of a grant logician like Vyāsarāja. The Dualists are the bitterest foes of the Advaitins. The Advaitins prove the non-duality of reality by showing the falsity of the world. The Dualists on the other hand maintain that the world is in no sense false. Vyāsarāja was a champion of the dualistic Mādhava school of Vedānta. So his charges against Advaita may be regarded as the best charges that a dualist can offer. A refutation of such best charges against Advaita would mean the refutation of all possible dualistic charges against Advaita. Madhusūdana Saraswatī has refuted Vyāsarāja's charges. This is why it may be said that advaita can be best uderstood by a reading of Madhusudana's Saraswati's 'Advaita-Siddhi'. It is this Madhusūdana's argumentative and analytic notion of Advaita that I have developed in the following chapters of my book. I have followed Madhusūdana closely, though I have retained the freedom of interpreting his points in my own way in order to make them intelligible.

THE DIFFERENT DEFINITIONS OF FALSITY.

The Advaita thinkers have defined falsity in different ways. There are five different definitions of falsity in Advaita literature. These are, no doubt, distinguishable from one another, but these do not represent any superiority or inferiority among them. Actually, speaking, these are alternative describptions of falsity, self-dependent and equally valid.

Padmapāda, the author of Pañcapādikā defines falsity as 'not being the locus of either reality or unreality' (Sadasattvānadhikaraṇatva). This means that the false is distinct from both reality and unreality. Reality implies non-contradiction or non-sublation. This, in turn, implies that reality is non-temporal

or non-transitory. The unreal can not be presented at all. The world is presented to us, so it is distinct from the unreal. Again as it is temporal and transitory so it is other than reality also. This means that the world as distinct from both reality and unreality is to be taken as false.

Prakāśātman defines the false as that which is eternally negated in the same locus where it is cognised (Pratipannopādhau traikālika niṣedha pratiyogitvam mithyātvam). The nacre is cognised in the locus of silver and again it is negated in the same locus when the silver is known in its real features. There fore, the nacre superimposed on silver is to be taken as false. The implication of this definition is : the false appears but it is negated. This means that the false is temporal or transitory though it has the ability to appear.

Prakāśātman defines falsity yet in another way. The false is that which is contradicted, by knowldege (Jñānanivarttyatvam mithyātvam). This means that what appears as a content of illusory cognition and ceases with the cognition of the real nature of the content is false. This again implies that the false appears and then it is negated and so it is non-eternal in nature.

Citsukhācārya considers the false as that the locus of which is equally the locus of its eternal negation (Svāśārayaniṣṭhātyantābhāva pratiyogitvam vā mithyātvam).

This definition appears to be the replica of the first definition of falsity given by Prakāśātman. But a close observation will reveal that the substantive and the adjective of the first definition have changed their places in the fourth definition. For further details the chapter on the 4th definition of falsity should be consulted. So the definition of falsity given by Citsukhācārya is no repetition of the first definition of falsity given by Prakāśātman. Of course, the implication of the definition of Citsukha remains the same with that the of Prakāśātman. The false appears and again it is sublated.

Ānandabodha describes falsity as other than reality (Sadviviktatvam vā mithyātvam). Here unreality has not been recognised as a catoegry. The details are discussed in the fifth definition of falsity. That which cannot appear at all (the unreal) can be no real content of discourse. So it should not be taken into consideration at all. We are concerned only with things which are presented or presentable. Now among the presnted objects, the real is non-temporal or non-contradicted. The consciousness alone cannot be contradicted (Vide pages 34, 35, 36). So the world which is other than consciousness should be regarded as false.

It is clear then that though there are different definitions of falsity, they mean the same thing ultimately. The false is that which is presented but later on contradicted or negated. We shall now critically examine the different definitions of falsity in the following chapters.

CHAPTER ONE

The first definition of Falsity.

(The panchapādikā view)

Reality, according to Advaita Vedānta is one without a second and this is Brahman, the supreme. What is other than Brahman is other than reality also. From this, it follows that the world as distinct from this one is distinct from reality. The Advaitins, therefore, regard this world as false. Now a controversy arises over the actual meaning of the term 'falsity'. Some critics identify vedāntic falsity with unqualified unreality and accuse the Advaitins for their other wordly attitude. In advaita literature, however, we get sufficient rebuff to this. The Advaitins contend that falsity is a third category which is distinct from the categories-reality and unreality. Here we propose to discuss the view of the author of Pañcapādikā, a celebrated advaita text, concerning this problem.

The author of Pañcapādikā defines falsity as 'not being the locus of either reality or unreality (Sadasattvānadhikaranatva). He cites as a case of falsity the example of silver superimposed on nacre.

The Mādhvas contend that first this is an ambiguous definition, 'not being the locus of either reality or unreality 'being intelligible in at least three different senses, and secondly, with all these alternative senses the concept is yet in the end untenable.

'Not being the locus of either reality or unreality' may in the first place mean that in the world there is the eternal absence of unreality qualified by reality, i.e., of real unreality. But this, as the Mādhvas point out, would involve the fallacy of proving the proved (Sidhasādhana). For, if there is no real unreality in the world, this world is real and the Mādhvas already admit this. Further, the negatum, here, is itself a chimera, unreality which is at the same time real is an impossible affair and if this is shown to be non-existent in the world, it would obviously be a case of proving what is already accepted. The Naiyāyikas add that as 'unreality which is at the same time real' is no fact of the world, there is the further fallacy of proving something which or the like of which is never found in this word (Aprasidhi).

'Not the locus of either reality or unreality' may in the second place mean what is neither the locus of reality nor that of unreality. But here there would first of all be the violation of the law of contradiction, according to which, two contradictory qualities cannot be denied of the same thing at the same time. If reality is denied, unreality has to be affirmed of it and vice versa. But as here the false is being defined as what is nether real nor unreal, the law is obviously violated. The definition is also untenable on the ground that it exactly misses what it ought to mean and actually means something else. Brahman, which,

according to the text 'Kevalaḥ, nirgunaśca', is neither real nor unreal, is, to the Advaitins, the only reality: and yet obviously this definition of falsity applies to this. Of the world. again, we cannot predicate "neither reality nor unreality' —for this would violate the law of contradiction-which obviously means that the world is not false, i.e., it is real. Thus while on the one hand the Advaitin with his definition fails to prove the falsity of the world and has rather proved it to be real, he bungled similarly with Brahman—his definition would rather make it unreal though with him it is the only reality. There would be a further fallacy also, if this second definition be accepted. The fallacy is as follows :—

The Advaitin is inferring the falsity (in the second sense) of the world. But in every concrete inference where S (World) is being shown to be P (Flase), we must first have an undisputed case (dṛṣṭānta) where this P is present, a case where having perceived the association of M (probāns) with P (probāndum) we have had come to know the universal concomitance (vyāpti) of M and P, in the form 'All M is P.' But if the probāndum 'falsity' be understood in the second sense as above, it turns out that in the so-called undisputed case (dṛṣṭānta) with which we started, the probāndum cannot be found present. Neither reality nor unreality is the probandum here, and the appearance of silver on nacre is said to be the undisputed case. But as according to the Mādhvas the superimposed silver is unreal, there is obviously no absence of unreality in the dṛṣṭānta, the dṛṣṭānta, in other words, is not 'not the locus of unreality'.

There are two other fallacies also—One is the absence of the probāndum and the other is the useless phenomenon of proving what is already taken for granted. The first fallacy arises because there is no case in our experience where there is the absence of both reality and unreality. One can indeed point here to the fact that unreality is absent in reality and reality in unreality, so there is no queston of the first of these two fallacies. But even then the second one is unavoidable. According to the Mādhvas, the world being real there is always the eternal absence of unreality, a part of the given probāndum, in it and so this need not be proved again.

Falsity may, thirdly, be defined as the eternal absenc of unreality characterised by the eternal-absence-of-reality. But then three different fallacies will arise, viz. (a) violation of the law of contradiction, (b) proving what was not intended and (c) anomaly round the probāndum. Reality and unreality are contradictory to each other, so they cannot both be true at the same time. But here this law of contradiction has been violated as falsity has been defined as unreality qualified by reality. This is the first fallacy. Secondly, as even the Indeterminate Brahman may, according to the Advaitin, be real in spite of the fact that It is qualified by 'eternal absence of reality', so also may the world as the eternally unreal qualified by eternal reality be taken as real, In other words, if the eternal reality (Brahman) in spite of being qualified by the eternal unreality (of the world) could yet be real, the eternal unreality not affecting the eternal reality in any manner

why should there be such affection in the case of the world? In that case too there are eternal unreality (the world) and the eternal reality (Brahman). If in the case of Brahman the two being present and one being qualified by the other, could not affect the reality of Brahman, the same thing should be admitted in the case of the world too. The world, in other words, would be as real as *Brahman*. This is the second fallacy. Lastly, there would be anomaly round the probandum. Unreality is not absent in the superimposed silver. According to the Mādhvas, it is unreal.

The present definition is also defective on the ground that the qualified probandum—the eternal absence of unreality characterised by the eternal absence of reality—is never a fact.

To the above Mādhva charges the Advaita replies are as follows :

The Advaitins never understand 'not being the locus of either reality or unreality' in the first sense. The second sense alone truly represents the advaita point ; *the false is that which evinces both the properties, viz.* 'eternal absence of reality' and 'eternal absence of unreality.' And yet none of the fallacies which the Mādhvas have urged are tenable. Let us see how.

First, there is no violation of the law of contradiction. The contradiction *in question may be understood in three ways*—(1) Reality *and unreality imply* that each is not (anyonyābhāva) the other, so that both of them cannot be negated at the same time and in the same place. (2) The absence of reality (atyantābhāva) is unreality and the absence of unreality is reality, i.e. where reality is absent there is unreality and where unreality is absent there is reality. As the two exhaust the universe of discourse, it is not possible that both of them will be absent at the same time and in the same place. (3) The presence of reality means the absence of unreality and the presence of unreality means the absence of reality. The presence of whiteness implies the absence of blackness while the presence of blackness means the absence of whiteness.

The first alternative is to be immediately rejected. The Advaitins do not *recognise* reality and unreality as the mutual negation of each other. Reality, according to them, is what remains non-contradicted through all times, and the unreal is what can never be presented at all. Hare's horn and the son of a barran woman are unreal in the sense that they can never be presented. So, reality and unreality are not contradictory and hence there is no question here of any violation of the law of contradiction.

But does not the false silver (on the locus of nacre) involve self-contradiction, the silver being neither real nor unreal (i.e. both not real and not unreal)? The Advaitin replies that there is no self-contradiction here. The silver is not real in the only sense that it is sublated when the nacre comes to be known, and not unreal in the only sense that it was shomehow presented.

If now, the first alternative is faultless, the second alternative also cannot be wrong. The absence of reality is not unreality and the absence of unreality is not reality. So, in this case also there can be no violation of the law of contradiction.

The third alternative raises no problem at all to the Advaitins. The presence of whiteness means the absence of blackness and the presence of blackness implies the absence of whiteness. But we may find a third case 'redness' where both whiteness and blackness are absent. In the same way we may find this world where the absence of both reality and unreality is easily intelligible as the presence of reality means the absence of unreality and the presence of unreality implies the negation of reality.

The charge of non-sequiter (i.e. proving what was not intended for proof) is also baseless. Brahman is indeterminate and hence no property like 'real' or 'unreal' can be predicated of it; it is reality itself, not possessing any property like reality. The world cannot in this way be reality; and as world it is neither real nor unreal.*

The Mâdhva charge of (partially) proving what is already taken for granted equally fails. It has been argued that the absence of unreality in the case of the world is accepted by the Mâdhvas, so when we try to prove the absence of both reality and unreality in the world, the part of it is already proved. Here the Advaitins claim that the probandum cannot be split up into parts in this way and therefore the fallacy in question does not arise at all. We shall have either to reject the probandum in toto or to accept it in full. No third alternative except the two is given to us.

There is, again, no absence of the probandum in the dṛṣṭanta. The superimposed silver on nacre is indeed neither real nor unreal; it is other than reality because *it is not eternally non-contradicted* and other than unreality as it is presented and what is presented cannot be unreal.

---

*But why, then, do we at all say that the world is real?

An answer to this question will throw much light on our central problem.

Objects, like pots are perceived to be real and the world is nothing but the combination of an infinite number of such objects. Here it may be pointed out that if we recognise different objects separately as real, there would be a plurality of hypothesis, compared with which the concept of Brahman alone as real would be parsimonious, particularly in view of the fact that the latter alone can explain the so-called reality of the different objects of the world. The objects are real as they are superimposed on Brahman which is ultimately real. Moreover, the recurrent perception of reality in the case of different objects is not intelligible if we do not think that Brahman, the locus of these objects, is real.

In the propositions "This pot is existent", This other pot is existent" and the like, the relation between the noun and the adjective is not recurrent. So there can be no intelligible recurrent perception of existence in these cases. The Advaitins, of course, can explain this, as according to them, everything is real fo Brahman, the locus, is real.

All the charges against the Pañcapādikā view of falsity thus fall to the ground. So, the concept of falsity as the locus of neither reality nor unreality is faultless.

The Naiyāyikas, of course, have accepted 'existence' as a universal in order to explain the recurrent perception of existence in different objects of the world. Therefore all objects according to them where this universal 'existence' lies should be regarded as existent. Now certain anomalies arise in this view. The Naiyāyikas accept the application of the universal 'existence' only to the three categories—Substance (Dravya), quality (Guna) and activity (Karma). If the perception of existence can be had only *in relation to the 'existence'*, we can *know* only substances, qualities and activities as existent. But we definitely recognise the universals, inherence (Samavāya) and particularlity also as existent. The Naiyāyikas can not explain how this is possible. Secondly, the very existence of the universal 'existence' in relation to which substances, qualities and activities are recognised as existent remains unproved as it has no relation to any second 'existence'. Moreover, we cannot understand how this non-existent 'existence' could make the existence of other things possible. Here the Vaiśeṣikas say that in substances, qualities and activities, the existence lies in the relation of inherence whereas it is present in universals, particularity and inherence in the relation of ekārthasamavāya, meaning that in the locii of these —which locii are but substance, qualities and activities, the universal *existence* has inhered. But the perception of existence, the Advaitin holds, is judgmental *(savikalpaka), the existent object known in that perception being what is qualified* by existence. Now a qualified perception involves three elements—the substantive, the adjective and the relation between them. Though the universal existence is not related in the same way to Dravya, Guṇa, Karma, Sāmānya, Viśeṣa and Samavāya, the savikalpa pratyakṣa remains neverthless the same. But the sameness of perception can only be due to the sameness of the object. If the sameness of perception is admitted in the presence of different objects, we are to admit that perception is possible without an object to percieve and this we know is the contention of the Vijñānavādi Buddists and not of the Vaiśeṣikas.

(The Advaitins however will say that all the objects of this world can be known as existent simply because they are superimposed on Brahman, the ultimate reality, in the relation of identity.) The difficulty of the Vaiśeṣikas, therefore, does not arise here. Moreover, the Vaiśeṣikas are to admit a universal "existence" in order to explain our perceptions like 'this is an existent pot' and 'this is another existent pot'. But this contention cannot be justified in any way. In the perception 'this is an existent pot', the pot appears as non-different from existence. The Vaiśeṣikas, however, are to say that the relation of inherence between the pot and existence is also evident here. But this cannot be. The relation of inherence implies a difference between the relata. The non-difference of pot and existence cannot be explained in terms of this relation of difference.

Kant, in Western Philosophy, will say that the objects are percieved as empirically existent due to the association of forms and categories. But the transcendental existence is due to their reference to thing-in-itself, which is alone real. So far as the empirical reality of objects is concerned, the Advaitins will have *nothing to say against* Kant *as they are ready to admit anything in the empirical* plane. Their main concern is with the transcendental sphere. Here of course Kant will side with the Advaitins. The Advaitins claim to explain the 'existence' of objects with reference to the existence of Brahman, which alone ultimately exists. Kant will also say that thing-in-itself is the existent reality and the objects are said to exist as they refer to thing-in-itself. But Kant will part company with the Advaitins when he will say that content can exist apart from existence. This content without existence or 'what' without 'that' can alone be somewhat intelligible if we consider this as universal. Russell and his friends actually believe in subsistent entities, which, according to them, are universals. But here again the Advaita Vedāntins will point out that the universal also has *existence, not only in our mind, but also in the particular objects of experience.* The universal is constituted by the essential common characteristics of all the particular individuals. So the universal is not distinct from the individuals but is identical with them in point of existence. The Logical positivists, of course, will say that there is nothing as universal. This is only due to language. But we are not ready to accept this. If the universal is not any thing significant, how can we know that a particular object belongs to a particular class ? And again, if we do not know this, how can we recognise a thing as this and not that ? A new table is recognised as a table because we have the knowledge of 'tablenes', which this table exemplifies and this 'tableness' is definitely a universal. Not only this. That a table is a table and not a chair is also known on the basis of the knowledge of the 'tableness' in the table. If we did not know that this table belonged to the class 'table', it would not have been possible for us to recognise it as a table. These definitely show that the universal is never a matter of language. It is very important and therefore it cannot be neglected on filmsy ground.

This long discussion, therefore, reveals the fact that Advaita explanation of the recurrent perception of 'existence' alone is intelligible and satisfactory. All other theories concerning this problem fall short of our expectation.

CHAPTER TWO

The Second definition of Falsity.

Prakāśātman, the author of Vivaraṇa, has given us two alternative definitions of falsity. First, he tells us 'the false is that which is eternally negated in the very locus where it appears' (Pratipannopādhau traikālika-niṣedha-pratiyogitvam). Secondly, he says, the false also may be that which is contradicted by knowledge (jñānanivarttyatvam). These two alternative definitions of falsity will be discussed separately. In this Chapter we shall discuss the first definition of Vivaraṇācārya and this is second in the series of the five definitions of falsity. Prakāśātman's second definition which will be the third definition in the scheme of the different defintions of falsity will be discussed in the next Chapter.

(Prakāśātman, as we have already said, has defined falsity as that which is eternally negated in the very locus where it appears' (Pratipannpopādhau traikālika-niṣedha-pratiyogitvam). The silver that appears in the locus of nacre is false as it is eternally negated in the same locus. Actually speaking the silver never exists in nacre. The silver is only a false appearance of nacre.) The expression 'in the very locus where it appears' has been used in order to exclude non-existent entities like hare's horn from the scope of this definition. (The non-existent entities also are eternally negated, but they never appear in any locus.) So they are unreal and never false. The false is that which appears and which is also an object of knowledge. But the unreal never appears and it is no object of knowledge also. The significance of 'eternal negation' lies in the fact that antecedent and emergent negations cannot make a thing false. The pot has antecedent negation in Clay and it has emergent negation in the parts (Kapāla). But this is no reason why the pot is to be condemned as false. The world, according to this definition, is false as it is eternally negated in Brahman where it appears to exist.

The eternal negation of the world is not easily intelligible. What should be its exact nature? Is it (1) transcendental (Pāramārthika) or (2) apparent (Prāṭibhāsika) or (3) empirical (Vyāvahārika) ? Whichever alternative is taken, the opponents point out different difficulties.

(1) If the first alternative is true, there is the negation of non-dualism. Brahman is transcendental. If again the eteranl negation also is transcendental, Brahman and the eternal negation will be equally real. This implies dualism. The Advaitins advocate non-dualism. So, to them, the eternal negation can never be transcendental.

(2) If again this negation be apparent, the world will be real. To be an apparent counter-entity of eternal negation will not go against the reality of the world. So the admission of the eternal negation as apparent would go in favour of those who are for the reality of the world. The Advaitins thus commit either of the two fallacies—proving the proved or Ignoratio Elenchi.

(3) If again the eternal negation is empirical, it is sublated by the knowledge of Brahman. *So, this does not go against the reality of the world.* This means that the contrary of the intention of Vivaraṇācārya is established. This also shows that the text "neha nānā asti kiñcana" (there is no manyness, Br. Upa., 4-4-19) is expressive of no truth (Atattvāvedaka). The text indicates the falsty of the world. Now as the falsity itself being empirical, according to this alternative, is false; so the text turns to be a lie.

The Advaitins cannot reply, the opponents urge, that even though the eternal negation is empirical (Vyāvahārika) *the negatum silver is yet only apparent* (Prātibhāsika) and that similarly inspite of the eternal negation being empirical *the world as the negatum may well be apparent.* The *Advaitins cannot hold* this view, the opponents add, because on their own admission the world is not apparent. To the Advaitins the world is empirical, though not transcendental. The world is not apparent as it is more durable than a snake that appears on a rope. But it is not transcendental as ultimately with the knowledge of Reality, it ceases to exist.

The Advaitin now replies to all these charges. He holds that "the eternal negation" of the world may be understood as either transcendental or phenomenal. If "the eternal negation" is regarded as transcendental, there is no fear of clash with *non-dualism. The world is eternally negated in its locus (Brahman) and* this eternal negation is absolutely non-distinct from the locus (Brahman). This *means that the negation of the world is the very nature of its locus (adhikaraṇa-*svarūpa). So, the transcendentalism of the eternal negation of the world implies *the transcendentalism of its locus (i.e.,* Brahman) *and this is what the Advaitins* have got to say.

Here the opponent raises an objection against this notion of negation as adhikarana-svarūpa. He urges that if Brahman is identical with the negation of the world, the manifestation of Brahman will be equivalent to the manifestation of the negation of the world. This leads to a great difficulty. The text "when all objects are manifested Brahman also is manifest" (Kausi. Upa. 2-5-15) interpreted in the light of the preceding contention will imply that when the objects of the world are manifested, their negation is equally manifest. But is it not absurd ?

Here the Advaitin tries to avoid this difficulty by pointing out an ambiguity in the expression "manifestation of Brahman." Brahman manifests itself as Being and also as the negation of the world. "The manifestation of Brahman" referred to in the text implies the manifestation of Brahman as Being. This manifestation is eternal. But the manifestation of Brahman as the negation of the world is possible only at the time of the realisation of Brahman. In our practical life Brahman is not manifested as the negation of the world. So the manifestation of Brahman does not negate the manifestation of the world in our practical life of ordinary experience.

The opponent may raise another objection. If Brahman is both Being and the negation of the world, why in our practical life—It appears only as Being and not also as the negation of the world ? The Advaitin will answer this charge with the help of an example. As in the case of the illusory knowledge of nacre-silver, the "thisness" of nacre alone is revealed, but its "nacreness" is veiled by nescience, so in the case of our practical life Brahman is revealed as Being and Its nature as the negation of the world is veiled by nescience.

Here another objection also may be urged, Nescience which veils the nature of Brahman as the negation of the world is real side by side with Brahman. This implies the rejection of non-dualism. The Advaitin will say that nescience is no real principle, it is cancelled with the realisation of Brahman. But Brahman is non-contradicted and so nescience can never stand side by side with Brahman.

There may arise another objection also. If Brahman is the cause and again the negation of the world, the negation of the world will mean an antecedent negation (prāgabhāva) of the world. This may be understood with the help of an analogy. The antecedent negation of the jar is actually speaking both the negation and the cause of the jar. Now the antecedent negation is destroyed with the rise of the effect. So with the appearance of the world, its antecedent negation (Brahman) will be destroyed, Thus Brahman will be non-eternal.

This charge is not valid. If the cause of a thing be its negation also, always it will not be the antecedent negation of the thing. The absence of an impediment also is regarded as the cause of the object, but it is not the antecedent negation of the object.

Here the opponent may argue that "antecedent negation" does not mean a negation which is the cause of any thing, it means the negation which is the cause of its negatum. The 'absence of impediment' is no antecedent negation in this sense. So the Advaita answer does not prove his case.

The Advaitin will answer this by pointing out that he is not ready to accept the opponent's definition of antecedent negation. (The antecedent negation must be of the same metaphysical status (pāramārthika or Vyāvahārika or Prātibhāsika) as that of the negatum. The pot and its antecedent negation are both empirical (Vyāvahārika). But the negation of the world (Brahman) is transcendental (pāramārthika), where as the negatum (world) is empirical. Therefore, Brahman, though both the cause and the negation of the world, is yet no antecedent negation of it.)

The opponent now points out another objection. How can the adjunct "traikālika" be applied to Brahman as the negation of the world ? Brahman is admittedly characterless. How can It be characterised by "traikālika" then ?

The Advaitin replies that "traikālika" is no adjunct to negation. It is the negation itself. This means the eternal negation. So there can be no difficulty at all.

The opponent now says that, if we take the definition of falsity in this way, then nacre—silver (which is admitted as false) will not be false. According to this definition, the false is that which is eternally negated in the same locus where it appears and this eternal negation is transcendental in nature. Now the nacre-silver is rejected from the empirical point of view. So the nacre-silver cannot be false.

Here the Advaitin will say that in this context there is no fundamental distinction between empirical and transcendental negations. In this particular case, consciousness characterised (avacchinna) by the nacre is regarded as empirical because the nacre which characterises it is empirical, yet consciousness in its purity lies in the background even there and this consciousness is transcendental. Thus the empirical is always the transcendental as characterised. So the empirically negated nacre-silver involves an element of transcendental negation and thus nacre-silver can very well be false.

It may be said here that the counterentity of transcendental negation must also be transcendental as the negation and the negatum are generally found to be of the same metaphysical status. Thus, the negation of the world being transcendental, the negatum (the world) must also be of the same order of reality. This will again imply dualism and the rejection of Advaita position.

The Advaitin shows the futility of this charge by pointing out that the negation and the negatum should not, as a rule, belong to the same grade of reality. The negation of the nacre-silver may be regarded as either empirical or transcendental, but the negatum nacre-silver is always apparent (prātibhāsika).

From the foregoing discussion it is clear that "eternal negation" may be taken as transcendental. Now the Advaitin tells us that "eternal negation" may also be taken as empirical.

Here the opponent will say that if the negation of the world is phenomenal, this negation will be negated with the realisation of Brahman. This again will imply the reality of the world. This is quite against the intention of the Advaitin as he is out to prove the falsity of the world.

Here the Advaitin points out that nothing goes against him if the negation of the world and the world itself are both empirical. The empirical negation of the world is not less in metaphysical status than the world. If the negation is of lower metaphysical status than that of the negatum, then alone the negation is negated to affirm the negatum. But if the negation be of higher metaphysical status than or of equal metaphysical status with the negatum, the negation of negation cannot posit affirmation.

The opponent may say here that in the case of the rejection of negation, the negatum generally has an order of reality higher than that of the negation. When anyone rejects silverness in silver and this rejection is again rejected, then the

reality of silverness is ensured and the status of silverness becomes automatically higher than that of the negation. In the same way, the negation of the negation of the world will imply a status of the world higher than that of its negation. Here, the negation of the world is taken as empirical, so the world must be transcendental.

The Advaitin refutes this charge in the following way. He tells us that when a negation is negated in order to affirm the negatum, the negatum has a status higher than that of the negation. If the negation of silverness in silver is negated for the reaffirmation of silverness in silver, the silverness will have an order of reality higher than that of its negation. But in the case of equal rejection of both the negation and the negatum where the negation is not rejected in order to reaffirm the negatum, the negatum has no status higher than that of the negation. In the case of the rejection of the negation of the world, the negation is not rejected in order to establish the reality of the world. So here the world cannot have any status higher than that of its negation. Actually speaking both the world and its negation are rejected on the same ground. They are negated as they are knowable (dṛśya).

Moreover, the example cited by the opponent is not also appropriate. The negation of silverness in silver and silverness itself do not belong to the same order of reality. The silverness in silver is empirical, but its negation is only apparent. This implies that in this case the negation has an order of reality lower than that of the negatum. But in the case of the negation of the negation of the world, the negatum has the same order of reality as that of the negation (both of them are empirical). Hence the example given by the opponent cannot prove the reality of the world.

The Text "there is no manyness" (Br. Upa 4-4-19) rejects both the world and its negation and so the reality of the world cannot be reaffirmed. Both the world and its negation are rejected as they are knowable. *So they sail in the* same boat. The world can never be transcendental when its negation is empirical.

To the opponent's charge that the text "nehanānāsti Kiñcana" is expressive of no-truth as the negation of manyness is again negated, the Advaitin replies that the texts have empirical reality. Now the empirical reality of the world is never denied. So, the Text does not lie when it gives us the empirical reality of the world. The text reveals the nature of the world. Validity does not always imply non-contradiction. It also implies that which reveals a thing in its own nature (Tadvatitadprakāraka). In this sense the validity of the text can never be questioned. The world is essentially false and the text is expressive of this truth, so the contingency of the invalidity of the text cannot arise at all.

The opponent here raises a very subtle objection. Let us now try to follow him. Negation of a thing, he tells us, is always the negation of the thing in a certain determinate aspect of it. When fire is negated, it is either negated in the

aspect of "firehood" or as 'the cause of burning' or as 'the cause of smoke' or in some other aspect. So the negation of the world must also mean the negation of the world in some determinate aspect.

The world may be negated as it is experienced, it may also be negated as it really is. In the first case the determinate aspect in relation to which the negation is established is "experience" while in the second case the determinate aspect is "reality." The first negation is known as "samānādhi-karaṇa—dharmāvacchinna—pratiyogitāka abhāva" or the negation that is the object of Svarūpataḥ niṣedha; and the second negation is known as "Vyādhikaraṇa—dharmāvacchinna—pratiyogitāka—abhāva" or the negation that is the object of pāramārthika niṣedha. So the non-existence or the negation of the world may mean the negation of the world in its own nature (Svarūpataḥ miṣedha) or it may mean the negation in its transcendental aspect (pāramārthika niṣedha). The opponent, now tells us, whichever alternative is taken, there will be difficulties.

If the first alternative is taken, the world will be identical with the nominal entities like hare's horn. That is to say, the world will be unreal or tuccha. It will be asat. But the Advaitins, we know, can never subscribe to this view. To the Advaitins the world is never asat, it is empirical (Vyāvahārika). The origin of the world is established by the text "Satyam ca anṛtam ca satyam abhavat." This text means that both empirical and apparent objects have their origin. The same conclusion may be obtained on the basis of an inference also. The inference will be as follows :—

The composite objects of the world must have a cause, because they are of the nature of effects, like a pot.

Now, it is clear that the world has its origin. But there can be no origin of tuccha (unreal). So how can the world be unreal ? That the world is not unreal may be established on further arguments. The world has practical efficiency in the sense that the different objects of the world have use and utility in our life. But an unreal thing like the "son of a barran woman" has no such use or utility. Avidyā is regarded as the material cause of the world. But an ureal thing can have no such cause at all. Moreover, the world is negated with the realisation of reality, but the unreal is not negated in this way. The unreal is eternally negated and it never appears. So, the world is not unreal.

If the second alternative is taken, the opponent urges, there will also arise other difficulties. The negation of the world in the aspect of reality involves two fallacies, 1) Petitio-principii and (2) Indefinite regress. Let us now see how do these fallacies originate.

The very concept of the 'real' involves the concept of falsity, for the real means the negation of the false. Now it implies that when the Advaitin tries to make the definition of falsity clear by saying that the negation of the world is in the aspect of reality, he actually speaking has presupposed falsity in the concept

of reality. This implies that he has presupposed what he is going to prove and this is Petitio-principii.

Moreover, in the assertion "the world is negated in the aspect of reality" or "the world is really not" there is indefinite regress. This "really not", will again be "really not" and so on ad infinitum. So, the second alternative also is in no way better tenable than the first one.

Now, the Advaitin will give his answers. He tells us that the first alternative is faultless. The world may very well be negated in its own nature and yet there will be no difficulty.

The opponent has said that the world in its own nature can never be negated. Only the unreal can be negated in its own nature. It is a contradiction to assert the negation of a pot in the locus where it appears. But this objection is baseless. When the nacre is perceived we say that the silver is negated in its own nature in the nacre. In other words, the silver is eternally negated in nacre where it appears. This implies that the silver did not, does not and will not exist in the nacre. But we never call the silver unreal. The unreal never appears. But the silver definitely appears in the nacre. Similarly the world is eternally negated in Brahman. In other words, the world is negated in its own nature where it appears. But this does not make the world in any way unreal. The world is actually speaking false.

This reply also cannot silence the opponents. They will further urge that what is negated in the nacre-silver illusion is never the apparent silver in its own nature, but only the empirical silver. So, the Advaitins are wrong when they say that the silver in its own nature is negated in nacre.

The Advaitins say in reply that this cannot be. The content of the illusory experience of silver is the apparent silver and never the empirical silver. If this experience is negated by empirical silver, the illusory experience and the experience of negation without being based on the same object will be based on different objects. But this is absurd. What appears in nacre-silver illusion is apparent silver, but what is negated with the rise of right knowledge is empirical silver. If this be the case, the apparent silver will be real because it is not negated. But this goes against our experience.

The opponent here raises another objection. If the apparent silver is an object of eternal negation, it can have no origin. The unreal (hare's horn) is eternally not and there can be no talk of its origin. But the Advaitins have admitted both the origin and eternal negation of apparent silver and the empirical world and this is unjustified.

In answer the Advaitins say that origination and the absence of eternal negation are not universally connected. The Mādhvas think that the sky is real. But, to them, it has no origin. So a thing may be real even if it has no origination.

Those things which have origin are visible or knowable (dṛṣya). But they are not eternal. And actually speaking what has origin can never be eternal. The world is knowable and again it is non-eternal. So it is in the fitness of things that it has an origin. Therefore the objection of the opponents is rather misdirected against the Advaitins.

The futility of this objection may be shown in another way also. The dream objects originate (in the sense that they appear in dream experience). But they are also eternally naught. There is even a text declaring that there is no chariot, no horse, no path in a dream, but all of them appear in a dream (Br. upa. 4-3-20). Similarly we may think that the world has origin though it is eternally naught. The silver that appears in nacre is also eternally negated there. So there is no difficulty at all.

The apponents here raise another objection. They say, if the silverin nacre-silver situation is eternally naught, it can not be an appropriate example of the false. For falsity can not belong to any thing which does not exist at all. This objection is specially raised against Madhusṇdana who holds that the illusory content in its own nature is an object of eternal negation. The opponents are, however, sympathetic with the older Advaitins. They hold that the older Advaitins may escape this charge as to them the illusory content as identified with the corresponding impirical object is an object of eternal negation. The older Advaitins do not think that the ob'ect of eternal negation is the illusory object in its own nature.

This objection is entirely based on a misunderstanding. The older Advaitins hold that the apparent eilver is eternally negated in nacre. So ultimately there is no difference between Madhuūudhan and the older Advaitins. It is our common experience that silver did not, does not and will not exist in nacre. And so Vivarana does not go against our experience when it takes the apparent content as the object of eternal negation. The older Advaitins have, of course, said that the empirical silver is the object of eternal negation. But the implication of this assertion is that the apparent silver as identified with the empirical silver is actually the object of eternal negation. The silver conceived as apparent cannot be any object of attraction. But we know that people are attracted to apparent silver in illusion. How is this possible then ? This is possible because the apparent silver is cognised as identical with empirical silver and empirical silver attracts all. But such silver also is eternally negated. So it fares no better than the apparent silver. Therefore ultimately there is no difference among the Advaitins.

The opponents may ask—what is the harm if we belive in a common factor of "silverness" which is present in both apparent silver and empirical one to explain the attraction of the people towards an apparent silver in illusion ?

The Advaitins say, this can not be. In this case, the apparent silver also will have practical efficiency like the empirical silver. But we all know that the apparent silver has no practical efficiency at all.

Citsukhācārya in his "Tattvapradīpikā" has also interpreted the Vivaraṇa view about the nature of silver in the nacre-silver-illisuon. His interpretation is in line with that of Madhusūdana Saraswatī. He urges that people would not have been attracted to the apparent silver, if it would not have appeared as non-distinct from the empirical silver. People have a special charm for the empirical silver alone. So the apparent silver which is cognised as nondistinct from the empirical silver is the object of eternal negation.

If we accept this interpretation the contingency of Anyathākhyāti also can not arise. According to the Naiyāyikas, in the nacre-silver illusion, the else where and else when empirical silver appears in the locus "nacre". This is known as "Anyathākhyāti" in Indian Philosophy. Now, if Vivaraṇācārya thinks that the object of the eternal negation is empirical silver, he will also subscribe to the view of Anyathākhyāti. But we know that as an Advaitin he can never do so. Therefore, the Advaita position in this context will be as follows.

The object of eternal negation is the apparent silver which appears as non-distinct from empirical silver. In this case, the identity between the empirical silver and the apparent one is as false as the apparent silver itself is, because both of them arise at the time of illusion and disappear with valid knowledge. The silver in illusion is created in the locus (consciousness) particularised by the "this" (nacre) and it ceases with the disappearance of illusion. This shows that the Advaita view with regard to the illusory content is different from Anyathākhyāti.

The opponents again may say that if false is that which in its own nature, is eternally negated in its own locus, it will be identical with the unreal (asat). It is admitted on all hands that the world does not exist except in its own locus. So, it is non-existent in other places than its locus. Now if it is again eternally negated in its own nature in the very locus where it exists, it becomes entirely unreal (asat).

The Advaitins say, in reply, that non-spatial objects (avṛtti) like ātman (self) do not exist anywhere. But because of this, the Mādhvas do not regard the self as unreal (asat). Why, then, there should be an exception in the case of the world which does not exist in any place ? The world can not be unreal as it appears before negation and the unreal never appears.

in a real locus. The unreal has no locus at all. So the difference between the false and the unreal cannot be easily ruled out.

The Naiyāyikas here raise an objection. To them Ākāśa has no locus. So it becomes unreal, though actually it is not. But the Avaitins will say that this can be no objection against them. The Advaitins consider Brahman as the locus of everything. To them Brahman is the locus of the sky. So, ākāśa can not be unreal.

The opponents may raise a new objection. If the false is that which is the object of eternal negation in its locus, Brahman becomes false. The eternal absence of Brahman in space and time is accepted by all. So, Brahman becomes the object of the eternal absence in space and time. This means that Brahman is also false, according to the definition of falsity under discussion.

Here, of course, the Advaitins will say that Brahman being characterless (nirdharmaka) can not be characterised as the object of the eternal absence in space and time. So Brahman can not be false.

The opponent will further urge that the text "Satyam jñānam anantam Brahma" (Taittirīya Upa, 2/1/1) will be a lie, if Brahman is characterless. Here the Advaitins will say that "Satyam (truth), Jñānam (knowledge) and Anantam (infinite) are not the characters of Brahman. The implication of the text is to be understood in the following way.

Truth (satyam) in the text means the absence of untruth and this is nothing but the locus itself. So, truth is no character of Brahman, it only implies the negation of untruth in Brahman. This again implies Brahman the locus of the negation. The self-luminosity, the eternity and the perfection of Brahman also are to be interpreted in the same way. Brahman's self-luminosity implies the negation of manifestation by others, its eternity, the negation of temporarality and its perfection, the negation of imperfection. These negations ultimately mean the locus, i.e. Brahman. So, strictly speaking the position of the Śaṁkarites is non-dualism (advaita) and not monism. If we call it monism, Brahman will be charactersied as one. But Brahman being characterless can have no such character.

CHAPTER THREE

The Third Definition of Falsity.

(The Vivarana view considered).

The Advaita view of the non-duality of the spirit as the ultimate reality can be established only when the world can be proved false. So the concept of falsity is an important concept in Advaita literature. Different Saṁkarites defined falsity in different ways. We may consider them as alternative definitions of falsity. All of them are equally correct and none is superior to others. We have already discussed the first two definitions. Now, we shall discuss the third definition of falsity and try to defend it from the attacks of the dualistic Mādhvas.

The author of Vivarana holds "the false is that which is contradicted by knowledge" (Jñānanivarttyatvam). As falsity can be taken in this sense so the texts like "Wise men free themselves from the world of name and form" and "one who knows the self can alone overcome miseries" are significant and intelligible. The world is contradicted with the realisation of Brahman, the ultimate reality and so, the world is false.

Now the question is —What are we to mean by the word "Contradiction"? If Contradiction means destruction, the false will be that which is destroyed by knowledge. Now, it often happens that the knowledge of "pot" is replaced by the knowledge of "table" and then the former is destroyed by the latter. But because of this, the knowledge of "pot" cannot be false. So, the definition becomes too wide. In another way it may also be shown that the definition is too narrow. A pot may be destroyed with a stroke of hammer, but this does not make the "pot" false as it is not destroyed by knowledge and yet the Advatins recognise the pot as false. So, the definition of falsity does not cover all the cases.

Even if contradiction by knowledge means contradiction by knowledge *as knowledge*, the definition remains too narrow. In this case also the pot cannot be false when it is destroyed with a blow of hammer. The superimposed silver is not also *destroyed* by the knowledge of nacre *as Knowledge*, for it is destroyed merely by the occurence of that later knowledge. So the superimposed silver cannot be taken as an example of falsity, which the Advaitins generally do. The Cognition of Brahman also (as Cognition) cannot be the cause of the destruction of the world, for this very destruction also is a part of the world and yet is not destroyed by that knowledge and as this destruction is not destroyed by that knowledge, the upaniṣadic text "everything other than this is destroyed" becomes meaningless.

Even if the above definition of falsity be interpreted in another way, viz., to mean the sublation of anything by a knowledge qua some type of knowledge (*Jñānatva-vyāpya-dharmapuraskāre-jñānanivarttyatva*), there is no escape from the fallacy "too wide". For consider the following cases.

Saṁskāra or unconscious trace is responsible for memory. With the rise of memory the relevant unconscious trace is destroyed. But because of this that trace can never be regarded as false. Again, the non-existence of a knowledge prior to its rise is definitely destroyed with the rise of knowledge. But this non-existence also, on that account, is never false. .Therefore it is urged that falsity cannot be understood as that which is destroyed by knowdledge. To all these the Advaita reply is as follows :—

The Advaitins contend that the critics have misunderstood the implication of this definition. It is to be interpreted in the following way :—

The negatum of the eternal negation of the gross and subtle forms of an object due to knowledge is false. Both the gross and subtle forms of an object are mentioned in the definition. In the case of the destruction of a pot with a stroke of hammer, though the pot in its gross form is destroyed by the hammer, it in its subtle form is not destroyed in this way; the subtle form is destroyed only by the knowledge of Brahman. The *total* sublation of the pot is thus possible only through the knowledge of Brahman. Hence the definition does apply to this case.

Here an objection may be raised to the effect that though the subtle form of the pot is sublated by knowledge, its gross form can be destroyed only with a stroke of hammer. The Advaitins, of course, can easily meet this charge. They believe in the identity of the subtle as cause and the gross form as its effect.*

---

*The Advaitins in general and the Sāṅkhists believe in Satkārya vāda. According to them the effect potentially remains in the cause. The cause and the effect are not really different from one another. The cause is the effect unmanifested and the effect is the cause manifested.

The Bauddhas and the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika thinkers will differ from these philosophers on this point. Unlike the Advaitins and the Sāṅkhists, they are the advocates of Asat Kāryavāda or Arambhavāda. According to them, the effect does not remain in the cause before the effectuation. They have based their thesis on the following grounds :—

If the effect already remains in the cause, then there is no point in saying that the effect is produced out of the cause. Secondly, the different names assigned to the cause and the effect definitely show that they are different from one another. Thirdly, if the effect were already there in the cause, the effort on the part of the efficient cause in order to produce the effect would have been unnecessary. But we all know that the effect like a table cannot be produced out of wood without the efforts of a carpenter who is the efficient cause.

The Sāṅkhists repudiate this theory on the following considerations :—

(a) If the effect does not remain in the cause, then no amount of force can press out the effect from the cause. No one can produce curd out of wood, as curd is non-existent in wood. (b) We see that any cause cannot produce any effect. Milk cannot produce a cloth and threads a table. (c) If we think that an effect is produced from a cause which did not contain the effect, we are land d in the absurdity—something comes out of nothing. We should never forget the dictum 'ex nihilo nihil fit'. The Vedāntins also join issue with the Sāṅkhists. They also think that the effect is existent in the cause before its production. In the further details of this view, the Sāṅkhists and the Rāmānuja Vedāntins part

The definition cannot be too wide also. Though a posterior knowledge destroys the prior knowledge, the unconscious trace of the former still remains and as this trace as the subtle form is identical with the gross knowledge which is said to be destroyed, there is really no final destruction of that knowledge.

This disposes of another possible objection also. It may be said that the world cannot be false simply because it is destroyed by the knowledge of Brahman, for though every just preceding knowledge is destroyed by a just posterior knowledge, the former is not taken as false on that account. But the Advaitin argues that this objection cannot be raised at all. The just preceding knowledge in its subtle form is not destroyed by the just posterior knowledge. But the knowledge of Brahman negates the world both in its subtle and gross forms. So, the world is definitely false whereas the prior knowledge is not.

The negatum of the destruction of the gross and the subtle forms of an object due to knowledge, may thus be regarded as false, as in this case the fallacies of too wide and too narrow definition cannot arise at all, for here the destruction of both the gross and the subtle forms of an object has been taken into consideration.

The expression "due to knowledge" finds a place in the definition in order to exclude inconceivable objects like 'hare's horn'. The eternal negation of the

---

company with the followers of Śaṁkara Vedānta. The Sāṅkhists and the Rāmānujites are in favour of Pariṇāmavāda as a further specification of the theory of Sātkāryavāda. According to them, the effect no doubt potentially remains in the cause, but at the time of effectuation the cause is really transformed into the effect. The Advaita Vedāntins, however, hold that the transformation of the cause into the effect is only apparent and not real. The effect is the vivarta of the cause and not the pariṇāma of it. The Advaita theory of causation is generally known as Vivartavāda. Here it may be observed that a consistent Satkāryavādin should be an advocate of Vivartavāda and not of pariṇāmavāda. If the cause really changes into the effect, then the cause and the effect become two things and there can be no identity between the two. The category of identity can alone be applied to the two aspects of the same thing. Two things can never be eidntical in every respect. The Leibnizian theory of the Identity of the Indiscernibles cannot be easily repudiated. It is indeed a fact that no two leaves of the same tree are identical. So, if the cause and the effect are at bottom identical we must admit that the effect is only the appearance or vivarta of the cause. The cause alone is real, the effect is only an appearance of the cause.

The Western Logicians often equate cause with effect from the standpoint of quantity. They hold that the cause is quantitatively equal to the effect. scientists also with the principles of conservation of Matter and Energy subscribe to the same view. They hold that the total quantity of matter and energy found in the effect is equal to that of the cause . So, they also think that in a sense there is an identity between the cause and the effect. These thinkers, of course, are not bold enough to follow the logical consequences of this theory. We have already seen that the identity between the cause and the effect can be established only when we are ready to regard the effect as the *appearance* of the cause. Śaṁkara does so. But the Westerners are not so strong as to come to this revolutionary conclusion. They, like Rāmānuja and others, will say that the cause is really transformed into the effect.

subtle and the gross forms is presnet in the case of hare's horn. But it is not false like the world, because this eternal negation is not due to knowledge. It cannot also be objected that the definition does not apply to the case of nacre appearing as the silver (the traditional Vedāntic example of false appearance). *The silver-appearance is definitely destroyed by the knowledge of the nacre as* contradicting the knowledge of that silver. To explain :—The silver superimposed on the nacre is definitely perceived by the man under illusion. The perception again cannot be objectless. So, we shall have to admit the existence of the appearance silver in order to explain the perception of the silver superimposed on the nacre. Now this silver is definitely destroyed by the knowledge of nacre which is its locus. So, the silver which is superimposed on the nacre is false.

Vivaraṇācārya defines sublation as the eternal negation of nescience with its present and past, gross and subtle effects. This definition of sublation tallies well with that of falsity considered just now. The author of Vārttika also admits this interpretation of sublation.* He holds that with the attainment of proper intellect due to the understanding of the texts like 'Tattvamasi', nescience with its effect becomes eternally negated. The word 'effect' here comprises the past, the present, the subtle and the gross effects.

The negation of hare's horn is not due to knowledge. But on this analogy we cannot think that the negation of the silver on the nacre (when the silver is superimposed on it) also is not caused by knowledge. The perception of the silver on the nacre is the same thing as that false silver itself and this false silver is a product of ajñāna (nescience) as referring to the nacre. Hence knowledge (jñāna) alone of the nacre can destroy the silver. The absence of silver on the nacre can thus be known only when the nacre is cognised. The hare's horn is not caused by ajñāna, so the question of its negation by jñāna or knowledge cannot arise at all. Nescince is not one, but it is many in number. The nescience attached to nacre is destroyed by the proper knowledge of that nacre. So, the silver superimposed on the nacre may very well be taken as an example of falsity.

Some others again believe in only one nescience. From their standpoint, the negation of silver in nacre by the knowledge of nacre is to be understood by means of the following inference—

The silver superimposed on nacre is sublated by knowledge.

As it is the object of cognition with some defect.

Just like the snake which is imposed on rope.

The negation of the snake on rope is to be established with the help of another inference. But this will not lead us to the fallacy of indefinite regress as

*Tattvamasyādi-vākyottha-samyagdhijanmamātrataḥ
Avidyā saha kāryyeṇa nāsidasti bhaviṣyati.

three is no such fallacy in the case of the relation between the seed and the sprout.

With the stroke of the hammer the pot is destroyed. So we may very well think that with the knowledge of the locus the nescience which covers it and projects something other than itself upon it is removed. As the nacre is cognised, the nescience covering the nacre and the silver due to this nescience are destroyed all at once. So, we are to admit that the nescience and its effect are eternally negated with the rise of the knowledge of the locus.

The definition that the false is that which is sublated by knowledge *qua any form of knowledge* is not also defective. For when it was pointed out that a posterior knowledge destroys the just prior knowledge without having branded it as necessarily false it was not the destroyer *qua a form of knowledge.* The prior knowledge is there destroyed as particular attribute of the self. If the destruction of the prior knowledge is understood as effected by the posterior *qua* a form of knowledge, the desire that arises after knowledge and the effort which follows the desire cannot be taken as capable of destroying the knowledge and the desire respectively, and we shall be going against fact. This is why the prior knowledge destroyed by the posterior knowledge is not necessarily false on that account. Therefore, the definition cannot be tabooed as too wide.

Memory, the opponents think, destroys the unconscious trace of the past percept and memory does this as a form of knowledge and not as an attribute of the self; for had it, as an attribute of the self, destroyed the trace then even a desire also that happens to arise after the unconscious trace would, as an attribute of the self, destroy the trace. But this is not the fact. Hence, the opponents continue, it must be said that memory destroys the unconscious trace *as a form of knowledge*; and so the definition having applied to this case, the unconscious trace has to be taken as false and the definition becomes too wide.

The Advaitins, however, do not believe that memory *qua* memory, can destroy the unconscious trace of the past percept, as there is no evidence for it.

Memory is caused by a past percept. The unconscious trace is the intermediate link between the memory and the past percept. The percept leaves the unconscious trace behind it and this in turn causes memory. Now, the opponents urge that the intermediate link ceases to exist when its purpose (connection between two extreme terms) is served. Adṛṣṭa, the unconscious repository of the merits and the demerits of actions, which is the intermediate link between the actions and its results dies out with the achievement of the results of the actions. So, in analogy it is held by the opponent that the unconscious trace which is the link between the percept and memory should lapse with the rise of memory.

Here the Advaitins contend that the result does not always destroy the intermediate link. Perception is said to be the result of the sense-object contact Now with perception, the sense-object contact does not cease to exist. If it

did so, recurrent perception would have been an impossibility. So the Advaita thesis that memory does not *destroy the unconscious trace of the* past percept is proved.

The repeated recollection of a thing rather makes the unconscious trace of it stronger and stronger. If memory destroyed the unconscious trace, this would not have been possible at all. This is an additional reason why we are to submit that memory does not destroy the unconscious trace. So, the definition of falsity under consideration cannot be too wide.

The opponent may raise here a subtle objection. It is this :—

If every recollection strengthens the trace, what can this strength mean ? The only possible meaning is that every next recollection will be better in the sense of being easier and speedier. But this, again, means that every next recollection as better is qualititively different (Vilakṣaṇa) *from every prior one.** It follows that because the same trace cannot cause two qualitatively different recollections the trace as causing the prior one must have been destroyed to allow the other trace to operate, for otherwise a qualitatively new recollection of the same object cannot occur.

But the Advaitins reply that the charge is untenable. The traces of the recollections are undoubtedly many. But, as for the traces, it must not be forgotten that they are all *about the same abject*, i.e., that they are traces of the cognitions of the same object and are therefore basically of the same stuff. As against the contention that here there are several recollections each qualitatively the same, they reply as follows :—

The unconscious trace alone, the Advaitins hold, cannot arouse memory. There must be *something* other than the unconscious trace to cause it (Udbodhaka). Though there are many unconscious traces, in every case the third principle which arouses the memory (Udbodhaka) is not present. So, the series of qualitatively different recollections will not arise even when there are many unconscious traces.

It might be further objected that the third principle which arosues memory in one case may cause it in every other case also. But the Advaitins think that the third principle is to be conceived according to the results. If the results are many, the third principle also must be many. So, the contingency of the series of memory cannot arise at all.

Even if for argument's sake, it is taken for granted that memory cancels the unconscious trace out of which it originates, the Advaitins fall in no difficulty.

---

*Indian philosophers do not as a rule admit *degree* as a category. 'A' as better than 'B' does not mean that in both there is the same univresal goodness in different degrees. It means that in A there is one type of goodness and in B there is another, and that the two goodness—universals are one the vyāpaka of the other.

three is no such fallacy in the case of the relation between the seed and the sprout.

With the stroke of the hammer the pot is destroyed. So we may very well think that with the knowledge of the locus the nescience which covers it and projects something other than itself upon it is removed. As the nacre is cognised, the nescience covering the nacre and the silver due to this nescience are destroyed all at once. So, we are to admit that the nescience and its effect are eternally negated with the rise of the knowledge of the locus.

The definition that the false is that which is sublated by knowledge *qua any form of knowledge* is not also defective. For when it was pointed out that a posterior knowledge destroys the just prior knowledge without having branded it as necessarily false it was not the destroyer *qua a form of knowledge.* The prior knowledge is there destroyed as particular attribute of the self. If the destruction of the prior knowledge is understood as effected by the posterior *qua* a form of knowledge, the desire that arises after knowledge and the effort which follows the desire cannot be taken as capable of destroying the knowledge and the desire respectively, and we shall be going against fact. This is why the prior knowledge destroyed by the posterior knowledge is not necessarily false on that account. Therefore, the definition cannot be tabooed as too wide.

Memory, the opponents think, destroys the unconscious trace of the past percept and memory does this as a form of knowledge and not as an attribute of the self; for had it, as an attribute of the self, destroyed the trace then even a desire also that happens to arise after the unconscious trace would, as an attribute of the self, destroy the trace. But this is not the fact. Hence, the opponents continue, it must be said that memory destroys the unconscious trace *as a form of knowledge*; and so the definition having applied to this case, the unconscious trace has to be taken as false and the definition becomes too wide.

The Advaitins, however, do not believe that memory *qua* memory, can destroy the unconscious trace of the past percept, as there is no evidence for it.

Memory is caused by a past percept. The unconscious trace is the intermediate link between the memory and the past percept. The percept leaves the unconscious trace behind it and this in turn causes memory. Now, the opponents urge that the intermediate link ceases to exist when its purpose (connection between two extreme terms) is served. Adṛṣṭa, the unconscious repository of the merits and the demerits of actions, which is the intermediate link between the actions and its results dies out with the achievement of the results of the actions. So, in analogy it is held by the opponent that the unconscious trace which is the link between the percept and memory should lapse with the rise of memory.

Here the Advaitins contend that the result does not always destroy the intermediate link. Perception is said to be the result of the sense-object contact Now with perception, the sense-object contact does not cease to exist. If it

did so, recurrent perception would have been an impossibility. So the Advaitā thesis that memory does not destroy the unconscious trace of the past percept is proved.

The repeated recollection of a thing rather makes the unconscious trace of it stronger and stronger. If memory destroyed the unconscious trace, this would not have been possible at all. This is an additional reason why we are to submit that memory does not destroy the unconscious trace. So, the definition of falsity under consideration cannot be too wide.

The opponent may raise here a subtle objection. It is this :—

If every recollection strengthens the trace, what can this strength mean ? The only possible meaning is that every next recollection will be better in the sense of being easier and speedier. But this, again, means that every next recollection as better is qualititively different (Vilakṣaṇa) from every prior one.* It follows that because the same trace cannot cause two qualitatively different recollections the trace as causing the prior one must have been destroyed to allow the other trace to operate, for otherwise a qualitatively new recollection of the same object cannot occur.

But the Advaitins reply that the charge is untenable. The traces of the recollections are undoubtedly many. But, as for the traces, it must not be forgotten that they are all *about the same abject*, i.e., that they are traces of the cognitions of the same object and are therefore basically of the same stuff. As against the contention that here there are several recollections each qualitatively the same, they reply as follows :—

The unconscious trace alone, the Advaitins hold, cannot arouse memory. There must be something other than the unconscious trace to cause it(Udbodhaka). Though there are many unconscious traces, in every case the third principle which arouses the memory (Udbodhaka) is not present. So, the series of qualitatively different recollections will not arise even when there are many unconscious traces.

It might be further objected that the third principle which arosues memory in one case may cause it in every other case also. But the Advaitins think that the third principle is to be conceived according to the results. If the results are many, the third principle also must be many. So, the contingency of the series of memory cannot arise at all.

Even if for argument's sake, it is taken for granted that memory cancels the unconscious trace out of which it originates, the Advaitins fall in no difficulty.

---

*Indian philosophers do not as a rule admit *degree* as a category. 'A' as better than 'B' does not mean that in both there is the same univresal goodness in different degrees. It means that in A there is one type of goodness and in B there is another, and that the two goodness—universals are one the vyāpaka of the other.

In that case they will interpret their definition of falsity in another way. Falsity, then, will mean the cancellation of anything by the direct and immediate knowledge (Sākṣātkāratvena jñānanivarttyatva). So even when memory negates the unconscious trace, the negation does not make the unconscious trace in any way false. Memory is not a direct and immediate cognition. The prior knowledge which is negated by the posterior knowledge cannot also be false as it is not cancelled by knowledge characterised by immediacy. Thus the third definition of falsity proves to be faultless.

CHAPTER FOUR

The Fourth Definition of Falsity—A study of Citsukha's view.

Citsukhācārya difines falsity in his own way. He considers the false as that the locus of which is equally the locus of its eternal negation (Svāśraya nisthātyantābhāva pratiyogitvam vā mithyātvam).

The Naiyāyikas do not recognise the locus of a thing as also the locus of its eternal negation. So, the author of Vedāntaparibhāṣā has added the word 'abhimata' (assumed) when he interprets this definition of falsity. So, the word 'thing' in the phrase 'locus of a thing' should be taken to mean 'the thing as assumed'. The Śruti text 'neha nānāsti Kiñcana' is definitely stronger than any other source of knowledge like perception. This text definitely shows that the world is eternally negated in its own locus. So, the Nyāya view deserves no consideration at all.

The eternal negation of the silver is there in its own locus-the nacre-when the silver appears where there is nacre only. So the silver in this case is false. The world also never exists where it is perceived and hence it also sails in the same boat with the silver.

The picture is eternally non-existent in pot. But because of this, the picture is not false and the pot is not true. Falsity of a thing arises when it is non-existent in its own locus. So, no anomaly can arise at all.

If this definition is interpreted in this way, it becomes the replica of the second definition of falsity (Pratipannopādhou traikālika niṣedha pratiyogitvam mithyātvam). In order to avoid repitition, the substantive and the adjective of the second definition have to be made the adjective and the substantive respectively in this definition. So, the definition under consideration is to be interpreted to mean that as false which appears in the locus of its eternal negation. (Svātyantābhāvādhikaraṇe eva pratīyamānatvam mithyātvam).

The definition requires further clarification. 'A' may both remain and be eternally absent in 'B' and yet this 'A' may not be regarded as false. A pot which the Naiyāyikas and the Mādhvas take as real has in a way this dual character and these philosophers themselves admit this and yet they do not take the pot as false. The pot, they would well admit, is present in its parts in the relation of inherence (samavāya) and eternally absent in these in the relation of contact (samyoga), and yet in spite of this dual character, it is not false. The Advaitins, however, regard the pot as false (because, according to them, everything in the world is false). How, then, does the definition of falsity under consideration apply to this case ?

The Advaitin in reply proposes to state the definition in a more specific way so that it may apply to the case. He says that the false is eternally absent

in the locus in the same relation in which it is also present in it. If the pot is present in its parts in the relation of inherence (samavāya), it is also eternally absent there in the same relation.

The opponent may ask-if the pot is absent in its parts in the relation of inherence (samavāya), they are no longer its parts, for a part is exactly that in which the whole remains present in the relation of inherence (samavāya).

The Advaitin, however, replies that the part-whole situation is not determined by the whole being inherent in its parts. It is enough for anything being a part if in it there is the not-yetness or antecedent absence (prāgabhāva) of the whole. A kapāla is a part of a ghaṭa, because in it that ghata is not yet.

But, it may now be asked by the opponent, if the ghaṭa (pot) is not yet present (i.e. if it will be present) in the kapāla (parts), how could the Advaitin in branding it as false regard it as also eternally absent (atyantābhāva) in that kapāla? Is not that which is eternally absent in a locus absent there for all times—past, present and future? There cannot be both eternal absence and antecedent absence (atyantābhāva and prāgabhāva) of the same thing in the same locus.

The Advaitin, however, replies that if this atyantābhāva and the prāgabhāva of the same thing can remain together at the same moment of time, there is no reason why they may not remain together in the same locus. That they remain together at the same moment is clear at any moment when the kapāla is there and yet the ghaṭa has not come into being. At any such moment there is undoubtedly the prāgabhāva of the ghaṭa and yet we can also say that the ghaṭa is absent there without any reference to past, present and future, which means that atyantābhāva co-exists there with prāgabhāva. (Atyantābhāva may similarly co-exist with dhvaṁsābhāva). If, then, they can co-exist at the same moment of time they can also co-exist in the same locus.

The opponent may still not be silenced. He may insist that such co-existence at a point of time may be a matter of immediate experience—we do really feel at this particular moment that both are present. But the presence of both in the same locus is not felt that way. In the kapāla which is the locus of the prāgabhāva of the pot, we do not feel the atyantābhāva of the pot, atyantābhāva meaning not absence without reference to past, present and future, but such absence as refers to all the three. Where, rather, there is the prāgabhāva of the pot it is implied that the pot will be there.

To this, however, the Advaitin replies that if the atyantābhāva is not immediately felt it can be known in other ways. The Advaitin has inferred the falsity of the pot and the false is certainly absent in its locus for all times. The main point of the Advaitin here is whether the definition of falsity under consideration is tenable or not. The opponent took it to be untenable on the ground that the pot of which there is prāgapbhāva in the kapāla cannot also be eternally absent there. The Advaitin replies that as the falsity of the pot can be otherwise

inferred that eternal non-existence follows automatically, and hence the definition stands uneffected. Besides, the scriptural texts like 'Neha nānāsti kiñcana' (everything is eternally absent here-in this locus) certifies this eternal non-existence. The scriptures are, even by the opponent, regarded as the highest source of knowledge.

It is again objected by the opponent that the present definition of falsity is too-wide as even 'hare's horn' which the Advaitin considers as truly nothing (asat) and not false (mithyā) comes to be covered by the definition. The 'hare's horn' also is eternally non-existent in its locus.

But the Advaitin replies that what is false must at least appear for sometime as identified with reality. The 'hare's horn' cannot appear at all. So, it can never be false. By 'what is both present and absent in the same locus' in this definition of the false, the Advaitins mean 'what appearing is both present and absent in the same locus'. Anything that is false is at least capable of being perceived, but no one can ever perceive 'hare's horn'. So, there is no question whatsoever of it being false.

The opponents may still argue that even 'nothing' is positive and may therefore as an object of cognition appear. The Śruti text 'asadevedam agre āsit' definitely certifies this.

But the Advaitins would interpret the text in such a way that 'asat' fails to mean nothing. The text simply means "In the beginning the Reality was not" (sat na agre āsit).

Here the particle 'a' in the word 'asat' does not mean any adjective implying negation. It is only a negative conjunction. So, 'asat' is not 'na sat' but it is 'sat na'.

The opponents have sometimes raised another objection. They have earlier argued that the definition does not apply to the pot which the Advaitin refers as false.

Now they argue in another way. The definition may apply successfully to the case of the nacre appearing as silver which the opponent too regards as false. But it extends even to the relation of contact (samyoga) which, according to the opponent is not false and thus is too wide in this respect. That it applies to contact is clear from the following consideration :—

When two things come in contact, that contact obtains only between two definite parts, each of one thing, and some parts always remain on the other side of this contact. Contact thus never pervades each thing wholly, it is avyāpya vṛtti. This being the case, it may be said that the contact of 'A' in 'B' is both present and absent in 'B', present in some parts of 'B' and absent in other parts. As such, then, the contact is to be regarded as false, according to the Advaitin.

To this, however, the Advaita reply is twofold. First, contact is not really avyāpyavṛtti. Why should we say that the contact of 'A' is in 'B', ? We should rather say that the contact of particular parts of A is in some particular parts of B. The contact is in other words not qualified by simple 'A' and 'B'. When the contact is understood in this way, there is no more any question of avyāpyavṛtti, and hence the opponent's objection falls to the ground.

Even supposing the contact is avyāpyavṛtti, the Advaitin has another reply. He would say that the contact is ultimately false, like everything else in the world. The avyāpyavṛtti contact of 'A' is phenomenally present in 'B', but is also transcendentally absent in that very locus.

The definition under consideration is : the false is that entity which has both presence (bhāva) and eternal absence (atyantābhāva) in the same locus. We have shown how this definition can stand all objections. But we must bear in mind that such compatibility of presence and absence (of the same entity in the same locus) is intelligible if only they belong to different grades of reality. The absence belongs to a grade higher than the one to which the presence belongs. The author of Vedāntaparibhāṣā says, the presence here is of a supposed (abhimata) entity and is therefore itself supposed ; but the absence is a fact from at least the vyavahārika point of view. These points were elaborated in connection with our discussion of the second definition of falsity and so need not be repeated here.

CHAPTER FIVE

The Fifth Definition of Falsity

(The view of Ānandabodha considered)

Here we shall discuss the view of Ānandabodha, a famous Advaitin, with regard to falsity. This is the fifth definition of Falsity.

The author of Pañcapādikā regarded the asattā of merely nominal entities like 'hare's horn' as a category. The Advaitins themselves have no faith in this. They considered it at all only because their opponents, the Mādhvas, believe in such a category. Their terminology was used merely to refute their views. Ānandabodha proposed to define falsity without even recognizing this category. In his celebrated work Pramānamālā he defined falsity as 'being other than reality' (Sadviviktatvam vā mithyātvam).

Brahman is the only reality in the philosophy of Advaita. The world is false as it is other than Brahman. This is established by the following inference :

The world under dispute is false as it is an object (dṛṣya).

Whatever is an object is false, as the silver superimposed on nacre is.

It may be argued that it is already established that the world is different from Brahman. So, unnecessary complication will arise when we try to prove this with the help of an inference. Actually speaking there will arise a fallacy which is technically known as 'proving the proved' (siddha-sādhana).

But the novelty in the present case is that the word 'sat' or reality in the definition is understood in a special sense. It means the object of knowledge that arises through a valid source.

But is the definition, so understood, free from all defects ? The opponent urges that it is too narrow. The world, which, according to the Advaitin is known through perception, a valid source of knowledge, cannot be covered by the definition. If the definition is right the Advaitin will have to take the world as real as Brahman.

But in order to avoid this difficulty the Advaitin desires that by the expression 'valid source of knowledge' (pramāṇa), we are to understand not merely the immediate and unconditional cause (kāraṇa) of knowledge, but one which is without any defect (doṣājanya). Reality, then, is, according to the Advaitin, the object of knowledge known by such a pramāṇa.

The opponent may, however, argue that though the knowledge of the silver superimposed on nacre is due to the defects of similarity and the like, there is no such defect when the world is cognized. So, the world being an object of knowledge due to no defect has to be taken as real and not false as the Advaitin claims.

But this may be answered in the following way:

There is a defect here too, and it is fundamental. Nescience (avidyā) constitutes the stuff of antaḥkaraṇa and therefore, also of any knowledge-of-an-object, which is a vṛtti of this antaḥkaraṇa. Such knowledge and the mescience are not, therefore, different from one another. Now, Advaita regards the nescience as the ground defect everywhere. So, the cognition of the world which arises due to the modification of the intellect is definitely due to a defect.

A subtler objection may again be raised. Is not the knowledge of Brahman also, arising out of hearing Śruti texts, due to defect, as it too is a vṛtti of antaḥkarana? But this means that even Brahman is false.

To avoid this difficulty, the Advaitin further specifies his position. The final cognition of Brahman as the partless modification of antaḥkaraṇa has, no doubt, avidyā as its stuff, but this avidyā is not the efficient cause of this cognition. And if the efficient cause of a cognition be a defect the cognition can be truly said to be defective. This is not the case with the cognition of Brahman. So, there is no difficulty here. The cognition of the world, on the other hand, has avidyā as both its stuff and the efficient cause, and is hence defective and therefore, the world is definitely false. Brahman is cognized through hearing Vedānta texts and has an object that is never sublated. This is why this cognition is valid and uncontradicted. The cognition of the world, on the other hand, is false as its object is sublated. Every false knowledge is due to a defect. So, it must be admitted that the knowldege of the world is due to avidyā, a defect. The false, therefore, is that which is an object of knowledge arising out of a defective source.

In course of the elaboration of this definition, Ānandabodhācārya says that truth is what is non-contradicted and falsity is what is sublated. Here it should be mentioned that what is non-contradicted is also established by means of a valid source of knowledge which has no defect. So, there is no inconsistency in the interpretation of this definition of falsity.

It may be objected that even 'hare's horn' is to be convered by this definition of falsity, as it too is no object of cognition that arises through a valid source of knowledge. Moreover, Brahman also will have to be regarded as false as there are some Advaitins who think that it cannot be known through vṛtti.

But the Advaitins, in reply, propose to take the definition in a still modified manner. They hold that the false is that which is perceived and yet at the same time other than the object of valid knowledge. "Hare's horn" cannot be perceived at all, as there is no possibility of its presentation. So, it cannot be false also. Those, again, who say that Brahman is no object of knowledge must also admit that Brahman cannot be perceived. The definition, therefore, does not apply to Brahman.

The opponents, the Mādhvas, have raised three further objections. But the Advaitin has replied to all the three. The objections and the replies are as follows :

(a) Does "reality" mean a universal—sattājāti (the universal existence)—as the Naiyāyika holds ? The Naiyāyika believes that as existence is immediately felt as the identical property common to all entities perceived as existent, it must be a universal (jāti), and like all universals, inheres in those entities. "An entity is real" means that the universal existence inheres in it. If this also be what the Advaitins mean by the word "reality" there will arise a difficulty. Brahman, according to them, is real and hence would possess the universal existence inherent in it. But Brahman, again, in their own admission, is without any feature and cannot, therefore, possess this universal existence. Or, in the alternative, Brahman is to possess, a false feature, viz. this universal.

But the Advaitins reply that by the word "reality" they never mean the universal existence. They have definite objections against this Nyāya notion. If an entity can be said to exist only as possessing the universal existence inherent in it, then this very universal is to exist for that reason, which is absurd because (i) then there would be indefinite regress and also because (ii) Nyāya never admits that a universal can possess, inherent in it, another universal.

(b) What does then the word "reality" mean ? Does it mean non-contradictedness (non-sublation) ? But, then, what was the use of so much discussion in connection with this definition of falsity ? It would have been enough if the Advaitin had merely said that the false is that which is sublated. Needless complications might, then, have been avoided.

The Advaitins reply that this too they do not mean.

(c) But then, do they absolutely equate Brahman with the real, and hold that "reality" is only another name for "to be Brahman"? If so, falsity would mean "not to be Brahman." In that case would the falsity of the world be any serious doctrine at all ? That the world is other than Brahman nobody would grudge. All the paraphernalia of logic to prove the falsity of the world would come to establish only the trite "The world is not Brahman." This is the fallacy of Siddha-sādhana.

The Advaitins reply that they do not mean even this. It is true that the real and Brahman ultimately come to be equated. But certainly the word "real" does not mean Brahman immediately. It means, "alternating with other things," what is purported in the fifth definition of Ānandabodha.[1]

---

[1]Falsity has been defined by different Advaita thinkers in different ways. In Advaita literature we get five different definitions of falsity. All of them are alternatively true. Here we are discussing the definition of Ānandabodha which is generally regarded as the fifth definition of falsity. Ānandabodha and Padmapāda identify reality with non-temporality or eternality. To them what is non-temporal is real. Prakāśātman means by reality "that which is never

The opponents may also raise another objection against this definition. If the false is what appears as real but is different from it, the definition tries to prove what is already accepted partially. It is already accepted by all that the world at least appears as real and hence this need not be proved again.

But here the Advaitins will reply that the definition should be considered as a whole. Any part of it should not be separated from the context as in that case it loses its significance. Therefore no objection can be legitimately raised against any part of a definition in isolation from the whole context. So the aforesaid charge deserves no consideration at all. This part was inserted only because had it been dropped merely nominal entities like "hare's horn" would have also to be regarded as false, for they are other than reality though they do not appear.

The Mādhvas may, again, say that the silver superimposed on nacre can never be an example of falsity as it is entirely asat in their philosophy. The advaitins retort that the silver superimposed on nacre cannot be entirely asat as it appears and the asat cannot appear at all.

Thus all the charges against the definition of Ānandabodha fall to the ground. Therefore this definition of falsity is valid.

---

an object of absolute negation in the same locus where it appears." This implies that reality is non-contradicted or eternally non-sublated. Prakāśātman also gives us another definition of reality. This is the reality is that which never ceases with knowledge. Citsukhācārya defines reality in the same line as that of Prakāśātman. To him the real is that the locus of which can never be the locus of its negation. He adds that the real can never be negated at all. So "the real" may imply any one of these things.

CHAPTER SIX

Falsity of Falsity.

The Advaitin considers the world as false. The opponent now makes him face a dilemma which appears to shake the very foundation of Advaita. Is this falsity itself false or not ? If the first alternative be allowed, it would mean that the world the falsity of which is itself false is rather confirmed as true. If then, the Advaitin proves the falsity of the world, bearing all the while in the mind that this falsity is nevertheless false, he is in effect proving the very reality of the world which the opponent has already accepted. The advaitin is thus only proving the proved. There is a further difficulty for him. Śruti, according to him, speaks only the truth. But if the world is real, the śruti texts relating to the non-dualism of reality will have to be taken as lies.

If, again, the falsity of the world is not sublated, this falsity at least is real, and it would be an easy step from this to the reality of the world. For, first, this falsity is itself a phenomenon of the world, and if even one item of the world is real, the Advaitin cannot hold that the entire world is false. Secondly, this falsity is an objective appearance (dṛśya) so that we can infer from its reality the reality of the world which also is an objective appearance. If falsity be real because it is dṛśya even so the world also should be real because it is dṛśya. The alternative that falsity is not false would also entail that the famous inductive premise of Advaita, viz., that whatever is dṛśya is false comes to be contradicted. For falsity itself is dṛśya and yet not itself false. Thus whichever alternative is accepted, Advaita loses its ground.

If falsity is sublated, the world becomes real. So, Brahman and the world have to be taken as two real principles. Again if falsity is not sublated, it is real. This means not merely that falsity is a second real principle side by side with Brahman, but that even the world stands as real side by side with Brahman. In any case it appears impossible to stick to the Advaita position.

The Advaitins reply that to them falsity is false, and that yet there are none of the difficulties mentioned. The difficulties which are said to arise when falsity itself is regarded as *real* do not concern them. And the difficulties said to arise when falsity is negated as false can all be explained away.

The falsity of the falsity of the world have implied the reality of the world if only both the cases of falsity had not the same metaphysical status. The silver-character in the nacre and the eternal absence of that silver-character do not have the same metaphysical status and this is why the falsity of the silver-character implies the reality of its eternal absence, similarly the falsity of that eternal absence implies the reality of the silver-character. But in the case of the falsity of the falsity of the world, both cases of falsity have the

same metaphysical status—both are equally *appearance*. So, the negation of the negation of the world does not imply the affirmation of the world.

To explain the sameness or difference of metaphysical status. When the silver-character is denied of shell it is denied *qua* silver character, and this silver-character is not to be found (indeed it would be meaningless to seek it) in the "absence of silver-character." The relevant aspect (avacchedaka) in which the silver-character is denied of shell does not thus belong to the "absence of silver-character." But this rule does not obtain between the false world and the falsity of the false world. When the world is denied of Brahman it is not denied *qua* world. The relevant aspect (avacchedaka) in which it is denied is not its being the world, but its just being an "appearance" (dṛśya). But, now, when even this false world is denied (false) the relevant aspect in which this second denial is made (or the aspect in which the false world is again false) is verily the same fact as this second falsity also is an "appearance" (dṛśya). From the first case of silver-character and its absence we can have the general proposition that the denial of x-character implies the truth of its contrary *if only* the relevant aspect in which the x-character is denied is not found in the contrary (and in all such cases the two terms are x and not-x, *i.e.*, *contradicting* each other, not merely *contrary*; or they are subsumable under a relation of contradiction). The world and the falsity of the world do not, however, come under this general proposition. Hence the denial of the falsity of the world does not posit the truth of the world.

We may offer another analogy to clarify the issue. Cowness and horseness are not two contradictory characters. So if we deny cowness of the elephant we do not necessarily affirm horseness of it. When cowness is denied of the elephant it is denied not *qua* cowness, but as a property subsumable under "not-elephantness." Now horseness is equally a property subsumable under "not-elephantness." This is why the denial of cowness of the elephant does not imply affirmation of horseness of it. Similarly with the denial of the falsity of the world, the aspect of dṛśyatva in which alone it is denied is present in the world also.

One might even simplify the case and argue that of two contrary, as opposed to *contradictory*, characters, the denial of one does not necessarily entail affirmation of the other. Reality and falsity, now, are not two contradictory characters, they are only contrary. Reality is that which is eternally non-contradicted and the false is that which appears before sublation. The contradictory of reality would include not merely this but also what is contradicted without ever appearing at all, viz., the *asat*, e.g., the son of a barren woman. If there were only two categories, viz., reality and falsity, the denial of falsity would have entailed affirmation of reality. But there is a third category also, viz., asat. Hence the denial of falsity might entail affirmation of asat also.

Here it may be argued by the opponent that in the second definition of falsity,[1] the Advaitins themselves have admitted reality as the contradictory of falsity, which means that reality and falsity are indeed contradictory. Again, if they are not contradictory and are related in the same way as cowness and horseness are, we cannot understand how the Advaitins could at all speak of the falsity of the world. The world, to say the least, *appears* as real. How can it be called false at the same time ? Cowness and horseness cannot both be present in the elephant. So reality and unreality also cannot both be found in the same world.

To the first objection, it may be urged that reality and falsity do not belong to the same order of reality. Reality is transcendental (Pāramārthika) where as falsity is only phenomenal (Vyāvahārika). So their contradiction does not imply the force of contradiction of two things belonging to the same order of reality. In the case of a contradiction of two things of the same order of reality the falsity of one will imply the reality of the other. But in this case where two things belong to different categories the falsity of one does not necessarily imply the reality of the other. So the falsity of the falsity of the world cannot imply its reality.

To the second objection the Advaitin will reply as follows: When the Advaitins call the world real and again false, they do not make the statements from the same standpoint. From one standpoint the world is real and from another standpoint, it is false. When we say that the world is real, the reality is apparent (Prātibhāsika) and not empirical (Vyāvahārika).

If it were empirical, there would have been a contradiction to think both empirical reality and empirical unreality of the same world. It may be said by the opponent that there is no harm if the reality of the world be understood as transcendental (Pāramārthika). But then we should reply that in the absence of the empirical order of reality the world cannot have transcendental reality also. When we have said that the world has no empirical reality what we have meant is that it is not uncontradicted even in our experience. So, the attribute 'eternal non-contradiction' cannot be applied to the reality of the world. Therefore it cannot be transcendentally real, as eternal reality implies eternal non-contradiction. So the world which has empirical falsity may very well have apparent reality.

Here the opponent may raise an objection as follows :—If from a certain standpoint the reality of the world has to be admitted, there would remain no distinction between empirical truth and empirical falsity. If the world as apparent be real from the standpoint of appearance, equally so would be the case with silver appearing in the locus of nacre.

---

[1]Prakāśātman defines the false as that which is an object of eternal negation in the locus where it appears (Pratipanno-pādhau traikālika-niṣedha-pratiyogitvam). This is known as the second defination of falsity.

Moreover, if the empirical world has only apparent reality, the Śruti text 'Truth and error equally come out of the Truth' (Satyam cānṛtam ca satyamabhavat) canot be explained satisfactority. The term 'error' in this text would become redundant. The text means that Brahman being covered by Māyā (nescience) was transformed into the empirical world and apparent silver which is found in the case of silver-nacre illusion. Now if the Advaitins accept the apparent reality of the world, we shall have to say that Brahman was transformed into the world and the silver which both have apparent reality or truth. The apparent reality is present both in the *world and in the silver preceived in the* locus of nacre. Now, if we think that both of them should be understood as true, then nothing as error is found which may be regarded as the manifestation of Brahman. As both the world and the silver are apparently real, nothing remains as false. In order to avoid this difficulty, the Advaitins have to admit, —so argue the opponents—the transcendental (Pāramārthika) reality of the world. The world is neither apparently real (Pratibhāsika), because then the distinction between truth and falsity would be *ablolished, nor*, empirically real (Vyāvahārika) because the falsity of the world has already been granted (by the Advaitin) empirical reality. The Advaitin would thus be forced to acknowledge transcedental (Pāramārthika) reality of the world.

The Advaitins, however, in reply, will say that this cannot be. If the falsity of the world be empirical, the world can have no transcedental reality. When we say that the falsity of the world is empirical, we have to admit that the world is not empirically real. Now, the world cannot be empirically real in the sense that it is not uncontradicted in empirical experience. What is not uncontradicted even in empirical experinece cannot be eternally uncontradicted and what is not eternally uncontradicted cannot also be transcendentally real. Therefore the world can never be eternally real. The first term 'truth' in Śruti text above implies the world which has pragmatic value, and the second term 'error' stands for the silver of the nacre-silver illusion, which has no pragmatic worth whatsoever. If we understand the terms 'truth' and 'error' in this way, then the term 'error' does not turn-out superfluous. The empirical falsity and the apparent reality are already admitted in the silver of nacre-silver illusion. From this standpoint, the world is admitted to have empirical falsity and apparent reality. As the ignorance of the falsity of the silver appearing in nacre implies the apparent reality of the silver, so in the same way the ignorance of the falsity of the *world suggests the apprarent reality of the world.* The valid knowledge of the falsity of the world removes the ignorance about the falsity of the world and the empirical reality which follows from ignorance. In this case, the reality of the world is negated by the valid knowledge of the falsity of the same. This means that the reality of the world is sublated by some other knowledge than the cognition of Brahman. So, the reality of the world is definitely apparent. If it were empirical, it would have been negated only by the knowledge of Brahman. As the reality of the world is apparent, so the belief of the Advaitins in only one ultimate reality remains unshaken.

The above is not indeed accepted by all Advaitins. There are good many Advaitins who hold that (1) the world is sublated only by the final knowledge of Brahman and (2) the knowledge of the falsity of the world can do nothing but expose the knowledge of the truth of the world as invalid. To all such Advaitins-the world has obviously empirical (Vyāvahārika) reality.

This view of other Advaitins need not be challenged. Even if this is admitted the Non-Advaitin opponents will gain nothing. In this case the falsity and the reality of the world would come to have the same empirical reality. But even then it is ovbious that they are not transcendental (Pāramārthika) realities. In any case the Advaita position that the eternal reality is one without a second, does not suffer at all.

Here it may be objected that empirical reality and empirical falsity are two contradictory concepts and so both of them cannot be true of the same thing at the same time. From this it would follow, the opponent might urge, that the world cannot be both empirically real and empirically false.

The Advaitins reply that this is not impossilbe. They point to a similar paradoxical case in Nyāyā. The Naiyāyikas believe that Conjunction (Saṁyoga)* and its eternal absence are not contradictory. This means that a particular conjunction and its absolute negation may exist in the same thing. Now, if this is not impossible, why should we think that empirical reality and falsity cannot be there in the same world?.

Inference and verbal testimony can again speak for such a possibility. The Śruti text 'there is no manyness' (neha nānāsti Kiñcana) implies that the world and its falsity are equally false. This may also be shown with the help of an inference. In Advaita philosophy 'to be an appearance' (dṛṣyatva) is regarded as a mark of falsity. Now the world and its falsity are equally appearance (dṛṣya), so they are false for the same reason.

Now the question is—In the case of silver superinposed on nacre, the silver and its falsity have not the same grade of reality, the silver being apparent (Prātibhāsika) and its falsity being empirical (Vyāvahārika), why, then, in the case of the world should the rality and falsity be of the same empirical grade?

The Advaitins support their stand in the following way:

When the knowledge of a particular thing negates another, they must be of the different grades of reality. But they may be of the same grade of reality

*Conjunction is a temporary relation between two things which can easily exist independently of and separately from one another. The relation between a man and his pen with which he writes is an instance of conjuction. The Naiyāyikas admit that conjunction and its absence may be had in the same thing. "A monkey, for example, can be both posited and negated in the same tree through the same conjuction at the same time—it happened to be present in the top but absent at the foot of the tree: (Dr. A. K. Roy Choudhury, Self and Falsity in Advaita Vedānta p. 166).

For a fuller discussion of the point 'Siddhāntamuktāvalī' may be consulted.

if the Śruti be in favour of it. Now the Śruti text 'neha nānā asti kiñcana' proves that both the world and its negtion are false as they are appearance dṛṣya). So, the reality and the falsity of the world may very well be of the same grade of reality.

Dṛṣyatva is found to be the common factor in both the reality an the falsity of the world. As both of them are equally sublated by the cognition of Brahman, so they are negated by the same Cognition and those which are negated by the same knowledge are of the same order of existence. Some times the nacre is perceived as silver due to the ignorance of the actual nature of the nacre and the perceived silver appears as different from the nacre also. Now when the nature of the nacre is known, the silver and its perceived difference from nacre are equally destroyed. As the silver and its perceived difference from nacre are sublated by the same knowledge of nacre, so they are of the same order of existence.

Udayanācārya contends in his 'Ātmatáttva viveka' that reality and falsity cannot be true of the same locus as they are contradictory and the absence of reality and falsity cannot, on the same account, be understood in the same thing.

This objection does not hit the target as the Advaitins do not admit reality and falsity as contradictory. The contradictory of reality is asat which cannot appear at all. But the false appears and so it is other than asat and this again implies that the false is not the contrdictory of reality.

The world and it falsity are of the same order of reality as both of them are negated by the knowdelge of Brahman. So it is clear that the world, its reality and also its falsity are negeted with the realisation of Brahman. Therefore, the falsity of the falsity of the world does not posit the reality of the world, and the non-duality of reality remains intact.

INDEX

F

G

H

I

J

K

L

M

N

Errata

Page	Line	Read	In place of
2	17	Mathematical	Metehmatical
3	17	atoms	atons
3	32	doctrine	dctrine
3	10	Monad of monads	Monads of monads
5	25	Sāṁkhists	Sāmkhysts
8	19	mere	more
8	19	entailment	entertainment
13	39	is not 'parādhīna-prakāśa'	is not of 'parādhīna prakāśa'
15	5	body	bdy
15	7	Viśeṣya	Viśṣya
15	10	he made a clear confession	he made such a clear confession
15	37	We have held	We have hold
22	31	Quoted by Śaṁkara	Quoted by Śomkara
24	14	fall to the ground	falls to the ground
25	8	its significance	it significance
25	14	Cause is necessary	Cause in necessary
25	14	only for a particular form of the staff.	only in order to get particular form of the staff.
25	18-19	Form is immaterial	From is immamaterial
27	4	not the reality, so,	not the reality, o,
31	19	Knownness	Knowness
35	42	nature	natuer
38	42	supervenes	supervences
41	41	Vivaraṇopanyāsa	Vivarnopanyāssa
42	25	In the Thirteenth Century	In the Thirteenth Centyry
43	22	At this time	At the time
43	28	name of Maṇḍana Miśra	name of Maṇḍana Mira
43	38	Journal of Royal Asiatic Society	Journal Royal Asiatic Society

Page	Lines	Read	In place of
46	18	grand logician	grant logician
46	22	Mādhva	Mādhava
46	27	Madhusūdana Saraswatī's	Madhusudana's Saraswati's
47	14	This Means that which	This means that what
47	26	With that of Prakāśātman	With that the of Prakāśātman
47	29	as a Category	as a Catoegry
49	11	False	Flase
49	26	question	queston
51	43	is real for	is real fo
55	5	falsity	falsty
61	20	empirical	impirical
61	24	silver	eilver
62	2	nacre-silver-illusion	nacre-silver-illisnon
62	39	Artha Kriyā Kāritva	Artha Kryā Kāritva
66	32	identical	idntical
68	1	there	three
68	39	always	alwaya
79	31	could imply	have implid
83	28	superimposed	suprinposed
84	5	and the falsity	an the falsity
